Turner v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 15 March 1999
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. H-97-2590.
• Citation: 46 F.Supp.2d 655
• Parties: Lance Michael TURNER, Petitioner, v. Gary L. JOHNSON, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

46 F.Supp.2d 655

Lance Michael TURNER, Petitioner, v. Gary L. JOHNSON, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Respondent.

Civil Action No. H-97-2590.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas.

March 15, 1999.

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Lance Michael Turner, Hughes Unit, Gatesville, TX, pro se.

Jeremy T. Hartman, Office of Attorney General, Austin, TX, James E. Custer, Office of Attorney General, Austin, TX, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CRONE, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. Introduction

Petitioner Lance Michael Turner ("Turner") challenges the outcome of three prison disciplinary hearings. Having reviewed the pending motion, the submissions of the parties, the state habeas record, the disciplinary records, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that Turner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (# 1) should be denied and that Respondent Gary L. Johnson's ("Johnson") Motion for Summary Judgment (# 16) should be granted.

II. Procedural History

On March 27, 1984, Turner was convicted of burglary of a habitation, committed on November 21, 1983, and was sentenced to fifty years imprisonment. See State v. Turner, No. 84-90566-PQ (204th Dist.Ct., Dallas County, Tex., Mar. 27, 1984). While incarcerated, Turner pleaded guilty to committing aggravated assault on August 5, 1986. On March 24, 1987, upon his conviction of aggravated assault, the court affixed his punishment at a consecutive sentence of five years imprisonment. See State v. Turner (278th Dist.Ct., Madison County, Texas, Mar. 24, 1987).

In 1995, Turner was incarcerated at the Wynne Unit in Walker County, Texas. During a prison lock-down, Turner composed, typed, and distributed documents calling for a work stoppage by the inmates upon the cessation of the lock-down. According to Turner's petition, on March 23, 1995, he typed the documents on a word processing typewriter and printed 150 copies for distribution among the other inmates. Turner rolled each of 150 copies of the materials into cylindrical tubes and sealed them with tape. He then arranged for support service inmates to slide each of the tubes of documents into the cells of other prisoners.

According to the disciplinary records, in Disciplinary Case Number 950181472, a search of Turner's cell on March 25, 1995, revealed copies of certain of the work stoppage documents. His typewriter was confiscated after it was discovered that the contents of the documents in question were saved in its memory. When interviewed by prison staff, Turner admitted that he had prepared the work stoppage materials and had distributed approximately 150 copies to fellow inmates. At a disciplinary hearing on March 31, 1995, conducted by R.D. Boyd, Turner was found guilty of Disciplinary Offense 23, "Creating a Disturbance—any act or activity which results in a disruption of institution operations or breach of institution security." As a result, he forfeited 730 days of good conduct time credit, was restricted to his cell for fifteen days, lost commissary privileges for fifteen days, and was reduced in security classification from Line Class I to Line Class III. The reason given for the punishment selected was "engaged in specified behavior trying to instigate work stoppage."

The second incident, Disciplinary Case Number 950183344, occurred on March 31, 1995, when, during a routine search of the cells, a prison staff member found additional documents in Turner's cell advocating a work stoppage. At a disciplinary hearing conducted by J.A. Simpson on April 5, 1995, Simpson was again found guilty of Disciplinary Offense 23. The penalty imposed was the loss of 730 days of good conduct time credit and remaining in Line Class III for an indefinite period of time. The reason stated for the punishment assessed was "serious nature of offense/instituting a work stoppage on the Wynne Unit."

The third incident, Disciplinary Case Number 950200709, occurred on April 13, 1995, when, during a cell search, prison staff found seven pages of written and typed work stoppage documents in Turner's cell. At a disciplinary hearing on April 26, 1995, conducted by T.R. Carter, Turner was once again found guilty of Disciplinary Offense 23. As a consequence, he lost an additional 730 days of good conduct time credit and was to remain in Line Class III for an indeterminate period. The reason given for the punishment assessed was "Progressive Penalty—Lesser & previous penalty attempts have failed to achieve compliance with unit security/control concerns."

Turner filed a state application for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the three prison disciplinary proceedings, which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied without written order on August 28, 1996. See Ex parte Turner, No. 20,084-03 (Tex.Crim.App. Aug. 28, 1996). Turner's appeals of his disciplinary cases through the prison grievance procedure were unavailing.

Turner filed his current federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus on July 30, 1997.

III. Claims

Turner asserts the following claims in support of his petition for federal habeas corpus relief:

(i). he was denied due process of law because the three disciplinary proceedings were arbitrary and discriminatory;

(ii). he was subjected to double jeopardy when he was punished in three separate disciplinary proceedings for the same act;

(iii). he was deprived of a vested liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution when his forfeited good conduct time credits were not restored;

(iv). the retroactive application of the policy preventing the restoration of lost good time credits violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution;

(v). the application of a new prison policy extending the length of time between custody classification reviews improperly restricts his ability to earn good conduct time credits; and

(vi). the theft and destruction of his personal property interfered with his due process rights.

IV. Analysis

A. Prison Disciplinary Proceedings

1. Due Process Claim

Turner's claims must be analyzed in the context of the prison setting. Prison disciplinary proceedings "take place in a closed, tightly controlled environment peopled by those who have chosen to violate the criminal law and who have been lawfully incarcerated for doing so." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Lawful imprisonment makes unavailable to an inmate many of the rights and privileges afforded an ordinary citizen due to the needs and exigencies of the institutional environment. See id. at 555, 94 S.Ct. 2963. Prisoners, however, may "claim the protections of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963. Nevertheless, "the fact that prisoners retain rights under the Due Process Clause in no way implies that these rights are not subject to restrictions imposed by the nature of the regime to which they have been lawfully committed." Id. "Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply." Id. (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)). Instead, "there must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application." Id.

Inmates, such as Turner, who are charged with an offense that could deprive them of good time credit are entitled to "those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause" to insure that their rights are "not arbitrarily abrogated." Id. at 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963; Gibbs v. King, 779 F.2d 1040, 1044 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1117, 106 S.Ct. 1975, 90 L.Ed.2d 659 (1986). In the context of a prison disciplinary hearing, due process requires that the inmate be provided: (1) at least twenty-four-hour advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence when the presentation is not unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied upon and the reason for disciplinary action. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-66, 94 S.Ct. 2963; Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir.1995); Reeves v. Pettcox, 19 F.3d 1060, 1062 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1994); Smith v. Rabalais, 659 F.2d 539, 543 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 992, 102 S.Ct. 1619, 71 L.Ed.2d 853 (1982). "Within these limits, the federal policy is to afford wide discretion to prison officials." Gibbs, 779 F.2d at 1044 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)). Moreover, if some of the procedural safeguards are overlooked, the petitioner must demonstrate resulting prejudice to establish a constitutional violation cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. See Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 734 (5th Cir.1998) (citing Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1251-52 (5th Cir.1989)); Hallmark v. Johnson, 118 F.3d 1073, 1080 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 118 S.Ct. 576, 139 L.Ed.2d 415 (1997) (citing Simpson v. Ortiz, 995 F.2d 606, 609 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 983, 114 S.Ct. 486, 126 L.Ed.2d 436 (1993)); Banuelos, 41 F.3d at 234-35.

When reviewing a prison disciplinary decision, "the standard to be applied is whether or not actions of the disciplinary committee were arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion." Smith, 659 F.2d at 545 (citing Thomas v. Estelle, 603 F.2d 488, 490 (5th Cir.1979)). "The findings of a prison disciplinary hearing will not be disturbed unless they are arbitrary and capricious." Banuelos, 41 F.3d at 234. "[T]he requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision of the prison disciplinary board to revoke good time credits." Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455, ...