Smith v. Meyers

• Decision Date: 16 February 2012
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 11–126–SLR.
• Citation: 843 F.Supp.2d 499
• Parties: Dennis L. SMITH and Helen S. Starchia, Plaintiffs, v. Patricia A. MEYERS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

843 F.Supp.2d 499

Dennis L. SMITH and Helen S. Starchia, Plaintiffs,

v.Patricia A. MEYERS, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 11–126–SLR.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

Feb. 16, 2012.

Dennis L. Smith, Selbyville, DE, and Helen S. Starchia, Dagsboro, DE, Pro se Plaintiffs.

William J. Dunne, Esquire, Community Legal Aid Society, Inc., Wilmington, DE, for Defendant Patricia A. Meyers.

Shannon Thee Hanson, Assistant United States Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Wilmington, DE, for Defendant United States District Judge Leonard P. Stark.

Ralph K. Durstein, III, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, DE, for Defendant Chancellor William B. Chandler, III.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SUE L. ROBINSON, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Dennis Lee Smith (“Smith”) and Helen S. Starchia (“Starchia”) (“together plaintiffs”) filed this lawsuit alleging “extrinsic fraud/fraud on court and invidious racial discrimination,” as well as violations of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and civil rights statutes. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3), 1986, 1988; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a–1, 2000a–2, 2000a–3. (D.I. 1, 11) Pending before the court are motions to dismiss and motions to strike. (D.I. 5, 14, 22, 24, 27) For the following reasons, the court will grant the motions to dismiss and deny the motions to strike.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed this action against nominal defendant Patricia A. Meyers (“Meyers”), Hon. Leonard S. Stark (“Judge Stark”) ¹ and Hon. William B. Chandler, III (“Chancellor Chandler”) ² (together “the judicial defendants”).³ (D.I. 1, 11) Plaintiffs have removed and/or filed numerous cases in this court. The instant lawsuit is one in a series concerning an underlying State court action between plaintiffs and Meyers, a case that plaintiffs have unsuccessfully attempted to remove to this court on numerous occasions.⁴See Meyers v. Smith, Civ. No. 09–579–JJF; Myers v. Smith, Civ. No. 10–199–LPS;Myers v. Smith, Civ. No. 11–329–SLR. In addition, plaintiffs have filed numerous lawsuits alleging violations of their civil rights, all related to the underlying State case and all having been dismissed. See Smith v. Farnan, Civ. No. 10–830–LPS (D.Del. May 27, 2011); Smith v. Stark, Civ. No. 11–257–SLR, 2011 WL 1770531 (D.Del. May 9, 2011); Smith v. Meyers, Civ. No. 09–814–JJF, 2010 WL 1408924 (D.Del. Mar. 30, 2010); Smith v. Meyers, Civ. No. 07–525–JJF (D.Del. Mar. 5, 2008).

As in their other cases, plaintiffs allege a racially motivated “chain link conspiracy” with jurisdiction resting upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331⁵ and § 1343(a)(3); ⁶42 U.S.C. § 1985(3),⁷§ 1986, ⁸§ 1988,⁹§ 2000a–1,¹⁰§ 2000a–2,¹¹ and § 2000a–3; ¹² and 18 U.S.C. § 241¹³ and § 2383.¹⁴ (D.I. 1, 1) Counts one through three allege unconstitutional and illegal double standards of the established local standard practice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2383 and federal appellate rules of procedures. In addition, plaintiffs seek civil preventive relief and a permanent injunction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000a–3. Finally, plaintiffs allege extrinsic fraud, fraud on the court, and invidious racial discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000a–1.

This lawsuit is related to the second attempt at remand, Meyers v. Smith, Civ. No. 10–199–LPS, assigned to the Hon. Joseph J. Farnan (“Judge Farnan”) prior to his retirement and later reassigned to Judge Stark upon his elevation to District Judge. Judge Farnan remanded Meyers v. Smith, Civ. No. 4739–MG (Del. Ch.) to the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware on May 12, 2010. (Civ. No. 10–199–LPS at D.I. 22, 23) Following remand, plaintiffs filed twenty motions in the case. In denying plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 remand order, Judge Stark observed in his December 23, 2010 order that once the matter was remanded, he lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of the case. The order characterized plaintiffs' motions as “vexatious, abusive of the system, and in many instances duplicative.” (Civ. No. 10–199–LPS at D.I. 91) The court advised plaintiffs that “future filings will be docketed, but not considered by the court.” ( Id.) When plaintiffs filed additional motions on January 10, 2011, they were denied as moot. On January 3, 2011, former Chancellor Chandler, who was hearing the State remanded matter, issued a scheduling order and set trial for March 16, 2011. On February 25, 2011 former Chancellor Chandler reassigned the State case to Vice Chancellor Laster. Meyers submitted a medical record in the State case that plaintiffs allege is fraudulent.

Plaintiffs claim fraud, fraud on the court, discrimination, and civil rights violations, alleging Meyers committed extrinsic and fraud on the court when she submitted a fraudulent medical record in the State case; Judge Stark was without constitutional jurisdiction to rule on the post-remand motions in Civ. No. 10–199–LPS; and because this court lacked constitutional jurisdiction to remand to the Court of Chancery, former Chancellor Chandler was without constitutional jurisdiction to enter orders in the State case. Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages, injunctive relief to stop the remand and to enjoin the orders entered by former Chancellor Chandler in State court. ¹⁵

Former Chancellor Chandler moves for dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), for lack of federal jurisdiction over the subject matter, and 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Judge Stark moves for dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) by reason of judicial immunity. Meyers moves for dismissal for insufficient service of process pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(5). (D.I. 5, 14, 24)

Plaintiffs move to strike former Chancellor Chandler's and Meyer's motions to dismiss, and oppose Judge Stark's motion to dismiss. (D.I. 22, 26, 27)

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEWA. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or if the plaintiff lacks standing to bring his claim. Motions brought under Rule 12(b)(1) may present either a facial or factual challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. In reviewing a facial challenge under Rule 12(b)(1), the standards relevant to Rule 12(b)(6) apply. In this regard, the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and the court may only consider the complaint and documents referenced in or attached to the complaint. Gould Electronics Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir.2000). In reviewing a factual challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction, the court is not confined to the allegations of the complaint, and the presumption of truthfulness does not attach to the allegations in the complaint. Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir.1977). Instead, the court may consider evidence outside the pleadings, including affidavits, depositions and testimony, to resolve any factual issues bearing on jurisdiction. Gotha v. United States, 115 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir.1997). Once the court's subject matter jurisdiction over a complaint is challenged, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists. Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891.

B. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(5)

A defendant may file a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5) when a plaintiff fails to properly serve him or her with the summons and complaint. Rule 4(m) states that, “[i]f service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, the court, upon motion or on its own initiative after notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m). The rule goes on the state that, “[u]pon a showing of good cause for the failure to serve, the court must extend the time for service; [and] the court can, at it discretion, extend the time for service even if plaintiff has not shown good cause for the delay.” Daniels v. Correctional Med. Services, Inc., 380 F.Supp.2d 379, 384 (D.Del.2005) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m)); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1098 (3d Cir.1995).

C. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a court may dismiss a complaint “for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” “In deciding a motion to dismiss all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint must be taken as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and all inferences must be drawn in favor of them.” McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir.2009) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should be granted only if the plaintiff is unable to articulate “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A plaintiff is required, by Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), to provide the “grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief [which] requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because Plaintiffs proceed pro se, the court construes their complaint liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007).

IV. DISCUSSIONA. District Judge's Jurisdiction over another District Judge

Initially, the court notes that plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief, denied on March 14, 2011, seeks injunctive relief identical to that in the complaint. Plaintiffs asks this court to enjoin rulings Judge Stark entered in Civ. No. 10–199–LPS. The structure of the federal courts does not allow one judge of a district court to rule directly on the legality of another district judge's judicial...