Smith v. Salish Kootenai College

• Decision Date: 06 August 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-35306.,03-35306.
• Citation: 378 F.3d 1048
• Parties: James R. SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SALISH KOOTENAI COLLEGE; Court of Appeals of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1048

378 F.3d 1048

James R. SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SALISH KOOTENAI COLLEGE; Court of Appeals of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 03-35306.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 10, 2004.

Filed August 6, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Rex Palmer, Attorneys Inc., P.C., Missoula, MT; Lon J. Dale, Milodragovich, Dale, Steinbrenner & Binney, P.C., Missoula, MT, for the plaintiff-appellant.

Robert J. Phillips, Fred Simpson, Jr., Phillps & Bohyer, P.C., Missoula, MT, for defendant-appellee Salish Kootenai College.

John T. Harrison, Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, Tribal Legal Department, Pablo, MT, for defendant-appellee Court of Appeals of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana; Leif B. Erickson, Magistrate, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-02-00055-LBE.

Before: BRUNETTI, McKEOWN, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

We consider an issue of increasing importance to the federal courts and to non-tribal members who live or work in or around Native American reservations: When does an Indian tribe's civil jurisdiction extend to non-tribal members? We must decide whether the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation had the adjudicative authority to exercise civil subject-matter jurisdiction over a non-tribal member in a tort dispute that arose from a traffic accident on a public highway on the reservation.

I

This case arises from a tragic one-vehicle rollover. Appellant Smith, a citizen of Oregon, a member of the Umatilla Tribe, and a student at the Salish Kootenai College ("SKC"), was that day driving a SKC dump truck on United States Highway 93 as it ran through the Flathead Reservation. Smith was driving as part of his work on a vocational course at SKC. At the unfortunate time, the dump truck's right rear main leaf spring broke, and the truck veered sharply left. Smith tried to maintain control, but the truck rolled. The accident killed one passenger, and injured Smith and another passenger.

After the accident, the injured passenger and the estate of the deceased passenger brought suits against Smith and SKC in tribal court. Smith and SKC cross-claimed against each other. All claims were resolved before trial, save Smith's cross-claim against SKC. That cross-claim alleged that SKC was liable for the accident and also asserted a claim of spoliation of evidence. At trial in tribal court on these claims a jury rendered a verdict in favor of SKC.

Smith then sought post-judgment relief with the tribal trial court on the theory that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over his claim. At the same time, he filed an appeal of the judgment with the tribal appeals court. The Court of Appeals of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation remanded the case for a ruling from the tribal trial court on the jurisdiction question. Upon remand, the tribal trial court decided that it had jurisdiction. Smith again appealed the tribal trial court's judgment to the tribal appellate court. While that second tribal court appeal was pending, Smith filed his federal court action, which is now before us, in the United States District Court for the District of Montana. Smith, in his federal suit, sought an injunction against the tribal courts on the theory that the tribal courts lacked jurisdiction over his cross-claim, and he also sought to litigate his underlying claims against SKC.

On February 17, 2003, the tribal appellate court issued an opinion affirming the tribal trial court. The tribal appellate court concluded that "[f]or purposes of determining jurisdiction, [SKC] must be treated as a tribal entity."

On March 3, 2003, the federal district court issued its order on jurisdiction. The district court found that SKC was a tribal entity for jurisdictional purposes and that Smith's claims arose on the reservation. Then, relying solely on Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959), the district court dismissed Smith's case. Smith appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse.

II

As we begin our analysis,¹ we first express and define the legal principles that govern a tribe's exercise of civil jurisdiction over a non-member such as Smith. Any time a tribal court wishes to exercise civil subject matter jurisdiction over a non-member of the tribe,² the framework in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981), must be satisfied. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 358, 121 S.Ct. 2304, 150 L.Ed.2d 398 (2001) ("Indian tribes' regulatory authority over nonmembers is governed by principles set forth in [Montana] which we have called the `path-marking case' on the subject....").³

Montana sets the framework of a general rule and two exceptions:

[A]bsent a different congressional direction, Indian tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of non-members on non-Indian land within a reservation, subject to two exceptions: The first exception relates to nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members; the second concerns activity that directly affects the tribe's political integrity, economic security, health, or welfare.

Strate, 520 U.S. at 446, 117 S.Ct. 1404. From this description, it might have been thought that Montana analysis applies only when there are non-members and the claim arose on non-tribal land. We have, however, rejected such a narrow reading of Montana. See Yellowstone County v. Pease, 96 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir.1996). In Pease, we held that a contention that Montana applies only when there are non-members and the activity arose on non-tribal land was "unpersuasive." Id. at 1174. "[T]he issue presented here is whether the tribal court may assert jurisdiction over a non-Indian party (the County), and this court has called Montana `the leading case on tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians.'" Id. (quoting Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d at 1314).⁴ The Supreme Court has likewise rejected a cramped reading of Montana. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360-61, 121 S.Ct. 2304.

For the purposes of invoking and satisfying Montana's pathmaking principles, the important variable is that there is a non-member of the tribe that is party to the specific claim being litigated. In the case before us, where it is not disputed that Smith is a non-member of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, it does not matter whether SKC is a non-member, and it also does not matter whether the action arose on tribal land. Montana applies in any event because Smith is not a member, and that fact alone impels the need for scrutiny of tribal court jurisdiction under the principles set by Montana.

In reiterating that Montana analysis applies whenever a party to a claim is a non-member, we reject the argument that Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959) (holding that tribal court had jurisdiction over a suit by a non-member against a member for a debt that arose on tribal land), but not Montana, applies to a suit involving a non-member that arises on tribal land. In Strate, the Supreme Court made clear that, after Montana, Williams is best understood as an example of Montana's first exception-not as a separate jurisdictional doctrine. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 457, 117 S.Ct. 1404 ("Montana's list of cases fitting within the first exception ... indicates the type of activities the Court had in mind: Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959) ...."); see also A-1 Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930, 937 (8th Cir.1996) (en banc) ("The [Williams] factual situation fits squarely under the `consensual agreement' test for jurisdiction in Montana.... In fact, Montana specifically cited Williams in creating the two exceptions...."). This reading of Williams, along with the consistent reasoning of the Supreme Court in Montana and Strate, demands that Montana apply whenever there is a non-member party.⁵

Most courts addressing jurisdiction in cases where a party is a non-member have reached the same result, applying the Montana framework even when the underlying claim arose on tribal land. See, e.g., Bank One, N.A. v. Brainard, 144 F.Supp.2d 640, 642-44 (S.D.Miss.2001) (holding that non-member plaintiff had to exhaust tribal remedies in a suit to compel arbitration because of a colorable claim of consensual relationship under Montana with the member defendant); Rodriguez v. Wong, 119 Wash.App. 636, 82 P.3d 263, 267 (2004) (holding that a non-member's claim of racial discrimination against the executive director of the Indian gaming commission fell under both Montana exceptions); Ortego v. Tunica Biloxi Indians, 865 So.2d 985, 988 (La.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a non-member's suit for worker's compensation against tribal casino fell within Montana's first exception). But see Winer v. Penny Enters., 674 N.W.2d 9, 16-17 (N.D.2004) (holding that when a non-member plaintiff sues a member defendant for an accident on a state road within the boundary of the reservation, Montana analysis does not apply, Williams controls, and the tribal court has exclusive jurisdiction).

Because "the general rule of Montana applies to both Indian and non-Indian land" whenever a non-member is a party to a claim litigated in tribal court, Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360, 121 S.Ct. 2304, we turn to the Montana framework to determine whether tribal jurisdiction exists here.

III

Because the Montana framework applies to resolution of non-member Smith's claim in tribal court, we are required to start with a presumption that the tribal court did not have jurisdiction. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 651, 659, 121 S.Ct. 1825, 149 L.Ed.2d 889 (2001). That presumption can be rebutted; whether the tribal court has jurisdiction depends on...