Smith v. Rose Auto Stores, 91-1321

• Decision Date: 13 April 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-1321,91-1321
• Citation: 596 So.2d 809
• Parties: Margaret SMITH, as personal representative of the estate of Robert L. Smith, Sr., deceased, Appellant, v. ROSE AUTO STORES and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Appellees. 596 So.2d 809, 17 Fla. L. Week. D959
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 809

596 So.2d 809

Margaret SMITH, as personal representative of the estate of Robert L. Smith, Sr., deceased, Appellant, v. ROSE AUTO STORES and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,

Appellees.

No. 91-1321.

596 So.2d 809, 17 Fla. L. Week. D959

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

First District.

April 13, 1992.

David C. Wiitala and Bill Contole, McManus, Wiitala & Contole, P.A., North Palm Beach, for appellant.

Walter E. Beisler, Beisler & Beisler, West Palm Beach, for appellees.

ZEHMER, Judge.

Margaret Smith, as personal representative of the estate of Robert Smith, appeals a workers' compensation order that vacates an earlier order approving a settlement agreement between employer and carrier and Mrs. Smith's deceased husband, Robert Smith. Because Mr. Smith's death prior to the judge of compensation claims's approval of the settlement agreement was a material fact that was essential to the judge's consideration of the agreement, we hold that such fact provided a sufficient basis for the judge's later vacation of the order of approval and affirm the appealed order.

The facts of this case are undisputed. Robert Smith sustained a work-related back injury on October 25, 1985. Employer and carrier accepted the accident as compensable, and paid some benefits. A dispute arose over the payment of additional benefits, and in February 1991, the parties agreed to a lump-sum settlement of $71,500.00. ¹ On February 19, 1991, the parties signed the joint stipulation and petition for lump-sum settlement. On February 20, 1991, the settlement papers were delivered to the judge of compensation claims's office for approval. On February 21, 1991, Mr. Smith died. On February 25, 1991, the judge of compensation claims, who at that time did not know of Mr. Smith's death, approved the settlement. On March 21, 1991, employer and carrier moved to vacate the order approving the settlement on the ground that Mr. Smith's death constituted a change of material fact that was not known to employer and carrier or to the judge of compensation claims at the time the settlement was approved. After hearing on the motion, the judge entered an order vacating the earlier order approving the settlement agreement and ordering that the settlement check be returned. ²

On appeal of this order, Mrs. Smith contends that the parties waived their right to a hearing and submitted the settlement agreement to the judge for approval on the record as it then existed. She argues that because the facts that existed at the time the parties signed the agreement were fully, accurately, and completely stated in the settlement agreement, the judge could consider only those facts in determining whether to approve the settlement agreement. We reject her argument for the following reasons.

The law is well settled that a settlement agreement is not final and enforceable until it is approved by the judge of compensation claims. Rogers v. Concrete Sciences, Inc., 394 So.2d 212 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). The responsibility of the judge in considering a settlement agreement is not to perform a perfunctory, mechanical act. Brantley v. A.D.H. Building Contractors, Inc., 215 So.2d 297 (Fla.1968). Rather, section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes (1989), requires the judge to perform several acts prior to approving a lump-sum settlement agreement, including reviewing the division file, determining whether a lump-sum payment in exchange for the employer and carrier's release from...