Smith v. Owens
| Decision Date | 24 May 1926 |
| Citation | 108 So. 891,91 Fla. 995 |
| Parties | SMITH et al. v. OWENS. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
En Banc.
Suit by T. L. Smith and others against W. T. Owens to cancel a deed and for partition. From a decree dismissing the bill as to certain real estate described in the deed sought to be canceled, complainants appeal.
Affirmed.
Syllabus by the Court
Whether complete and unconditional delivery is intended when grantor delivers deed to third person for delivery to grantee is question of fact to be determined from all circumstances. Whether a complete and unconditional delivery is intended by a grantor when he delivers a deed to a third person for delivery by such person to the grantee is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances surrounding the transaction.
Manual delivery of deed is not always required to effectuate grantor's intention to deliver it; grantor need not use particular formula of words in expressing intention to deliver deed. Actual manual delivery of a deed is not always required in order to effectuate the grantor's intention to deliver; nor is it necessary for the grantor to use any particular formula of words in expressing his intention, so long as such intention to deliver the deed and to surrender all dominion and control over the same is made clear.
Filing and recording deed is prima facie evidence of delivery, but such presumption is rebuttable. The filing and recording of a deed is prima facie evidence of its delivery, but the presumption thus created may be rebutted by other evidence.
Where father executed deed to adult son, and had it recorded, and then, just before his death, delivered it to third person to be delivered to son, to whom it was delivered through agency of another person, acceptance by son related back to time of delivery by father to third person. Where a father executed a deed to his adult son, had the same recorded and then repossessed the deed, and, just before his death, delivered the deed to a third person for delivery to his son, and in pursuance thereof the deed was delivered to the son after the father's death by such third person through the agency of another person and accepted by the son, such acceptance relates back to the time of the delivery by the father to such third person.
Evidence that father, who had executed deed to adult son, recorded it and retained possession thereof, but directed third person before his death, to deliver it to son, held sufficient to sustain finding that deed was lawfully delivered. Where the evidence shows that a father, joined by his wife, executed a deed to his adult son several years before his death, and had the deed recorded, and then repossessed the same; that several years before his death he had a third person, his housekeeper, bring him a tin box of papers from the mantel in his bedroom, opened the same, and showed her the deed and other papers therein contained, and got her to promise that if she was present in his last hours, she would deliver the box containing the deed to his son; that later on, during his last illness, and just before his death, such father called such third person to his bedside, the box containing the deed being in its accustomed place on the mantel in the same room and remined her of his previous instructions, and told her to deliver the tin box to his son, she signifying her assent though not immediately taking manual possession of the box, but carrying out such instructions a few hours later, the father having died during such interval, and the son having accepted the deed when so delivered, such evidence is sufficient to sustain the finding of the chancellor that said deed was lawfully delivered.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Madison County; M. F. Horne, judge.
E. Dixie Beggs, of Fort Myers, and W. Turner Davis, of Miami, for appellants.
R. H. Rowe, of Madison, for appellee.
This cause is before this court on appeal from the final decree entered by the chancellor in the court below in a suit brought by T. L. Smith and others, heirs at law of a deceased daughter of G. Owens, deceased, to cancel a certain deed of conveyance made by G. Owens to defendant, W. T. Owens, and for partition of the property described in the bill of complaint, which embraced other lands in addition to those described in the deed sought to be canceled.
In their bill, the complainants alleged that on March 6, 1912, G. Owens and his wife executed a deed of conveyance to said W. T. Owens, an adult 68 years of age, to certain described property, comprising some 34 acres of land, which deed provided that the grantor's wife should have the right to have a home, undisputed, during her natural life, on said described lands; that on April 14, 1914, said G. Owens deposited the deed with the clerk of the circuit court for recording and that the same was duly recorded; that the grantor then took possession of the deed and kept it with his papers and effects; that said deed was not delivered to W. T. Owens or to any one for delivery to him and that W. T. Owens had no knowledge of its execution, until after the death of G. Owens, when he, the said W. T. Owens, found that deed in the said G. Owens' papers and effects; that said deed was not, during the life of said G. Owens, or the life of his said wife, accepted by the said W. T. Owens or any one acting for him or in his behalf, and that the same constitutes a cloud upon the title of complainants; that G. Owens died on January 26, 1919, leaving as his only heirs at law Mrs. J. P. Smith, a widow, and the said W. T. Owens, his daughter and son, and that at his death these two became the owners of said property as tenants in common, each having an undivided one-half interest by descent from their father; that said Mrs. J. P. Smith died on November 12, 1919, leaving the complainants as her heirs at law, and hence vesting them with her undivided half interest; that Mrs. Bettie Owens, the wife of G. Owens, had died intestate prior to the death of said G. Owens. The bill prayed the cancellation of the said deed to W. T. Owens and concluded with the usual prayer for partition.
W. T. Owens filed an answer, in which he admitted the execution of the deed to him, and its recordation, as alleged in the bill, and its possession after such recordation by the grantor, but alleged that said instrument was, on or about January 26, 1919, delivered to Mrs. Henry Burnett, by the grantor, for delivery to the defendant, in the lifetime of said G. Owens, and was delivered afterwards, on the same day, or a short time thereafter, to the defendant, who accepted the same; that defendant knew before the death of G. Owens that the instrument had been executed and had assented thereto; that, after the death of said G. Owens, the said deed was among certain papers which had been in the possession of G. Owens, but that he had parted with the possession of said papers during his lifetime; and that they were not his papers at the time of his death.
Considerable testimony was taken and the chancellor rendered the final decree dismissing the bill as to the real estate described in the deed from G. Owens to W. T. Owens, above mentioned, but providing for the partition of the remaining lands described in the bill.
There are 75 errors assigned by the appellants, but only two of them are argued, the same being numbered 45 and 75, and it is only necessary here to consider assignment of error No. 75, which attacks the action of the court in dismissing the bill as to the lands described in said deed, and which raises the controlling question in the cause. Evidence was adduced by the respective parties tending to support the allegations of both the bill and the answer, leaving as practically the only matter in dispute the question of whether or not, under the facts in evidence, there was such a delivery of the deed by G. Owens before his death as would result in vesting the title to the lands described in the deed in the said W. T. Owens.
The evidence shows that, after the execution and recording of the deed, said G. Owens repossessed the same, and appellants contend that he retained possession and control of the deed until his death, while appellee contends that just a short while before his death the grantor delivered the deed to Mrs. Burnett for delivery by her to the appellee; which was doen immediately after his death.
While the question presented is not without difficulty, we cannot escape the conviction that there was sufficient evidence in this case to sustain the decree of the court below on the question of delivery of the deed. The rule is that the chancellor's conclusions on the facts will not be reversed unless it clearly appears that he has erred in such conclusions, and, in our opinion, no such error clearly appears.
One of the witnesses, Mrs. Burnett, who had formerly acted as housekeepter in the home of Mr. G. Owens, testified that some two or three years before his death, Mr. Owens asked her to get the tin box in which he kept his papers and bring it to him out on the porch, where he was at the time. She obtained the tin box from its usual place on the mantelpiece and brought it to him and he opened the box and took the papers out of his hand, among them the deed in question, and told her that, 'if you are here in my last hours, will you give this to Billie?' It is conceded that he referred to his son, W. T. Owens, and that among the papers was the deed in question. After giving these directions, he closed the box and she took it and returned it to its usual place on the mantel. There was also evidence that Mr. G. Owens had told his son's daughter, during his lifetime, and several friends, that h...
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Westgate Resorts, Ltd. v. Sussman
...no burdens or duties on him. (Doc. 184, pp. 21–23 (citing Riehl v. Bennett , 142 So. 2d 761, 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962) ; Smith v. Owens , 91 Fla. 995, 108 So. 891 (1926) ; Ellis v. Clark , 39 Fla. 714, 23 So. 410 (1897).) Pure balderdash. Since day one, Mr. Sussman has experienced Westgate's r......
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In re Parker
...167 So. 366, 369 (1936) ; Parramore v. Parramore , 371 So.2d 123, 124 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) ).74 Id.75 Id. (citing Smith v. Owens , 91 Fla. 995, 1002, 108 So. 891, 893 (1926) ).76 Id.77 Id.78 Id. ; Howarth v. Moreau , 430 So. 2d 576, 578 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).79 Sargent , 673 So. 2d at 980 (cit......
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...One such case is where a deed is for the benefit of the grantee and imposes no burdens or duties on him or her. Smith v. Owens, 91 Fla. 995, 1000, 108 So. 891, 893 (1926); accord Corbett v. Corbett, 249 N.C. 585, 590, 107 S.E.2d 165 (1959). When a grantor causes a deed conferring substantia......
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In re Parker
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