Smith v. McDowell County Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 05 June 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 8329SC677,8329SC677 |
| Citation | 316 S.E.2d 108,68 N.C.App. 541 |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | , 17 Ed. Law Rep. 992 Eddie Kenneth SMITH v. McDOWELL COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Keith Weldon Gillespie, and Roy Hollifield. |
Dameron & Burgin by Charles E. Burgin, Marion, for defendant-appellee, McDowell County Bd. of Educ.
The sole question for determination on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in dismissing the action as to the McDowell County Board of Education (hereafter the "Board"), a party defendant. The basis for the dismissal by the trial court was G.S. 143-300.1, which provides in substance that claims against county and city boards of education for accidents involving "school buses or school transportation service vehicles" shall be heard and determined by the North Carolina Industrial Commission under the state Tort Claims Act, G.S. 143-291 et seq. The record reveals that the plaintiff would otherwise be entitled to proceed against the Board in Superior Court pursuant to G.S. 115C-42, on the basis of the Board's waiver of governmental immunity by its act of obtaining liability insurance. 1
G.S. 143-300.1 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) The North Carolina Industrial Commission shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine tort claims against any county board of education or any city board of education, which claims arise as a result of any alleged mechanical defects or other defects which may affect the safe operation of a public school bus or school transportation service vehicle resulting from an alleged negligent act of maintenance personnel or as a result of any alleged negligent act or omission of the driver of a public school bus or school transportation service vehicle when:
(1) The salary of that driver is paid or authorized to be paid from the State Public School Fund, and the driver is an employee of the county or city administrative unit of which that board is the governing body, or
(2) The driver is an unpaid school bus driver trainee under the supervision of and authorized employee of the Department of Transportation, Division of Motor Vehicles, or an authorized employee of that board or a county or city administrative unit thereof, and which driver was at the time of the alleged negligent act or omission operating a public school bus or school transportation service vehicle in the course of his employment by or training for that administrative unit or board.
As a preliminary matter, we agree with defendant that except for guidance as to what a "school transportation service vehicle" is, the above-quoted statute clearly vests jurisdiction over claims against county boards of education for accidents involving school buses or school transportation service vehicles in the North Carolina Industrial Commission when the following factors are present:
(1) If there is an accident, and if the accident involved the operation of a public school bus or school transportation service vehicle, and
(2) If the accident resulted from the negligence of the driver of a public school bus or school transportation service vehicle, and
(3) If the salary of such driver is paid from the state public school funds, and
(4) If the driver is an employee of the county or city administrative unit, and
(5) If the driver was at the time of the alleged negligent act operating a school bus or a school transportation service vehicle in the course of his employment.
The narrow issue before us, whether the phrase "school transportation service vehicle" embraces a driver education vehicle, is one of first impression under G.S. 143-300.1. Plaintiff urges that the phrase "school transportation service vehicle" be construed narrowly and contextually; that is, to include only those vehicles which perform the service of transporting children to and from school and related school activities. In other words, to include only "service vehicles" that are akin to "school buses" in function, if not form. Such a definition would, therefore, exclude driver education vehicles. Defendant, on the other hand, contends that the phrase "embraces all vehicles owned by a board of education other than school buses which serve a transportation need of the board of education when that need is mandated by the legislature." Further, that since driver education training is a mandated duty, driver-training automobiles come within the definition of "school transportation service vehicles."
As a general matter, the applicable statute is in derogation of sovereign immunity, therefore, it must be strictly construed and its terms must be strictly adhered to. Teer Co. v. Highway Commission, 265 N.C. 1, 143 S.E.2d 247 (1965); Withers v. Board of Education, 32 N.C.App. 230, 231 S.E.2d 276 (1977). Furthermore, the wording in the Tort Claims act generally, and in G.S. 143-300.1 particularly, is clear and unambiguous. Therefore, the words used must be given their natural or ordinary meaning. Alliance Co. v. State Hospital, 241 N.C. 329, 85 S.E.2d 386 (1955). The legislative intent and purpose in enacting the Act must be ascertained from the wording of the statute, and rule of liberal construction cannot be applied to enlarge its scope beyond the meaning of its plain and unambiguous terms. Id. Accordingly, defendant's overly broad definition of "school transportation service vehicle" must be rejected.
As originally enacted, G.S. 143-300.1 applied to claims involving public school bus drivers. In 1961, the provision was amended to include "school transportation service vehicles when the salary of such driver is paid from the State Nine Months School Fund." Session Laws, 1961, c. 1102, ss. 1-3. However, no definition of the phrase was provided. We conclude that the phrase includes vehicles which perform the service of transporting children to and from school and related school activities: including...
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...S.E.2d 386, 389 (1955) (“The wording in the [Tort Claims Act] is clear, certain and intelligible.”); Smith v. McDowell Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 68 N.C.App. 541, 545, 316 S.E.2d 108, 111 (1984) (concluding that “the wording in the Tort Claims Act generally ... is clear and unambiguous”). Moreover......
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