Smith v. Rabalais

Decision Date15 October 1981
Docket NumberNo. 80-3587,80-3587
Citation659 F.2d 539
PartiesCharles SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Fulton RABALAIS, Jr., et al., Defendants-Appellees. . Unit A *
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Professor George M. Strickler, New Orleans, La. (Court-appointed), for plaintiff-appellant.

J. Marvin Montgomery, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baton Rouge, La., S. Dwayne Broussard, Staff Atty., Dept. of Justice, Baton Rouge, La., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana.

Before CHARLES CLARK, TATE and SAM D. JOHNSON, Circuit Judges.

TATE, Circuit Judge:

The plaintiff, Charles Smith, an inmate at Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, appeals from summary judgment dismissing with prejudice his petition for habeas relief 1 and for damages for violation of his civil rights pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 2 Contending that the district judge erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, Smith claims that the factual findings show that he was found guilty of dealing in narcotics and was transferred to cell block lockdown in violation of his constitutional rights. Smith alleges that he did not receive a fair and impartial prison disciplinary board hearing because (1) under a claim of protecting prison security, he was apprised of neither the specific facts nor other circumstances whereby the confidential informant witnessed the incident for which he was disciplined, and (2) the evidence was not sufficient to support the board's decision. We find the disciplinary board, under the exceptional circumstances present in this case, did not abuse its discretion to conduct disciplinary procedures in a manner necessary to protect the security of the prison and, therefore, affirm.

Facts

In late September 1977, Charles Smith, an inmate at Angola, requested and was granted an interview 3 with a penologist for the Louisiana Department of Corrections. At this time Smith alleged that he had been "harassed" by a defendant, Captain Fulton Rabalais, a correctional officer at Angola. 4 No proceeding had been filed against Smith at this time.

Subsequently, on December 1, 1977 Rabalais filed an incident report in which he claimed to have "received information, from several reliable informers" that inmate Charles Smith was one of the "main narcotic dealers on the trusty yard" and that he was involved in the "sale and distribution of pills on the walk." The incident report further stated that the informers from whom Rabalais received his information were "very reliable and (had) been in the past, very reliable, and had first hand knowledge of inmate Smith's involvement in the drug traffic on this yard." Smith was therefore placed in administrative lockdown.

Smith appeared at a hearing conducted by the prison Disciplinary Board, composed of prison employees, to respond to the incident charge filed by Rabalais, to which Smith had pleaded not guilty. On December 12, 1977, 5 in accordance with prison disciplinary procedures, Smith was found guilty of "dealing in narcotics" 6 and was transferred to cell block lockdown, maximum security.

At the December 12 hearing Rabalais, the only witness, testified solely on the basis of information provided to him by a confidential informant. He further testified as to the reliability and firsthand knowledge of the informant, but he consistently refused to reveal the identity or any information which he claimed would reveal the identity of his informant to inmate Smith (i. e., dates, places, times, persons involved, number of alleged sales witnessed, description of drugs.) Smith, through inmate counsel, was allowed to cross-examine Rabalais. 7 However, in the interest of prison security, Rabalais continued to refuse to reveal any information which would pinpoint the identity of a confidential informant or, even, the circumstances of the alleged drug transaction(s). The reason advanced was that to do so would permit identification of the inmate informers and (by implication) thus submit them to fatal prisoner reprisal. The hearing board upheld Rabalais' refusal to provide further particulars.

Smith was not barred from calling witnesses and producing evidence in his own behalf, but, in fact, produced no witnesses. Smith claimed that, as he was unable to elicit any more facts on the charge, he could not properly present alibi witnesses or opposing evidence.

Smith's administrative appeal to the Secretary of Corrections was denied on February 1, 1978. 8 A subsequent application for rehearing was also denied March 13, 1978. During this time Smith remained in lockdown, where his case was reviewed every ninety days by the Lockdown Review Board. During this period Smith alleges he received no "write-ups" or complaints from prison officials. (On October 31, 1978, subsequent to filing this suit, he was transferred from lockdown to the general prison population.)

On May 12, 1978 Smith filed the present pro se complaint in the federal district court, claiming that he had been denied a fair and impartial disciplinary hearing. The district judge granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff Smith's suit was dismissed with prejudice on June 23, 1980.

The Issues

Smith alleges in his complaint that his civil rights were violated and he did not receive a fair and impartial disciplinary board hearing because (1) of the denial of any opportunity to test the accusatory information furnished by confidential informants and, (2) the board's decision was based on insufficient evidence. The plaintiff's argument at the disciplinary hearing and in brief indicates that the refusal to reveal the identity of the confidential informant, or to reveal any specific information concerning the alleged violations, accounts in large measure for the lack of substantial evidence to justify the court's decision.

I. The Standard of Due Process for Prison Disciplinary Hearings Under Wolff v. McDonnell.

In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), the Supreme Court, while indicating reluctance to review the judgment of prison administrators, id. 418 U.S. at 566, 94 S.Ct. at 2979, and while acknowledging that prison disciplinary proceedings do not require the "full panoply of rights" due a defendant in a criminal proceeding, id. 418 U.S. at 556, 94 S.Ct. at 2975, set forth positive minimum requirements of procedural due process which should be accorded prisoners: 9 (1) advance written notice of the claimed violation; (2) a written statement of the fact finders as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken; 10 (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in defense, when to do so would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals. Id. 418 U.S. at 563-67, 94 S.Ct. at 2976-80. By his first argument Smith appears to assert a violation of the first and third due process requirements established in Wolff. Smith claims that failure of prison officials to provide him with specific acts of sale, time, place, and date rendered the written notice of the charges so vague as to preclude a defense and for this reason he was effectively denied the right to call witnesses and present evidence in his behalf.

A prisoner, by the very nature of his confinement, is afforded diminished rights and privileges provided to all citizens, but is "not wholly stripped of constitutional protections." Wolff, supra, 418 U.S. at 555, 94 S.Ct. at 2974 (and citations collected therein). Although the courts have been careful to protect due process rights of inmates, such rights are subject to restrictions when balanced against the exceptional needs of prison society. Id. at 566, 2980.

Transfer to maximum security, obviously a deprivation of "liberty" 11 and unquestionably a matter of serious importance entitling an inmate to minimal due process, does not present the same immediate disaster as the revocation of parole, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2601, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), Wolff, supra, 418 U.S. at 560, 94 S.Ct. at 2977, or initial incarceration, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965).

The very nature of due process precludes establishing an inflexible 12 procedure applying without variation to vastly variegated situations. "(C) onsideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with the determination of the precise nature of the government function involved, as well as the private interest that has been affected by government action." Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748-49, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961). In weighing the interest presented here, we begin with the realization that

(p)rison disciplinary proceedings, on the other hand, take place in a closed, tightly controlled environment peopled by those who have chosen to violate the criminal law and who have been lawfully incarcerated for doing so ... we must realize that in many of them the inmates are closely supervised and their activities controlled around the clock. Guards and inmates co-exist in direct and intimate contact. Tension between them is unremitting. Frustration, resentment, and despair are commonplace. Relationships among the inmates are varied and complex and perhaps subject to the unwritten code that exhorts inmates not to inform on a fellow prisoner.

Wolff, supra, 418 U.S. at 561-62, 94 S.Ct. at 2977.

Smith points out the Supreme Court's declaration that the function of notice is "to inform him of the charges and to enable him to marshal the facts and prepare a defense," Wolff, supra, 418 U.S. at 564, 94 S.Ct. at 2979. He asserts that the defendants' refusal to provide sufficient details of the charges (date, place, time, number of violations) is in direct contravention of the Court's dictates.

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