Smith v. Municipal Court of Glendale Judicial Dist., Los Angeles County

• Decision Date: 03 February 1959
• Citation: 334 P.2d 931,167 Cal.App.2d 534
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Arthur Maxson SMITH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF GLENDALE JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, State of California, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 23349.

Page 931

334 P.2d 931

167 Cal.App.2d 534

Arthur Maxson SMITH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF GLENDALE JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, State of California, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. 23349.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

Feb. 3, 1959.

Robert A. Keller, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, Donald K. Byrne, Deputy County Counsel, and Iver E. Skjeie, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for respondent.

NOURSE, Justice pro tem.

By his petition in this action plaintiff sought from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County writs of prohibition and mandate against the Municipal Court of Glendale Judicial District, County of Los Angeles. Demurrer to his petition having been sustained with leave to amend and petitioner having failed to amend, judgment of dismissal was entered and from this judgment petitioner appeals.

Petitioner seeks to prohibit the respondent court from proceeding to try him on a complaint charging him with the violation of section 476(c) par. 1 of the Vehicle Code and seeks writ of mandate to compel the respondent court to enter its order transferring the action to the Municipal Court of Los Angeles (the county seat). Petitioner is entitled to a writ of prohibition if the respondent court in seeking to try him is acting in excess of its jurisdiction even though it may have jurisdiction over petitioner's person and jurisdiction of cases involving the misdemeanor charged. Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280, 285-291, 109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715; Caminetti v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.2d 838, 848, 108 P.2d 911; State v. Superior Court, 14 Cal.App.2d 718, 58 P.2d 1322; Shell Oil Co. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.App.2d 348, 37 P.2d 1078; Carter v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. 752, 169 P. 667. He is entitled to the writ of mandate if the respondent court has abused its discretion and he has no speedy and adequate remedy at law. Caminetti v. Superior Court, supra; Dowell v. Superior Court, 47 Cal.2d 483, 304 P.2d 1009; Marr v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.App.2d 275, 279, 86 P.2d 141; Simmons v. Superior Court, 96 Cal.App.2d 119, 132, 214 P.2d 844, 19 A.L.R.2d 288.

Whether the respondent court would be acting in excess of its jurisdiction should it proceed to try him and whether it has abused its discretion in refusing a transfer of the action to the municipal court of the county seat, is dependent upon the construction placed upon section 739 of the Vehicle Code and sections 1462 and 1462.2 of the Penal Code.

The facts as alleged by the petition and which are by the demurrer thereto admitted to be true are in substance as follows: On June 23, 1957, petitioner was placed under arrest in the city of Glendale by a police officer of that city. At the time of the arrest the officer prepared a citation charging petitioner with the violation of section 476(c), par. 1 of the Vehicle Code for allegedly having made a right turn against a red light in violation of that section. Petitioner then demanded that the arresting officer specify in the citation as the place for him to appear the municipal court at the county seat, namely, Los Angeles. This the arresting officer refused to do and specified in the citation the respondent court as the place at which petitioner would, by signing the citation, promise to appear. Petitioner refused to sign this citation and was thereupon taken into custody by the arresting officer and removed to the Glendale police station where he was booked, fingerprinted, photographed and released on bail.

On June 24, 1957, petitioner appeared in the respondent court, objected to the jurisdiction of that court and demanded that the cause be transferred to the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District. His motion was denied and he was thereupon arraigned upon a criminal complaint charging the violation of the section of the Vehicle Code above mentioned and July 16th was set as the date for plea. On that date petitioner appeared by his attorney and objected to the jurisdiction of the respondent court and filed a written motion to transfer the cause to the county seat and to stay proceedings. On July 22nd this motion was denied and the cause continued to September 3, 1957, for the purpose of plea, the petitioner having waived the time to plead. Thereupon petitioner filed his petition in the superior court.

Section 739 of the Vehicle Code, insofar as is pertinent here, reads as follows:

'Whenever a person is arrested for any violation of this code, not declared herein to be a felony, * * * and such person is not immediately taken before a magistrate as hereinbefore required or permitted, the arresting officer shall prepare in triplicate a written notice to appear in court or before a person authorized to receive a deposit of bail, containing * * * the time and place when and where such person shall appear.

* * *

* * *

'(c) The place specified in said notice to appear shall be either:

'(1) Before a magistrate within the county in which the offense charged is alleged to have been committed and who has jurisdiction of the offense and is nearest or most accessible with reference to the place where said arrest is made; or

'(2) Upon demand of the person arrested, before a municipal court judge * * * at the county seat of the county in which such offense is alleged to have been committed or before a magistrate in the judicial district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed.' (Emphasis added.)

Section 1462 of the Penal Code confers jurisdiction on each municipal court within a county of all misdemeanors committed within the county in which such municipal court is established with certain exceptions which are not pertinent here.

Section 1462.2 of the Penal Code so far as is pertinent here reads as follows 'Except as otherwise provided in the Vehicle Code, the proper court for the trial of criminal cases amounting to misdemeanor shall be determined as follows: If there is a municipal * * * court having jurisdiction of the subject matter of the case, established in the district within which the offense charged was committed, such court is the proper court for the trial of the case; * * * [Emphasis added.]

'If an action or proceeding is commenced in a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof other than the court herein designated as the proper court for the trial, the action may, notwithstanding, be tried in the court where commenced, unless the defendant, at the time he pleads, requests an order transferring the action or proceeding to the proper court. If after such request is appears that the action or proceeding was not commenced in the proper court, the court shall order the action or proceeding transferred to the proper court.' (Emphasis added.)

It is petitioner's contention that under section 739 of the Vehicle Code he had the right to select the court before which he would be obligated to appear and having made his demand that he be cited to appear at the county seat, the municipal court there was the proper court for the trial of the action and that the respondent court therefore acted in excess of its jurisdiction in proceeding to try him and abused its discretion in refusing to transfer the action to the municipal court at the county seat.

We are of the opinion that it was the intent of the Legislature to permit the person arrested upon a charge such as that involved here to designate the place at which he should appear and be tried. The section requires the officer to specify in the notice or citation the place at which the person shall appear and provides that this place shall be either before the nearest or most accessible magistrate within the county with reference to the place where the arrest is made or upon demand of the person arrested, before a magistrate in the county seat or a magistrate in the judicial district in which the offense was alleged to have been committed. It is respondent's contention that by the use of the word 'either' in paragraph (c) of section 739 of the Vehicle Code the Legislature evidenced its intent to give the arresting officer the right to specify in the citation the place at which the arrestee should appear. We do not so read the statute. It is apparent that while the statute requires the officer to specify in the notice one or the other of the two places for the appearance of the arrestee, it does not leave to his discretion which of the two places shall be named. If no demand is made by the arrestee the officer must specify the place of appearance as before a magistrate within the county which has jurisdiction of the offense and who is nearest and most accessible with reference to the place where the arrest is made. But if a demand therefor is made by the arrestee the officer must specify as the place of appearance a municipal court within the judicial district at the county seat or at the demand of the arrestee, before a magistrate in the judicial district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed.

Inasmuch as paragraph (c)(2) of the section provides for a demand on the part of the person arrested, we must assume that the Legislature intended the word 'demand' to have its ordinary meaning and the import which that meaning gives to the statute. 'Demand' is defined as: 'An asking with authority, claiming or challenging as due.' The clear import of the statute is therefore to give the right to the arrested person to specify the place of his appearance and trial. If he has a right to demand that as something due him, that right cannot be denied him at the discretion...