Smith v. Lanier

• Decision Date: 29 July 1999
• Citation: 998 S.W.2d 324
• Parties: (Tex.App.-Austin 1999) Carol Ann Reid Smith, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Theodore R. Reid, Appellant v. Sidney E. Lanier, Independent Executor of the Estate of Wylma E. Reid, Appellee NO. 03-98-00684-CV
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 324

998 S.W.2d 324 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999)

Carol Ann Reid Smith, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Theodore R. Reid, Appellant v. Sidney E. Lanier, Independent Executor of the Estate of Wylma E. Reid, Appellee

NO. 03-98-00684-CV

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

July 29, 1999

Rehearing Overruled Sept. 10, 1999.

FROM THE PROBATE COURT NO. 1 OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. 70,273-A HONORABLE GUY HERMAN, JUDGE PRESIDING.

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Before Justices Jones, Kidd and Patterson.

Mack Kidd, Justice

Appellant Carol Ann Reid Smith, individually and as representative of the estate of her deceased father, Theodore Reid, brings this interlocutory appeal of the probate court's denial of her special appearances and of its injunctive order compelling her to return half of her father's assets from South Carolina and deposit them in the registry of the probate court. Smith presents this Court with four issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Smith in her representative capacity; (2) whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Smith in her individual capacity; (3) whether the probate court abused its discretion in refusing to defer its subject-matter jurisdiction in favor of the South Carolina probate court; and (4) whether the probate court abused its discretion in issuing the temporary injunction. We will affirm.

BACKGROUND

This cause presents us with the complex problem of competing states' probate jurisdiction over an elderly couple's property. The couple, both in their nineties, died in quick succession; the husband died in South Carolina a mere fifty-two days after his wife died in Texas. Each left their entire estate to a different beneficiary. The husband's will was admitted for probate in South Carolina before the Texas probate court had characterized the couple's property and settled the wife's estate. The matter is further complicated by the fact that Texas is a community property state, where property owned by a married couple is presumed to be part of the community unless it meets certain specific criteria,¹ whereas South Carolina is a common-law state, where property titled in a person's name passes through that person's estate.

Theodore and Wylma Reid married after retirement age and remained married for more than twenty-five years. The two resided in Texas throughout their marriage and owned property valued at more than $2,500,000. Carol Ann Reid Smith, Mr. Reid's only child from a previous marriage, lived in South Carolina during the Reids' marriage. In February 1998, Smith came to Texas to help move Mr. and Mrs. Reid into a retirement home in Austin. During this visit, she attended a meeting with her father and his attorney. At the meeting, she accepted her father's power of attorney and aided in the drafting of his will, which left Smith all of Mr. Reid's property and named Smith as the personal representative of his estate.

Wylma Reid died on June 28, 1998. An application to probate Mrs. Reid's will was filed on July 9, 1998, and her will was admitted for probate in a Travis County probate court on July 29. The will specified that Texas law controlled its disposition. Mrs. Reid left all of her property to the Texas Baptist Children's Home.² She named as her independent executor appellee Sidney Lanier. Smith returned to Austin from South Carolina for Mrs. Reid's funeral. While in Austin, Smith began using her father's power of attorney to gather her father's assets. During this investigation into her father's financial affairs, she discovered a number of valuable securities held in a safe-deposit box. Smith went home to South Carolina, but returned two weeks later to move her father to South Carolina and to collect Mr. Reid's assets and transfer them to South Carolina. Over the next weeks, using her father's power of attorney, Smith: took all of Mr. Reid's financial records to South Carolina; removed the securities from the safe-deposit box and closed the account; transferred the securities to a Merrill Lynch account in South Carolina; stored the Reids' automobile in Niederwald, Texas; withdrew $42,000 from the Reids' account at Bank One in Austin and deposited it into two accounts in South Carolina; and established her power of attorney over Mr. Reid's American Express mutual fund account.

Mr. Reid died on August 7, 1998, nineteen days after Smith moved him to South Carolina and placed him in a retirement home. He was ninety-six years old. On September 4, 1998, Mr. Reid's will was admitted for probate in South Carolina, and Smith was named the personal representative of her father's estate. Smith submitted an inventory of Mr. Reid's assets, valued at more than $2,000,000, to the South Carolina probate court pursuant to South Carolina law.³ In the inventory, Smith claimed that Mr. Reid solely owned all of the property that she had transferred to South Carolina from Texas, including the securities from the safe-deposit box. The only interest in the property of Mrs. Reid reflected on the inventory was a half interest in an automobile valued at $4000.

Meanwhile, Lanier initiated proceedings in Texas to halt the probate process in South Carolina in order to protect the beneficiary of Mrs. Reid's estate. He filed a declaratory judgment action in Travis County requesting that the Texas court determine the characterization, whether community or separate property, of the Reids' assets at the time of Mrs. Reid's death. Lanier also requested and received a temporary restraining order freezing one-half of the assets owned by the Reids and enjoining Smith from any further activity involving this half of the property. At a subsequent temporary injunction hearing, Smith filed a special appearance in her capacities as both an individual and as representative of Mr. Reid's estate objecting to the Texas probate court's personal and subject-matter jurisdiction. The probate court, however, found the necessary jurisdiction and issued the injunction.⁴ The injunction required Smith to return half of the assets she had previously transferred to South Carolina and to deposit them into the registry of the Texas probate court until such time as a characterization of the assets could be made. Smith appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a defendant challenges a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction through a special appearance, she carries the burden of negating all bases of personal jurisdiction. See Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. Middleton, 699 S.W.2d 199, 203 (Tex. 1985); Siskind v. Villa Found. for Educ., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Tex. 1982); Nikolai v. Strate, 922 S.W.2d 229, 236 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied). When a trial court overrules a special appearance, the defendant should request the court to make findings of fact according to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 296. Runnells v. Firestone, 746 S.W.2d 845, 849 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied). Absent such findings, we view the trial court's judgment as impliedly finding all the necessary facts to support its judgment. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990). In the instant cause, appellants have made no request for findings of fact and conclusions of law from the trial court, and none were filed. We therefore presume that the trial court made all necessary findings to support its judgment. See Garner v. Furmanite Australia PTY., Ltd., 966 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, writ denied). Where a complete statement of facts appears in the record, however, these implied findings are not conclusive and an appellant may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Roberson v. Robinson, 768 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex. 1989). Where such points are raised, the standard of review to be applied is the same as that to be applied in the review of jury findings or a trial court's findings of fact. Id.

When in personam jurisdiction is challenged, we review all the evidence. See Nikolai, 922 S.W.2d at 236; Hotel Partners v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 847 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied). We apply a factual sufficiency standard in reviewing the evidence, not a de novo review.⁵ See Nikolai, 922 S.W.2d at 236; Hotel Partners, 847 S.W.2d at 632; NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 812 S.W.2d 441, 443-44 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ). Thus, we may reverse the decision of the trial court only if its ruling is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly erroneous or unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); In re King's Estate, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (Tex. 1951).

DISCUSSION

Personal Jurisdiction over Smith as Representative of the Estate

Smith's first issue contends the probate court erred in asserting personal jurisdiction over her as a representative of Mr. Reid's estate. She argues that she is a South Carolina resident, the disputed property is similarly located in South Carolina, and that Texas cannot obtain long-arm jurisdiction over her or the estate. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 17.041-.045 (West 1997); see also Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 356 (Tex. 1990) (Two components required for assertion of personal jurisdiction: (1) authorized by Texas long-arm statute; and (2) consistent with federal and state constitutional guarantees of due process). Although Smith challenges in this issue the Texas probate court's in personam jurisdiction, we will begin our analysis with an examination of in rem jurisdiction, and of the authority of the Travis County probate court upon Lanier's filing of the application for probate.⁶

Statutory probate courts have jurisdiction over all matters relating to the settlement, partition, and distribution of estates of deceased persons. See Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 5A(b) (West Supp. 1999). Moreover, a...