Smith v. Marshall Ice Co.

• Decision Date: 10 January 1928
• Docket Number: No. 38695.,38695.
• Citation: 217 N.W. 264,204 Iowa 1348
• Parties: SMITH v. MARSHALL ICE CO. ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

204 Iowa 1348

217 N.W. 264

SMITH

v.MARSHALL ICE CO. ET AL.

No. 38695.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Jan. 10, 1928.

Appeal from District Court, Marshall County; Clarence Nichols, Judge.

Claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. An award was granted the claimant, which on appeal was affirmed by the district court. Affirmed.Miller, Kelly, Shuttleworth & McManus, of Des Moines, for appellants.

Holt & Allbee, of Marshalltown, for appellee.

FAVILLE, J.

In January, 1925, the appellee was engaged in repairing an icehouse belonging to the Marshall Ice Company, While engaged in said work he moved a ladder, and a large iron washer that had been left on top of said ladder fell, striking the appellee over his right eye. The skin was cut and the appellee's eye was blackened. He did not consult a physician at the time and home remedies were applied to the eye. He resumed work the next day and kept his eye tied up for a week or more. He did not lose time from his employment, and in February following he noticed difficulty with the eye. He consulted a doctor the latter part of March, 1925. This doctor was not a witness in the case. The claim for compensation was filed December 8, 1925, approximately eleven months after the accident. The appellee was examined in December, 1925, by a doctor, who testified as a witness for the appellants, and in May, 1926, was examined by a physician who testified for the appellee.

I. It is contended that the appellee was not an employee within the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act, but was an independent contractor and therefore not entitled to compensation. Code, § 1421, subd. 2, is as follows:

“ ‘Workman’ or ‘employee’ means a person who has entered into the employment of, or works under contract of service, express or implied, or apprenticeship, for an employer, except as hereinafter specified.”

Code, § 1421, subd. 3, is in part as follows:

“The following persons shall not be deemed ‘workmen’ or ‘employees': * * *

An independent contractor.”

[1] It is the universal holding of the courts that the Workmen's Compensation Act (Code 1927, §§ 1361-1422) must be liberally construed to effect its obvious purpose and intent. Such is our rule. Rish v. Iowa Portland Cement Co., 186 Iowa, 443, 170 N. W. 532;Bidwell Coal Co. v. Davidson, 187 Iowa, 809, 174 N. W. 592, 8 A. L. R. 1058. The evidence with regard to the character of the employment of the appellee is found solely in his own testimony. We quote therefrom as follows:

“I am in the carpenter business, and have been doing carpenter work for 40 years. I am a contractor, so I don't have to belong to the union. At the time this injury occurred I was paid 85 cents per hour, or something like $42 a week. I had been working for Mr. Nelson of the Marshall Ice Company in all two months. I worked for him for 8 months after that--10 months altogether. I was paid by the hour. I have worked for the Marshall Ice Company before at the same kind of work; I built one of their icehouses. * * * I was my own boss when I was working for the ice company. Chris Hanson was helping me. They paid him; he wasn't my man. I had charge of the work. They didn't tell me how to do the work; I knew how. I told Hanson how. I tried to put in about the same number of hours per day, 8 hours. It would be to my advantage to get in as much time as I could, but I didn't work over 8 hours. I am a contract carpenter and have been for 25 years anyway. Every other week I would give the ice company a bill for the time I had put in; then they would pay me what the bill showed. They didn't keep time for me. They always paid the bill as I brought it in. I was just hired by the hour to do that work of fixing up the old icehouse and work around. At the time I was hurt I was fixing the icehouse. The job I had on hand then was fixing up this icehouse. * * * Just the icehouse was the only job I was doing at that time. I knew what had to be done. Nobody came out there and told me what to do; we just did it. They let me do the repairs and left it to me as to what we should do.”

There were also offered in evidence the several statements rendered by appellee for his services. Said statements recite:

“Marshall Ice Co., in account with Charles Smith, contractor and builder, 529 North Second Street.”

The question of whether a claimant for compensation is an employee within the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act, or is an independent contractor, has frequently been before the courts. We discussed and reviewed the authorities at length in Bolon v. Amond, 210 N. W. 923. It is unnecessary that we repeat at this time the discussion therein contained or again review the authorities on the question, which are cited in the Bolon Case. In said case we said:

“Looking to our own cases, we find that the test quite uniformly applied in this state is, Does the employee represent the master as to the result of the work only, or as to the means by which the result is obtained? If, as to the result and in the employment of the means, he acts entirely independent of the master, he must be regarded as an independent contractor Overhouser v. American Cereal Co., 118 Iowa, 417, 92 N. W. 74. In all of the cases decided by this court, particular emphasis has been given to the right of the employer to dictate and control the manner, means, and details of performing the services. * * * In each of these cases, the determinative question was, Did the employer have the right to direct the workman as to the manner and means of doing the work; that is, did he exercise control over [him] as to the means employed and manner of rendering the services? * * * The decisions in other jurisdictions are not entirely in harmony with the rule announced by this court, but all courts recognize the reserved right of the employer to control the method and means of doing the work, rather than merely of the result, as factors to be considered in determining whether the claimant was an employee or an independent contractor.”

[2] These general rules are recognized in other decisions which are cited in the Bolon Case. Applying these rules to the instant case, we hold that the industrial commissioner and the district court did not err in finding that the appellee was an employee of the appellant ice company and not an independent contractor. The appellee was employed for the general work of repairing the icehouse of the appellant ice company. He did not undertake to do the work as a contractor who was being paid by the job. The employer had the right to direct him as to the manner and means of doing the work. Even though it be true that, because of the confidence reposed in the employee, the employer left the manner of making the repairs largely to the knowledge, skill, and judgment which he knew the employee possessed, he still had the reserved right to control the method and means of doing the work, and the employee was at all times subject to any instructions or directions from the employer in regard thereto. The finding of the industrial commissioner that the relation of employer and employee existed and that the appellee was entitled to compensation as such employee...