Smith v. Ryder Truck Rentals Inc., 34627

• Citation: 182 So.2d 422
• Decision Date: 16 February 1966
• Docket Number: No. 34627,34627
• Parties: Freddy R. SMITH, Petitioner, v. RYDER TRUCK RENTALS, INC., Respondent.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida

Page 422

182 So.2d 422

Freddy R. SMITH, Petitioner, v. RYDER TRUCK RENTALS, INC., Respondent.

No. 34627.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Feb. 16, 1966.

It appears Freddy R. Smith, petitioner here and plaintiff below, and William Holmes were employed by Crandon Wholesale Drug Company. They both operated motorcycles for the drug company. The motorcycles were leased to the drug company by their owner, Ryder Truck Rentals, Inc., a defendant below and respondent here. Smith sued Ryder Truck Rentals, Inc., and Holmes for personal injuries received when the motorcycle Smith was operating collided with the motorcycle operated by Holmes. The accident occurred on a public street in Miami, Florida.

Summary final judgment was entered in favor of Ryder. On appeal, the District Court affirmed, saying:

'Smith received workmen's compensation from his employer Crandon for the injuries sustained in the accident. The controlling question on this appeal is whether or not the immunity from liability which is granted to an employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act, § 440.11, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., extends to the employer's lessor, or is the lessor a third party tort-feasor for which liability may be imposed under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine.

'In reaching the conclusion that Ryder was not liable the trial judge relied upon the decision of this court in Zenchak v. Ryder Truck Rentals, Inc., Fla.App.1963, 150 So.2d 727. On that appeal we affirmed a judgment of the trial court holding that the owner of a rental truck was not vicariously liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine where a fellow servant of the driver was injured by the truck. We find no reason that the principle therein expressed should not be applied in this case.'

Despite the excellent argument of the petitioner, we find we must disallow it. Petitioner urges that the provisions of F.S. Section 440.11, F.S.A. of the Workmen's Compensation Act limiting liability of an employer to payment of workmen's compensation, do not extend to Ryder, the lessor of the motorcycles, and that the latter is a tort feasor subject to petitioner's suit for injuries arising from the alleged negligent operation of the motorcycle. Petitioner contends the vicarious liability of an owner of a dangerous instrumentality to an employee injured by the negligent operation of such instrumentality which is leased to his employer is not immunized by the Workmen's Compensation Act because F.S. Section 440.39, F.S.A. thereof authorizes suits by injured employees against third party tort feasors. He urges there is no basis for treating Ryder, the lessor, any differently than a third party owner of a motor vehicle or other dangerous instrumentality against whom petitioner could have brought suit had the third party's vehicle injured him. He contends the fact there was a lessee-lessor relationship between his employer and Ryder does not operate to immunize the latter. He argues that because he receives Workmen's Compensation benefits owing to the fact he and his employer had accepted the Workmen's Compensation Act is likewise immaterial in view of Section 440.39. He contends he is entitled to any remaining amount over his workmen's compensation benefits that might be recovered from Ryder after his employer or its compensation carrier had been reimbursed the amount paid him for workmen's compensation.

The acceptance of the Workmen's Compensation Act and benefits thereunder serves as a release by the employee of the right to sue his employer for personal injuries resulting from the negligent act of the employer or of a fellow servant occurring in the scope of the employment. Thus, petitioner could not sue his employer in this case because of the statutory release. See F.S. Section 440.11, F.S.A. On the other hand, it is elementary law that petitioner's employer, as lessee and in control of the motorcycle allegedly negligently operated and causing petitioner's injury, could not sue Ryder, lessor of the motorcycle, under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine to recover amounts paid petitioner for workmen's compensation benefits. Under these circumstances where the petitioner had released his employer as a tort feasor by accepting workmen's compensation benefits and the...