Smith v. Planning and Zoning Bd. of City of Milford

• Citation: 203 Conn. 317,524 A.2d 1128
• Decision Date: 28 April 1987
• Docket Number: 12872,Nos. 12768,s. 12768
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Parties: Louise M. SMITH v. PLANNING AND ZONING BOARD OF the CITY OF MILFORD et al.

Page 1128

524 A.2d 1128

203 Conn. 317

Louise M. SMITH v. PLANNING AND ZONING BOARD OF the CITY OF MILFORD et al.

Nos. 12768, 12872.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 5, 1986.

Decided April 28, 1987.

Bruce L. Levin, Orange, for appellant (named defendant).

William B. Barnes, Milford, for appellant (defendant Bic Pen Corp.).

Stephen W. Studer, with whom, on brief, was Richard J. Buturla, Milford, for appellee.

Before HEALEY, SHEA, DANNEHY, CALLAHAN and STOUGHTON, JJ.

DANNEHY, Associate Justice.

These are separate appeals by the defendants from a judgment in the Appellate Court which unanimously reversed a judgment rendered upon an order of the trial court granting a motion by the defendant Bic Pen Corporation (Bic) to dismiss the plaintiff's appeal from a decision of the defendant planning and zoning board of the city of Milford (board). Each appeal is concerned with the scope and applicability of General Statutes § 8-8(a) providing, so far as here pertinent, that "any person owning land which abuts or is within a radius of one hundred feet of any portion of the land involved in any decision of said [zoning] board ... may ... take an appeal to the superior court...." ¹ The question on appeal is whether a tenant for life of land abutting or within a radius of one hundred feet of land thus involved is a "person owning land" within the purview of § 8-8. The Appellate Court answered the question in the affirmative. Smith v. Planning & Zoning Board, 3 Conn.App. 550, 552, 490 A.2d 539 (1985). We reach the same conclusion.

The case was heard on a motion to dismiss. The plaintiff is the owner of a life estate in land abutting Caswell Street in Milford. The premises were formerly the property of the plaintiff's husband. In 1979, he conveyed the land to Bic by a deed in which he reserved to himself and the plaintiff a life estate during the lifetime of either or both of them. On October 5, 1982, the board granted an application of Bic which requested that the name of Caswell Street be changed to Bic Drive. The plaintiff, claiming to be aggrieved, seasonably appealed from the decision of the board to the Superior Court, joining the board and Bic as parties to the appeal. Bic filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, based on the ground that "[t]he plaintiff's specific interest as a life tenant ... does not render her 'aggrieved.' " The trial court granted the motion to dismiss the appeal, finding "that the plaintiff's position as life tenant does not constitute record ownership of the premises in question so as to qualify the plaintiff as an aggrieved person under ... § 8-8 of the Connecticut General Statutes." Thereafter, by final judgment, the plaintiff's appeal was dismissed. From the judgment of dismissal the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Session of the Superior Court. The matter was subsequently removed to the Appellate Court under General Statutes § 51-197a(c). The facts have been stated on the basis of the record of the pleadings, the trial court's memorandum of decision, and the parties' admissions.

During the arguments before the Appellate Court the parties agreed that the dispositive issue on appeal was whether "a life tenant ... is an 'owner' under Section 8-8 ... of the General Statutes." The Appellate Court held that the plaintiff, as a life tenant, was entitled to appeal as an owner of land "which abuts or is within a radius of one hundred feet of any portion of the land involved in any decision of said [zoning] board...." General Statutes § 8-8; Smith v. Planning & Zoning Board, supra, 555, 490 A.2d 539. The judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff's appeal from the decision of the board was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Smith v. Planning & Zoning Board, supra, 561, 490 A.2d 539. Permission to appeal by certification was granted by this court. The defendants appealed on a single record. We now consolidate the two appeals. Practice Book § 4004 (formerly § 3002).

The only issue which we need consider is whether the plaintiff as a life tenant has standing to appeal from the board's decision as an owner of land under § 8-8. ² The plaintiff, who claimed to be aggrieved by the decision of the board to change the name of Caswell Street to Bic Drive, appealed to the Superior Court to reverse the decision. ³ Section 8-8 allows aggrieved persons to appeal from decisions of zoning authorities to the Superior Court. The traditional requirements for an appeal have been frequently stated. The appeal will be dismissed unless the appellant alleges and proves aggrievement. To be an aggrieved person, one must be affected directly or in relation to a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as distinguished from a general interest such as is the concern of all members of the community, and the appellant must be specially and injuriously affected as to property or other legal rights. I.R. Stich Associates, Inc. v. Town Council, 155 Conn. 1, 3, 229 A.2d 545 (1967). The situation is different with respect to any person owning land which abuts or is within a radius of one hundred feet of the land involved in any decision of a zoning board. Abutting landowners or landowners within a radius of one hundred feet of the land involved in any decision of the zoning board are considered automatically aggrieved and have standing to appeal a decision of a zoning board without having to prove aggrievement. See Point O'Woods Assn., Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 178 Conn. 364, 366, 423 A.2d 90 (1979).

The defendants contend that the Appellate Court erred in holding that the plaintiff has an interest in the land sufficient to entitle her to the benefit of the automatic appeal for landowners embodied in § 8-8. The defendants seem to rely principally upon Warner v. Leslie-Elliot Constructors, Inc., 194 Conn. 129, 137, 479 A.2d 231 (1984), where the term "landowner," for reasons there stated, was narrowly construed to include only those who possess title to the land. That case, of course, dealt with a statute different from that now before us. See General Statutes § 52-557. Other cases, however, indicate that "[t]he word 'owner' has no fixed meaning but must be interpreted in its context and according to the circumstances in which it is used.... Courts have not agreed in the application of the meaning of the word, even when due allowance is made for the differing phraseology of the statutes involved and the circumstances under consideration." Warren v. Borawski, 130 Conn. 676, 679-80, 37 A.2d 364 (1944).

We assume, although it is not entirely clear from the record, that the deed conveying the premises on Caswell Street to Bic and creating the plaintiff's life estate was a duly recorded instrument. Upon the execution of the deed, the plaintiff was a tenant for life and a remainder in fee was vested in Bic. The plaintiff's life interest, as shown in the deed, is a matter of record. Thus no question of whether she has record title is presented.

Section 8-8 purports to grant an automatic right of appeal to "any person owning land" who meets certain other qualifications. The question is whether the quoted language can be construed to include a life tenant. The plaintiff satisfies all requirements for an automatic right of appeal, if she may be regarded as a "person owning land." The problem is apparently one of initial impression. For that reason we must interpret the statute in its context and according to the circumstances in which the term a "person owning land" is used.

The plaintiff's freehold estate is an estate for her own life. Her reserved life interest remains subject to her direction and control as long as she is alive. In every beneficial sense, she is the owner of the premises situated on Caswell Street. By the common law, a tenant for life, where he is under no restriction in the deed by which he holds, could use the land in the same manner as the holder in fee. Every life tenant had the right to...