Smith v. Postal Tel. Cable Co.

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Writing for the Court: HOLMES, C.J.
• Citation: Smith v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 174 Mass. 576, 55 N.E. 380 (Mass. 1899)
• Decision Date: 29 November 1899
• Parties: SMITH v. POSTAL TEL. CABLE CO.

174 Mass. 576

55 N.E. 380

SMITH v. POSTAL TEL. CABLE CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

November 29, 1899

COUNSEL

E. T. McCarthy, for appellant.

R. F Sturgis, for appellee.

OPINION

HOLMES C.J.

The point decided in Spade v. Railroad Co., 168 Mass 285, 47 N.E. 88, 38 L. R. A. 512, and White v Sander, 168 Mass. 296, 47 N.E. 90, is not put as a logical deduction from the general principles of liability in tort, but as a limitation of those principles upon purely practical grounds. See, further, Spade v. Railroad Co., 172 Mass. 488, 52 N.E. 747, and Silsbee v. Webber, 171 Mass. 378, 380, 381, 50 N.E. 555. If the rule is to be adhered to that there can be no recovery for sickness due to the purely internal operation of fright caused by a negligent act. it cannot be avoided by calling the negligence gross, and alleging that the defendant ought to have known that the result complained of would follow his act. Negligence with reference to a given consequence means that the consequence ought to have been foreseen; and, although the distinction between gross negligence and negligence is known to the law, still, having regard to the grounds for the above-mentioned rule, to allow it to be avoided by such an allegation would be to do away with it. The decisions leave open the question whether, if the harm to the plaintiff was actually foreseen and intended, that would make a difference. It is possible that in some cases...