Smith v. John L. Roper Lumber Co.

• Decision Date: 11 March 1908
• Citation: 60 S.E. 717,147 N.C. 62
• Parties: SMITH v. JOHN L. ROPER LUMBER CO.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

60 S.E. 717

147 N.C. 62

SMITH v. JOHN L. ROPER LUMBER CO.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

March 11, 1908

Appeal from Superior Court, Craven County; Lyon, Judge.

Action by W. G. Smith against the John L. Roper Lumber Company. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

There was evidence on the part of plaintiff tending to show that plaintiff, an employé of the defendant company, was engaged in moving a heavy engine of the defendant company from their mills to the cars, and at the time of the injury was raising the engine by means of a jackscrew, when the engine fell catching plaintiff's arm between the engine and a brick wall near by, and crushing same so that amputation was necessary, and that the injury was caused by reason of a defective jackscrew negligently furnished by defendant company. The defendant claimed, and offered evidence tending to show, that there was no defect in the screw, and further that the injury was caused by fault of plaintiff in negligently kicking or jerking the screw from its proper placing. In support of defendant's position they introduced one Dr. Jones, who testified that he was called to attend plaintiff, and before treating plaintiff asked him how he had received the injury, and plaintiff replied that he was raising the engine with a jackscrew, and he kicked it or wrung it out, he could not tell which, causing the engine to roll back and crush his arm,] etc. Plaintiff in apt time objected to this testimony, but same was admitted, the court stating that it was admitted, not as a matter of discretion but as a matter of law, and plaintiff excepted. There was verdict for defendant, and plaintiff appealed, assigning for error the ruling of his honor in admitting the testimony of Dr. Jones.

The privilege is intended for the benefit of the patient alone and may be insisted on or waived by him, in his discretion subject to the limitations provided by the statute itself.

D. L. Ward and Simmons, Ward & Allen, for appellant.

W. W. Clark and Moore & Dunn, for appellee.

HOKE J.

At common law communications between patients and attending physicians were not regarded as privileged, and the matter has been very generally made the subject of statutory regulation. Our own statute, which substantially accords with the form more usually adopted in such legislation, provides as follows: Revisal 1905, § 1621: "No person, duly authorized to practice physic or surgery, shall be required to disclose any information which he may have acquired in attending a patient in a professional character, and which information was necessary to enable him to prescribe for such patient as a physician, or to do any act for him as a surgeon: Provided, that the presiding judge of a superior court may compel such disclosure, if in his opinion the same is necessary to a proper administration of justice." It is the accepted construction of this statute that it extends not only to information orally communicated by the patient, but to knowledge obtained by the physician or surgeon through his own observation or examination while attending the patient in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable him to prescribe. Gartside v. Insurance Co., 76 Mo. 446, 42 Am. Rep. 765; Dilleber v. Insurance Co., 69 N.Y. 256, 25 Am. Rep. 182. And it is further held, uniformly, so far as we have examined, that the privilege established is for the benefit of the patient alone, and that same may be insisted on or waived by him in...