Smith v. Miller
| Decision Date | 19 August 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 20531,20531 |
| Citation | 153 Colo. 35,384 P.2d 738 |
| Parties | Charles L. SMITH, Fred R. Monk and Hugh J. Ross, as the Board of County Commissioners of El Paso County, Colorado, and Colorado State Association of County Commissioners, Plaintiffs in Error, v. G. Russell MILLER, William M. Calvert and David W. Enoch, as the District Judges in and for the Fourth Judicial District of Colorado, et al., Defendants in Error. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Tarter & Tarter, Strand & Geddes, Colorado Springs, J. F. Schneider, Denver, for plaintiffs in error.
Jim R. Carrigan, W. H. Erickson, Denver, for defendants in error.
Plaintiffs in error Smith, Monk, and Ross are county commissioners of El Paso county. The Colorado State Association of County Commissioners was granted leave to appear as an intervenor. The interests of the commissioners and the intervenor are the same, and plaintiffs in error accordingly will be referred to as the Board. Defendants in error were plaintiffs in the trial court. The three parties first named in the above caption are judges of the district court of the Fourth Judicial District which includes the county of El Paso. The other defendants in error are employees of the district court of El Paso county. They will be referred to collectively as plaintiffs. The amount of salary which they are entitled to receive is the subject matter of this controversy.
The amended complaint of plaintiffs contained two claims for relief which, as stated in the prayer of each claim, were as follows:
(1) 'Plaintiffs pray that this Honorable Court issue a Writ of Mandamus commanding the Board of County Commissioners of El Paso County to approve the salaries listed in Exhibit 'A' and set by the Judges of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District or show cause why said salaries should not be approved, * * *'
(2) 'Plaintiffs pray that this Honorable Court, * * * by declaratory judgment construe and interpret each of said statutes, determine their validity, declare the relative rights, powers, duties and liabilities of these parties under them, * * * and further that the Court order the Defendants in their capacities as County Commissioners to pay the Plaintiffs' reasonable expenses of litigation, attorneys' fees, and court costs from funds of El Paso County, Colorado.'
The Honorable John N. Mabry, judge of the district court for the Third Judicial District, was assigned by this court to hear the case. No evidence was submitted upon the trial since all pertinent facts were presented by written stipulation entered into by the respective parties.
The facts are as follows: In 1961, the four judges of the district court made a survey of salary scales in other district courts in Colorado counties having comparable county population, number of employees, court case loads, and other factors peculiar to such court's personnel and their duties. They also made extensive investigation of the wage scale of office employees in governmental agencies, business, and industry in and near El Paso county. From this information so received, and considerating the ability, proficiency responsibility of the positions, and competency of the employees of the district court of El Paso county, the plaintiff judges and decedent Judge Schaper in October, 1961, agreed upon, determined, and fixed certain 1962 salaries to be paid to said employees, listed in writing the names and enumerated the salaries so fixed, and delivered the list to the defendant county commissioners, and asked that the salaries be approved and payment made accordingly for the year 1962. A substantial number of such salaries were approved by the commissioners, but the salaries of plaintiff employees were disapproved, and the commissioners thereupon set a different salary scale for plaintiff employees under a formula the commission had adopted for all 'county employees', based largely on seniority of service and on the report of a survey made by an agency engaged by the commission for such purpose. The judges and commissioners conferred on two or three occasions in efforts to resolve their differences, but to no avail. During the pendency of the action counsel stipulated in open court that the plaintiff employees should be paid monthly salaries at the 1961 rate, without prejudice to their claims herein.
The judges maintain that under C.R.S. '53, 39-16-1 and 56-3-8 (as amended), they have the inherent and statutory power to fix the salaries of their court employees as long as the judges do not act unreasonably, arbitrarily, or capriciously in fixing such salaries and the salaries so fixed are reasonable in amounts; that the commissioners have a ministerial and not a discretionary duty to approve the salaries under such circumstances, and the burden is on the commissioners to show unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious acts by the plaintiff judges, and that the salaries so set were unreasonable; that the commissioners have acted unreasonably, arbitrarily and capriciously in refusing to approve the salaries so fixed by the judges.
The commissioners urge that under the same statutes referred to above, they have the discretion to disapprove the salaries here considered; that there was sufficient evidence before the commissioners to sustain their actions, and that the evidence further shows that the commissioners acted reasonably and were not arbitrary or capricious and did not exceed their authority in disapproving such salaries and in setting the salaries of the district court employees in amounts different than the judges had determined and fixed. The trial court upheld the above stated position of plaintiffs and entered judgment as prayed in the complaint.
Pertinent portions of the statutes which are here subject to interpretation are as follows:
* * *'
* * *'
Interpretation of the foregoing involves the application of certain well established rules of construction, among which we mention the following: (1) It is the legislative intention, as expressed in the statute, which the court must ascertain and declare; and (2) it must be assumed that the legislature acted with full knowledge of relevent constitutional provisions, inherent judicial powers existing, and of previous legislation and decisional law on the subject; that it did not intend to create a situation amounting to a departure from the general concept of democratic government; and that it sought to recognize and confirm inherent powers rather than to destroy them.
Article III of the Colorado Constitution divides the powers of government into three departments and directs that, '* * * no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, * * *.' In City and County of Denver et al. v. Lynch et al. 92 Colo. 102, 18 P.2d 907, 86 A.L.R. 907, we quoted with approval the following:
In the case above cited this court quoted from State ex rel. Schneider v. Cunningham, 39 Mont. 165, 101 P. 962, the following:
We approve and adopt the following language contained in the conclusions of the trial court:
'It is an ingrained principle in our government that the three departments of government are coordinate and shall co-operate with and complement, and at the same time act as checks and balances against one another but shall not interfere with or encroach on the authority or within the province of the other. The legislative and executive departments have their functions and their exclusive powers, including the 'purse' and the 'sword'. The judiciary has its exclusive powers and functions, to-wit: it has judgment and the power to enforce its judgments and orders. In their responsibilities and duties, the courts must have complete independence. It is not only exiomatic, it is the genius of our government that the courts must be independent, unfettered, and free from directives, influence, or interference from any extraneous source. It is abhorrent to the principles of our legal system and to our form of government that courts, being a coordinate department of government, should be compelled to depend upon the vagaries of an extrinsic will. Such would interfere with the operation of the courts, impinge upon their power and thwart the effective administration of justice. These principles, concepts, and doctrines are so thoroughly embedded in our legal system that they have become bone and sinew of our state and national polity.
'In Colorado there are repeated confirmations of the proposition that the courts have the inherent power to carry...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. State, Dept. of Revenue
... ... under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code." Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 120, § 2-203(d)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1974). Despite this, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld apportionment based on the combined worldwide business income of Caterpillar Tractor and ... E.g., Rauschenberger v. Radetsky, 745 P.2d 640 (Colo.1987); Thompson v. People, 181 Colo. 194, 510 P.2d 311 (1973); Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo. 35, 384 P.2d 738 (1963). When a statute is ... Page 407 ... amended, the judicial construction previously placed upon the statute is ... ...
-
Williams v. White Mountain Const. Co., Inc.
...aware of the exclusive remedy provision of the Compensation Act when it adopted the Contribution Act. See Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo. 35, 39, 384 P.2d 738, 740 (1963). Therefore, because the Contribution Act demonstrates no intent to abrogate or even alter the allocation of risk assigned to ......
-
Eichelberger v. Eichelberger
...to require the payment of reasonable and necessary expenses that were essential to allow the court to function, e. g., Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo. 35, 384 P.2d 738 (1963); Noble County Council v. State ex rel. Fifer, 234 Ind. 172, 125 N.E.2d 709 (1955); Judges for the Third Judicial Circuit ......
-
Morgan County Commission v. Powell
...the many decisions, though not all, holding to this effect, and cited and commented upon in the decree here involved are: Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo. 35, 384 P.2d 738; Noble County Council v. State, 234 Ind. 172, 125 N.E.2d 709; Commissioners Court of Lubbock County v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100......
-
Emerging Issues Under the Colorado Organized Crime Control Act-colorado's Little Rico
...courts to do otherwise would violate Article III of the Colorado Constitution. For an application of Article III, see, Smith v. Miller, 384 P.2d 738, 740--41 (Colo. 1963). 10. See, Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 493 (1985) (private attorney general provision designed to fill pr......
-
Assault on the Citadel, Part Ii: Dams, Diversions and Water Quality Regulations
...supra; Hughes, "Amendments to the Colorado Water Quality Control Act." 10 The Colorado Lawyer 2758, 2764 (Nov. 1981). 14. Smith v. Miller, 384 P.2d 738, 740 (Colo. 1963). 15. CRS §§ 37-82-106(1) and 37-90-107(3), (4) and (5). 16. Water Supply Co. v. Curtis, 733 P.2d 680, 685 (Colo. 1987); M......