Talley v. Savage
| Decision Date | 08 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 22-4186-KSM |
| Parties | QUINTEZ TALLEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TIMOTHY J. SAVAGE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Currently before the Court is a Complaint filed by Plaintiff Quintez Talley, a pro se litigant incarcerated at SCI Fayette, raising claims based on a prior civil action that Talley filed in this District. (Doc. No. 1.) Talley has also moved to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 4.) For the following reasons, the Court will dismiss the Complaint in its entirety as frivolous and for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and deny Talley's Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis as moot.
Talley's claims are wholly based on a prior lawsuit that he filed in November 2018, Talley v. Bissell, Civ. A. No. 18-5072 (E.D. Pa.) (“Bissell”), which was assigned to the Honorable Timothy J. Savage, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.[2] In Bissell, Talley sued the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and several of its employees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). (Bissell, Doc. No. 2.) In an order entered on December 4, 2018, Judge Savage granted Talley leave to proceed in forma pauperis, dismissed the DOC as a defendant pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, and directed service of Talley's complaint on the remaining defendants. (Id., Doc. No. 5.)
Talley moved for reconsideration of Judge Savage's order to the extent it dismissed the DOC as a defendant. (Id., Doc. No. 8.) In an order entered on December 21, 2018, Judge Savage granted Talley's motion. (Id., Doc. No. 9.) It appears Judge Savage understood Talley to be limiting his claims to the ADA, which provides for claims against public entities such as the DOC, but not individual defendants. (Id. at 1 n.1.) Accordingly, Judge Savage instructed the Clerk's Office to “update the docket to reflect that the [DOC] is no longer a terminated defendant in this matter and is the sole defendant.” (Id. ¶ 1.)
The December 21, 2018 order also appointed the Clerk of Court to serve a waiver request on the DOC. (Id. ¶ 2.) In accordance with the order, the Clerk's Office sent the waiver request to the DOC the same day; the waiver requested that the DOC respond to the waiver by January 20, 2019. (Id., Doc. No. 10.) On January 24, 2019, Kevin R. Bradford, an attorney with the Office of the Attorney General, filed a signed, completed form for waiver of service of summons on behalf of the DOC. (Id., Doc. No. 13.) Among the representations made on the form was that Bradford understood that he “or the entity [he] represent[s], must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/21/2018, the date when this request was sent” and that if he failed to do so, “a default judgment will be entered against [him] or the entity [he] represent[s].” (Id.)
After obtaining an extension of time, Bradford filed an answer on behalf of the DOC. (Id., Doc. No. 16.)
On August 15, 2019, Judge Savage issued a memorandum opinion granting summary judgment to the DOC on Talley's ADA claims. See Talley v. Bissell, No. 18-5072, 2019 WL 3837111, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2019). Talley appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. (Bissell, Doc. No. 32.) After initially granting a stay, the Third Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction in a May 3, 2022 order because the constitutional and state-law claims against the individual defendants remained unresolved. (Id., Doc. No. 36.) Thereafter, Talley filed several motions in Bissell, which Judge Savage denied. (Id., Doc. Nos. 37-38, 41, 43-45.) Talley filed another appeal in August 2022, which is currently pending before the Third Circuit. (Id., Doc. No. 46.)
On October 11, 2022,[3]Talley filed the instant Complaint naming three federal Defendants - the United States of America, Judge Savage, and “Unknown Clerk's [sic] of Judge Savage” (the “federal Defendants”) - and four Defendants associated with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania - the Attorney General's Office, Attorney General Josh Shapiro, the DOC, and Attorney Kevin Bradford (the “Commonwealth Defendants”). (Doc. No. 1 at 1.) Based on what happened in Bissell, Talley brings federal claims pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), and state law. (Id. at 1, 6.)
Talley's Complaint recites the relevant portions of the docket and filings in Bissell, as set forth above, which provide the entire factual basis for Talley's claims. (See Doc. No. 1 at 2-5.) Those claims focus on the effect of the DOC's waiver of service in Bissell. Talley alleges that when Bradford signed the waiver of service form, he essentially entered into a contract on behalf of himself, Attorney General Shapiro, the Attorney General's Office, and the DOC, requiring them to “file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days” or risk entry of default judgment. (Id. ¶¶ 23-27.) Conversely, Talley also alleges that, since Bradford's waiver of service was filed four days late, and since it was sent to the court instead of to him directly, it was essentially ineffective. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27.) According to Talley, taking these two principles together, the consequence of the DOC's late filing of the waiver was: (1) that the DOC was not entitled to the benefit of the sixty-day response time and was instead obligated to respond to his complaint within twenty-one days under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12; and (2) that the DOC's failure to file an answer in the shorter time frame should have entitled Talley to a default judgment in Bissell under the “terms” of the waiver.[4] (Id. ¶¶ 27-28, 30-32.)
Talley further alleges that the DOC, through Bradford, breached the “contract” Talley believes was created by the waiver of service, by “vigorously” litigating Bissell despite “agreeing” to a default judgment via the waiver. (Id. ¶ 28; see also id. ¶ 34.) He adds that Judge Savage and his unknown law clerks mishandled the case by “refus[ing] to enter a default judgment against Defendant DOC” despite “the very contractual nature of the agreement entered into between Talley and the Defendant DOC by way of the [waiver of service] form filed in [Bissell].”[5](Id. ¶ 30.) As a result, Talley alleges that he was deprived of the $50,000 in damages he requested in Bissell, and that he has suffered “mental and emotional strain” that has “been so overbearing that it keeps [him] up for days at a time!” (Id. ¶¶ 34-35.) For relief, Talley seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. ¶¶ 49-54.) He also seeks “a declaration that, under the terms of the [waiver of service] forms mailed to Defendant DOC on December 21, 2019; and, subsequently returned to the E.D. Pa. on January 24, 2019; Defendants DOC's failure to timely act constitutes a ‘material' breah [sic]” and an injunction compelling the United States, Judge Savage and the Judge's law clerks “to enforce the terms of the [waiver of service] forms . . . and enter a default judgment against Defendant DOC.” (Id. ¶¶ 47-48.)
When a prisoner files a complaint and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, a district court may take a “flexible approach” and opt to screen the complaint prior to addressing the prisoner's in forma pauperis motion. Brown v. Sage, 941 F.3d 655, 660 (3d Cir. 2019) (en banc) (). This approach “permits courts to move early to screen complaints in order to conserve judicial resources.” Id. Here, the Court concludes that it would be more efficient to screen Talley's Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) prior to addressing his Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis.[6] Section 1915A requires that the Court “review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In doing so, the Court must dismiss a complaint or any portion thereof that “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Id. § 1915A(b)(1). A complaint is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). It is legally baseless if “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1085 (3d Cir. 1995).
Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915A(b)(1) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Neal v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, No 96-7923, 1997 WL 338838, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 1997); see also Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the Court must determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). “At this early stage of the litigation,' ‘[the Court will] accept the facts alleged in [the pro se] complaint as true,' ‘draw[] all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff's] favor,' and ‘ask only whether [that] complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to state a...
To continue reading
Request your trial