Smith v. Long

• Decision Date: 17 March 1955
• Docket Number: No. 8189,8189
• Citation: 76 Idaho 265,281 P.2d 483
• Parties: Marion SMITH and Amel Smith, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. E. W. LONG and Grace Long, husband and wife, Robert I. Long, a single man; John E. Long and Phyllis Long, husband and wife, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 483

281 P.2d 483

76 Idaho 265

Marion SMITH and Amel Smith, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. E. W. LONG and Grace Long, husband and wife, Robert I. Long, a single man; John E. Long and Phyllis Long, husband and wife, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 8189.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

March 17, 1955.

Donart & Donart, Weiser, for appellants.

Ryan & Ryan, Weiser, Dunlap & Dunlap, Caldwell, for respondents.

TAYLOR, Chief Justice.

In a previous action between these same parties, each seeking to quiet title to the same land involved in this action, the court found and decreed that neither party had established title. Referring to the claim of the defendants (respondents here) in the previous action, the court found:

'That every since the 1st day of May, 1947, defendants and cross-complainants have been and now are in the sole and exclusive quiet, peaceful, open and notorious possession and occupancy of said real property' and 'have paid all taxes which have been levied and assessed against said real property.'

'* * * that none of the parties to this action, or their predecessors in interest, protected said lands by substantial enclosure or cultivation and improved the same until the 1st day of May, 1947; * * *'

The defendants in that action appealed, and this court affirmed the decree. Smith v. Long, 73 Idaho 309, 251 P.2d 206. In the former action defendants made two claims to the land; one by adverse possession, and the other by accretion. The court found that no part of the land was the result of accretion. Even if it were, their right to it as such would in turn depend upon their right by adverse possession to the adjacent land to which the accretion was claimed to have attached. Adverse possession was, therefore, the foundation of defendants' claim, and it was necessary for them to prove that such possession continued over a period of five years. §§ 5-207 and 5-210 I.C. Such possession was put in issue by the pleadings and was actually litigated and determined as indicated by the findings above quoted. It was, therefore, conclusively settled as to the parties and their privies that defendants' adverse possession commenced May 1, 1947. Jensen v. Berry & Ball Co., 37 Idaho 394, 216 P. 1033; Marshall v. Underwood, 38 Idaho 464, 221 P. 1105; Giuffre v. Lauricella, 25 Cal.App. 422, 143 P. 1061; Bijou Irr. Dist. v. Weldon Valley Ditch Co., 67 Colo. 336, 184 P. 382; Dugan v. Wilms, 93 Okl. 89, 219 P. 651; Bowman v. Parks, 166 Iowa 403, 147 N.W. 850; Pontiac Mut. County Fire & Lightning Ins. Co. v. Sheibley, 279 Ill. 118, 116 N.E. 644; Linton v. Omaha Wholesale Produce Market House Co., 8 Cir., 218 F. 331; United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 45 S.Ct. 66, 69 L.Ed. 262; 2 Freeman on Judgments (5th ed.) § 670.

The date of the commencement of this action does not regularly appear from the record, the clerk having omitted from the transcript the date of the filing of the complaint. However, it was acknowledged March 29, 1952, and defendants' demurrer was filed April 16, 1952, and in a written stipulation between counsel the filing date is referred to as the 1st day of April, 1952. Accepting this as the correct date, it follows that this action was commenced thirty days before the expiration of the five year period of adverse possession, which otherwise would have matured and perfected defendants' title. However complete and perfect defendants' title by adverse possession at the end of the five year period on May 1, 1952, may be as to others, as to the plaintiffs the period of adverse possession was interrupted by the filing of the complaint herein, and their rights as against the plaintiffs must be determined as of April 1, 1952. Westphal v. Arnoux, 51 Cal.App. 532, 197 P. 395.

Thus, the paramount question is the validity of the title now for the first time asserted by the plaintiffs in this action. In both actions the plaintiffs asserted title on the theory that the land in dispute lies between the government meander line of the Snake River and the high-water mark. They were defeated in the first action because the conveyances, under which they claimed title, described and were limited to specifically numbered lots in a subdivision known as the Sunnyside Orchard Tract. This subdivision, apparently created and recorded in 1909, was laid out, over and upon original government Lots 2, 3 and 4, in Section 17, Township 10 North, Range 5 West of the Boise Meridian, and other property. The lots created by the subdivision do not purport to extend beyond the water line of the east, or nearest, channel of the Snake River. Hence, it was held that under such conveyances, plaintiffs acquired no title to the land involved herein, which lies west of the east channel of the river and upon an island between the east channel and the main channel.

At the time of the creation of the Sunnyside Orchard Tract or subdivision, the Sunnyside Orchard Company, a corporation, was the owner of government Lots 2, 3 and 4, in Section 17. But the plat did not purport to cover and no sale had ever been made by that company of any land lying on the island beyond the east channel of the river.

In December, 1917, the charter of the Sunnyside Orchard Company was forfeited by the state. At that time its entire stock was owned by George M. Waterhouse, August Brockman and A. A. Record. Subsequently to the trial of the prior action, the plaintiffs obtained quitclaim deeds from all of the heirs of all three of the above-named stockholders (deceased). These deeds describe and purport to convey to the plaintiffs all of that portion of Lots 2, 3 and 4, in Section 17, lying between the west boundary line of the platted lots of the Sunnyside Orchard Tract and the high-water mark of the main channel of the Snake River. Founding their claim upon these deeds the plaintiffs commenced this action to quiet title to that part of the island, lying in Section 17, as a part of the original government Lot 4.

Upon dissolution of a corporation, the corporate property vests in its stockholders, subject to the liabilities of the corporation. Taylor v. Interstate Investment Co., 75 Wash. 490, 135 P. 240; Service & Wright Lbr. Co. v. Sumpter Valley Ry. Co., 81 Or. 32, 149 P. 531, 152 P. 262, 158 P. 175; Baldwin v. Johnson, 95 Tex. 85, 65 S.W. 171; Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 240 N.W. 392; Pontiac Trust Co. v. Newell, 266 Mich. 490, 254 N.W. 178; Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Van Winkle, 6 Cir., 221 F. 590; Late Corporation of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 792, 34 L.Ed. 478; 19 C.J.S., Corporations, § 1730b. The quitclaim deeds from the heirs of the stockholders, who died seized of the property of the Sunnyside Orchard Company, are effective to convey to the plaintiffs whatever title those stockholders and their heirs held in the land involved. Biaggi v. Ramont, 189 Cal. 675, 209 P. 892; Buller v. Buller, 62 Cal.App.2d 694, 145 P.2d 653; 26 C.J.S., Deeds, § 118. Cf. Crane v. French, 39 Cal.App.2d 642, 104 P.2d 53 (deed by former officers and directors).

The ultimate question then is, whether the respective owners in the chain of title to the original government Lot 4, in Section 17, held title to that portion of the island opposite that lot and across the minor or east channel of the river.

The general rules applicable here were stated in Johnson v. Hurst, 10 Idaho 308, at page 318, 77 P. 784, 788, as follows:

'It is conceded as the general rule of law that the meander line run in surveying public lands bordering upon a navigable river is not a line of boundary, but one designed merely to point out the sinuosity of the bank of the stream, and as a means only of ascertaining the quantity of land in the fraction that is to be paid for by the purchaser; and that the water course, and not the meander line as actually run on the land, becomes the true boundary line.' See authorities there cited.

And, after reviewing a number of cases, Justice Ailshie further said:

'In no case called to our attention, where the court has refused to allow the grantee's true boundary line to extend to the main stream or water line, has it appeared that the strip or tract of land claimed was within the section that contained the fractional lots patented; nor does it appear in any of those cases that the lands were returned as surveyed on all sides of the tract claimed. In other words, wherever it has appeared from the notes and official plats that all the lands within the legal subdivision as directed to be surveyed by the United States statutes has been returned as surveyed and the remainder of those subdivisions is shown to be the waters of a navigable stream, the courts have uniformly held that the grantee to lots or fractional subdivisions abutting on the meander line takes title to the stream.' Johnson v. Hurst, 10 Idaho 308, at page 323, 77 P. 784, 790.

In the Johnson-Hurst case, an exception was claimed to the general rule that where the quantity of land lying between the meander line and the water line, was equal to or greater than that contained in the original fraction or lot, then the rule is not applicable. This objection was overruled and in that case an area, between the meander line and the stream greater than that embraced within the original lots, was held to belong to the owner of such lots. In the case before us the dispute strip, being around sixteen acres, is less in quantity than the original Lot 4, containing 46 acres.

In Johnson v. Johnson, 14 Idaho 561, 95 P. 499, 502, 24 L.R.A.,N.S., 1240, the rules applied in Johnson v. Hurst, supra, were followed and applied to the effect that a 25 acre island, lying between the north and south channels on the Snake River, was held to be the property of the owner of the abutting lots on the north side of the river. The south channel was found to be the main channel. In the north channel there was a 'small neck of land extending...