Smith v. MacDougall
| Decision Date | 30 November 1983 |
| Docket Number | CA-CIV,No. 2,2 |
| Citation | 139 Ariz. 22,676 P.2d 656 |
| Parties | Gregory Michael SMITH, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Ellis MacDOUGALL, Director, State of Arizona Department of Corrections and The State of Arizona, Defendants/Appellees. 4805. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
This appeal was taken from the order of the superior court granting appellees' motion to dismiss the complaint. Although the court's order does not recite the reasons for granting the motion, the parties agree that the dismissal was based on the court's conclusion that the action was barred by the statute of limitations.
Appellant's original complaint was filed February 17, 1981, naming only the State Department of Corrections as a defendant. The complaint alleged that on May 10, 1980, appellant was beaten and sexually assaulted by other inmates while he was incarcerated at the Arizona Correctional Training Facility in Tucson, and sought to recover damages on the grounds of negligent supervision and failure to protect appellant. The complaint was dismissed without prejudice on June 17, 1982. A second complaint was filed October 4, 1982, naming as defendants the director of the Department of Corrections and the State of Arizona. The state filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint on the ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitations, and that appellant was under no legal disability which would prevent the statute from running. The motion was granted on January 14, 1983, and appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
Appellant concedes that the second complaint was filed more than two years after the alleged negligence occurred, but argues that the applicable statute of limitations was tolled under A.R.S. § 12-502 because appellant was imprisoned on the date the acts occurred and for a substantial period of time thereafter. Appellees argue that, despite the clear language of § 12-502, imprisonment is a disability which tolls the statute of limitations only when it deprives the individual of the legal capacity to sue. Appellee further argues that the effect of the enactment of A.R.S. § 13-904 was to restore to prisoners the right to bring a civil suit which had been previously denied to them under former A.R.S. § 13-1653, with the consequence that appellant was not under a disability within the meaning of § 12-502 at the time his cause of action accrued, and therefore the statute of limitations was not tolled.
In support of their argument that a disability must amount to a legal incapacity to sue before it can operate to toll the statute of limitations, appellees rely on Western Coal and Mining Company v. Hilvert, 63 Ariz. 171, 160 P.2d 331 (1945). This reliance is misplaced. The statutes in issue in Hilvert were essentially identical to their present counterparts, which provide:
It is to be noted that, while minority, incompetence and imprisonment are specifically designated as disabilities in § 12-502, absence from the state is not so designated in § 12-501. In Hilvert, the court was called upon to decide whether such absence was nevertheless to be deemed a disability for purposes of the prohibition against tacking of disabilities found in § 12-503. It was in this context that the court had occasion to review the case law addressing the meaning of the term "disability" and to conclude that it "is generally defined as 'the want of legal capacity' to do a thing ...." 63 Ariz. at 182, 160 P.2d at 336. Since absence from the state does not in and of itself result in a lack of legal capacity, the court concluded that the disabilities referred to in § 12-503 were confined to minority, insanity and imprisonment, as set forth in § 12-502. The court did not address the issue of whether minority, insanity and imprisonment must have the effect of depriving an individual of legal capacity before they can operate to toll the statute of limitations.
Apart from the Hilvert decision, we have been referred to no authority in support of appellees' contention, nor any authority which would preclude the legislature from designating imprisonment as a disability which tolls the period of limitation, notwithstanding the fact that a prisoner has the legal capacity to sue. The legislature may reasonably have concluded that imprisonment as a practical matter is a sufficient impediment to a prisoner's ability to protect his rights through the judicial system to warrant its designation as a disability under § 12-502. Cf. Ortiz v. LaVallee, 442 F.2d 912 (2nd Cir.1971).
We also find no basis for appellees'...
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