Smith v. Quattlebaum
| Citation | 223 S.C. 384,76 S.E.2d 154 |
| Decision Date | 14 May 1953 |
| Docket Number | No. 16745,16745 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | SMITH v. QUATTLEBAUM et al. |
James B. Hare, B. W. Crouch and Butler B. Hare, Saluda, for appellant.
B. E. Nicholson, Edgefield, Jeff D. Griffith and Billy C. Coleman, Saluda, for respondent.
This case came on for trial at the November, 1952, term of Court of Common Pleas for Saluda County, resulting in a verdict by the jury in favor of the respondent against the appellant for the full amount demanded in the complaint, to wit, $3,750, upon which judgment was entered in due course. The Ridge Banking Company was made a defendant for the reason that appellant had placed the funds in dispute in this bank to his special account. No motion of any nature was made in connection with the case following the publication of the verdict and before the sine die adjournment of court on the same date, November 12, 1952.
On November 20, 1952, appellant served notice on respondent that he would appear before Judge Pruitt, at Lexington, to move for a new trial on the basis of after-discovered evidence, or more properly described, after-discovered disqualification of a juror who sat in the trial of the case.
When the case was called for trial, Judge Pruitt asked the jury panel if any were related by blood or connected by marriage with respondent. A similar question was asked concerning appellant. One juror responded and was disqualified by reason of his relationship to respondent. The trial Judge then stated to counsel: Apparently counsel were satisfied for there was no response to this query.
The jury was selected included a juror bearing the name of James Pou who is related to respondent within the sixth degree, the great-grandfather of each being the common ancestor. At the time of the selection fo the jury this relationship was not known to the litigants, their counsel or to the juror, and not know to litigants and counsel until after the court had adjourned sine die. The first knowledge of kinship came to Mr. Pou during the trial when a witness testified his wife is a sister of respondent and Mr. Pou knew of his relationship with the wife of the witness, and it then occurred to him he was related to respondent but he nothing about it for fear of doing the wrong thing. Several days after court had adjourned the juror advised counsel for appellant of this relationship. All of the foregoing information comes from affidavits submitted for or against the motion for a new trial. These affidavits show that Mr. Pou and respondent were strangers and had not recognized or known of any relationship, and, further, that counsel for appellant and respondent, respectively, were very diligent in their pretrial investigationof any possible relationship of their clients with any member of the panel.
At the hearing on the motion it was resisted by respondent on lack of merit and loss of jurisdiction by reason of sine die adjournment of court. Judge Pruitt, in his order denying the motion, did not make any decision on the question of jurisdiction and specifically refrained from passing thereon. He founded his order on the contents of the affidavits of the juror wherein the juror stated he did not know respondent or recognize any relationship, and after learning of the connection 'in no way did he permit his relationship with the plaintiff to affect his decision in the matter.' Judge Pruitt further stated a just verdict was rendered, to which verdict the plaintiff was clearly entitled.
The appellant's exceptions may be expressed in one question: Did the trial Judge abuse his discretion in refusing to grant a new trial upon ascertaining that a juror was related to one of the litigants within the sixth degree? The respondent offers a sustaining ground, to wit, the lower court was without jurisdiction to hear the motion or grant a new trial.
There is no statute that disqualifies a juror by reason of relationship or kinship with any of the parties to an action. The only statute on the point is Section 38-202 of the 1952 Code:
In State v. Brock, 61 S.C. 141, 39 S.E. 359, 361, which construes the foregoing section, is the following: * * *'
We also quote from State v. Merriman, 34 S.C. 16, 34, 12 S.E. 619, 625, cited and followed in Sims v. Jones, 43 S.C. 91, 20 S.E. 905:
'We are not aware of any statute fixing the degrees, either of consanguinity or a affinity, within which a juror is disqualified; and it must therefore be left to the circuit judge to determine whether the fact that the juror's father and the grandfather of the accused were brothers was such a relationship as would be likely to render the juror not indifferent in this case.'
It is not by reason of consanguinity or affinity that a juror becomes disqualified, but in the exercise of the discretion of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Payton v. Kearse
...to grant mistrial when defendant learned after the verdict that a juror was the third cousin of a witness); cf. Smith v. Quattlebaum, 223 S.C. 384, 76 S.E.2d 154 (1953) (no abuse of discretion in refusing to grant a new trial after it was discovered that, through inadvertence, a juror had n......
-
State v. Best
...void. In addition to the cases hereinbefore cited, we call attention to State v. Williams, 221 S.C. 107, 69 S.E.2d 371; Smith v. Quattlebaum, 223 S.C. 384, 76 S.E.2d 154; Hines v. Farr, 235 S.C. 436, 112 S.E.2d 33 and State v. Gorie, S.C., 183 S.E.2d The orders granted by Judge Weatherford ......
-
Hassell v. City of Columbia
...59(b) ; .... Id. at 287, 379 S.E.2d at 895. The court in Gray further noted as follows:This issue was addressed in Smith v. Quattlebaum , 223 S.C. 384, 76 S.E.2d 154 (1953). In Smith , defendant moved for a new trial because of an after-discovered relationship of juror to plaintiff. [Our su......
-
O'Neill's Estate, In re
...as a matter of law. Whether or not they were permitted to serve rested within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Smith v. Quattlebaum, 223 S.C. 384, 76 S.E.2d 154; State v. Nicholson, 221 S.C. 399, 70 S.E.2d 632; Nicholson Investment Co. v. Glymph, 148 S.C. 226, 145 S.E. At the beginn......