Smith v. International Shoe Co.
| Decision Date | 03 May 1932 |
| Docket Number | 21933 |
| Citation | 49 S.W.2d 233 |
| Parties | SMITH v. INTERNATIONAL SHOE CO. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Marion County; Chas. T. Hays, Judge.
“ Not to be officially published.”
Proceeding under the Workmen’s Compensation Act by Vaughn Smith, employee, opposed by the International Shoe Company, employer and self-insurer. From a judgment affirming award of full commission, employee appeals.
Affirmed.
Roy Hamlin and Ben Ely, Jr., both of Hannibal, for appellant.
Mahan Mahan & Fuller, of Hannibal, for respondent.
This is a proceeding under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (sections 3299-3376, R. S. 1929), which reaches this court on the employee’s appeal from the judgment of the circuit court of Marion county, affirming a final award of the commission. Vaughn Smith is the employee, and the International Shoe Company, a corporation, is the employer and self-insurer.
The employee, on March 28, 1928, was concededly injured by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, when one end of a pipe or bar with which he was feeding sheet rubber into a roller mill caught in some manner between the rollers, and caused the other end to strike violently against the left side of his face and jaw.
At some time shortly following the accident, the employer recognized its liability for the payment of compensation under the act; and by the time of the first hearing on the claim had paid the employee a total sum of $724.51, computed at the rate of $16 a week for a period of 45 2/7 weeks over which such payments had been made.
On April 27, 1929, the employee filed with the commission his formal claim for compensation, and on July 11, 1929, he filed an amended claim, alleging as permanent injuries that he was unable to move his head, and that he had severe pains in the back of his head, his neck, and shoulders. The claim of inability to move the head without turning the body is to be kept in mind throughout the case, for the connection between that condition or injury and the accident in question is the bone of contention between the parties in this proceeding.
On July 23, 1929, the employer filed its answer, denying that the condition complained of by the employee had resulted from injuries sustained in the accident.
Three separate hearings, the first on August 27, 1929, the second on September 4, 1929, and the third on September 25, 1929, were held before Referee Graff of the commission; and on December 23, 1929, he filed his award, allowing the employee compensation for temporary total disability at the rate of $16 a week for 45 2/7 weeks, and for temporary partial disability at the rate of $8 a week for 100 weeks, each of such payments to begin as of March 28, 1928, the date of the accident, and to be subject to a credit of $724.51 which had theretofore been paid the employee. In other words, the balance due the employee under such award was only the amount of compensation allowed for temporary partial disability.
On December 26, 1929, the employee filed his application for a review before the full commission, asking the right to be heard anew with a view to establishing the fact of a permanent disability.
On June 12, 1930, the full commission entered its final award, modifying the referee’s award of December 23, 1929, by finding that the employee had been fully paid for all temporary disability resulting from the accident, and that there was no permanent disability as a result thereof.
An appeal was thereupon perfected by the employee to the circuit court, where the award of the full commission was affirmed; and from such judgment, and at the judgment term, the employee has duly prosecuted his appeal to this court.
The points relied upon by the employee for a reversal fall within the scope and purview of the third and fourth grounds enumerated in the statute (section 3342, R. S. 1929), namely, that the facts found by the commission do not support the award, and that there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award.
The issue being one having to do solely with the nature and extent of the disability, if any, and its relation to or connection with the injuries sustained in the accident, a brief history of the case becomes of some importance.
The employee lives in the city of Hannibal, and was employed in the employer’s rubber heel and sole factory, which is located in that city. The manner in which the accident occurred has heretofore appeared. The employee was rendered unconscious by the force of the impact of the bar against his jaw, and was thrown backwards against a low railing which surrounded the platform on which he stood; his back and neck being caused to strike against the railing.
Immediately following the accdent, the employee was examined by Dr. Sultzman, the employer’s local physician at Hannibal, after which he returned to work, and continued steadily on the job for thirteen days, when he returned once more to Dr. Sultzman, complaining of pain in his neck, and stating that his neck was stiff. It was the employee’s contention that the soreness and stiffness had developed immediately after the accident, and had grown constantly worse.
The employee was sent by Dr. Sultzman to the Levering Hospital, an institution in the city of Hannibal, where he was given a general traction treatment for a period of nineteen or twenty days, in the course of which several X-ray pictures were taken. Thereafter he returned to work for a short while, but being unable, as he stated, to continue to work, he was sent by the employer to Barnes Hospital, in the city of St. Louis, for examination and treatment by Dr. Warren R. Rainey, the employer’s chief surgeon. He remained in Barnes Hospital from June 20, 1928, to June 30, 1928, under the care and observation of Dr. Rainey, and in the meanwhile X-ray pictures were taken by Dr. Edwin C. Ernst.
Upon his discharge from Barnes Hospital, he returned to his home in Hannibal, and again went to work, continuing on the job for about five weeks, when he was forced to quit on account of the pain, according to his testimony. This was the last work he did for the employer, though afterwards he undertook to solicit orders for a mail order house for a few days.
On November 8, 1928, he was sent back to Barnes Hospital, where he remained until ...
To continue reading
Request your trial