Smith v. Seaport Marine, Inc., Civil Action No. 12–0501–WS–B.

• Decision Date: 28 January 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 12–0501–WS–B.
• Citation: 919 F.Supp.2d 1267
• Parties: Wilbur SMITH, Plaintiff, v. SEAPORT MARINE, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

919 F.Supp.2d 1267

Wilbur SMITH, Plaintiff,

v.SEAPORT MARINE, INC., et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 12–0501–WS–B.

United States District Court,

S.D. Alabama,

Southern Division.

Jan. 28, 2013.

Dennis Michael O'Bryan, O'Bryan Baun Cohen, Birmingham, MI, for Plaintiff.

Alex F. Lankford, III, Douglas W. Fink, Hand Arendall, L.L.C., Jannea S. Rogers, Nicholas F. Morisani, Adams and Reese, LLP, Mobile, AL, for Defendant.

ORDER

WILLIAM H. STEELE, Chief Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Seaport Marine, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss (doc. 11) and Odyssea Marine Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss (doc. 14). ¹ Both Motions have been briefed and are now ripe.

I. Relevant Background.

Plaintiff, Wilbur Smith, for himself and on behalf of others similarly situated, filed a multi-count Complaint (doc. 1) against defendants, Seaport Marine, Inc. and Odyssea Marine, Inc. According to the well-pleaded allegations of the Complaint, Smith is a seaman who entered into an Employment Placement Contract with defendant Seaport, pursuant to which Seaport provided employment placement services for Smith ( i.e., it helped him find a job) in exchange for Smith authorizing Seaport to collect a recruitment fee and to recoup advances out of his resulting wages. (Doc. 1, ¶ 4, 6.) To facilitate that arrangement, Smith executed a Paycheck Mailing Agreement authorizing his employer to mail his payroll checks to Seaport until Seaport's “fee and advances were collected in installments,” as well as a Special Power of Attorney authorizing Seaport to endorse and deposit those checks, collect an allotment from them, and mail the balance to Smith. (Id., ¶ 6.) Although the allegations of the Complaint center on defendant Seaport, they also relate to defendant Odyssea. Smith maintains that he was employed by Odyssea, that Odyssea was complicit in implementing the terms of the Paycheck Mailing Agreement, and that the result was an unlawful allotment of $3,640 from his wages. (Id., ¶ 14.)

Notably, the Complaint does not identify what contacts (if any) Odyssea has with the forum state in which this litigation was filed, or with the United States as a whole. Nor does the Complaint identify any nexus between Smith and the Southern District of Alabama, much less any explanation or allegation concerning venue, aside from the barest, most conclusory of statements that “Defendants [are] subject to service of process within this forum, vis-à-vis the purported contracting of business.” ( Id., ¶ 2.) Careful review of the Complaint in its entirety reveals no clues as to why Smith filed suit here, as opposed to some other forum having an articulable nexus to the parties and/or the dispute.²

Based on the limited factual allegations embedded in his cumbersome (and sometimes opaque) Complaint, Smith purports to bring claims against both Seaport and Odyssea for (i) “seaman's claim for wages” (on the theory that the wage assignments were non-binding, such that Smith is entitled to the balance of his wages allotted, forwarded to and retained by Seaport); (ii) conversion; (iii) conspiracy; (iv) equitable rescission of contract and restitution for money had and received; (v) legal restitution / breach of contract; (vi) breach of fiduciary duty; and (vii) violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). Of these claims, Smith aims the equitable rescission, legal restitution/breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary claims solely at Seaport; however, the remaining claims (seaman's claim for wages, conversion, conspiracy and RICO) are brought against both defendants.

Seaport and Odyssey have independently filed overlapping Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim, with Odyssey also advancing arguments under Rule 12(b)(2) to dismiss the Complaint for want of personal jurisdiction.

II. Analysis.A. Personal Jurisdiction as to Defendant Odyssea.

In its Motion to Dismiss, Odyssea argues in general terms that the Complaint is insufficient to demonstrate that this Court has personal jurisdiction over it. Rather than affirmatively showing pertinent jurisdictional facts or circumstances, Odyssea is content to point out that “[n]o facts whatsoever are pled regarding the location where Smith purportedly was employed by Odyssea” and that “[n]o facts whatsoever are pled pertaining to Odyssea's contacts with the instant forum.” (Doc. 14, at 5.) Because Odyssea is challenging the existence of personal jurisdiction, the Court will address this Rule 12(b)(2) component of its Motion to Dismiss before reaching the merits issues detailed in the Rule 12(b)(6) portion of the Motion. See, e.g., Koch v. Royal Wine Merchants, Ltd., 847 F.Supp.2d 1370, 1374 (S.D.Fla.2012) (“The general rule is that courts should address issues relating to personal jurisdiction before reaching the merits of a plaintiff's claims.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Daily Access Corp. v. Gaedeke Holdings, Ltd., 2012 WL 6728051, *2 (S.D.Ala. Dec. 7, 2012) (similar); Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1–25, 2012 WL 3940142 (M.D.Fla. Aug. 21, 2012) (similar).

As articulated in its Motion, Odyssea's Rule 12(b)(2) argument is firmly rooted in a traditional Fourteenth Amendment personal jurisdiction analysis, which first looks to whether the forum state's long-arm statute provides jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant and, if so, then “requires that the defendant have minimumcontacts with the forum state and that the exercise of jurisdiction not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Sloss Industries Corp. v. Eurisol, 488 F.3d 922, 925 (11th Cir.2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In response, Smith correctly points out that the typical Fourteenth Amendment framework gives way where, as here, the plaintiff brings a claim under a federal statute with a nationwide service of process clause. See Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 942 (11th Cir.1997) (“When a federal statute provides for nationwide service of process, it becomes the statutory basis for personal jurisdiction.”). As noted, Smith has asserted a RICO claim against both defendants. RICO has a nationwide service of process provision. See18 U.S.C. § 1965(d) (“All other process in any action or proceeding under this chapter may be served on any person in any judicial district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs.”). “[I]t is well established that when, as here, a federal statute provides the basis for jurisdiction, the constitutional limits of due process derive from the Fifth, rather than the Fourteenth, Amendment.” Republic of Panama, 119 F.3d at 942;Grail Semiconductor, Inc. v. Stern, 2012 WL 5903817, *3 (S.D.Fla. Nov. 26, 2012) (“[i]n this analysis, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause serves as the constitutional touchstone” because a federal statute provides the jurisdictional basis). Accordingly, the constitutional prong of Odyssea's Rule 12(b)(2) objection is governed by the Fifth Amendment's due process clause, not that of the Fourteenth Amendment. ³

In performing a Fifth Amendment due process inquiry, courts “should balance the burdens imposed on the individual defendant against the federal interest involved in the litigation.” Republic of Panama, 119 F.3d at 946. The Eleventh Circuit cautions, however, “that courts must engage in this balancing only if a defendant has established that his liberty interests actually have been infringed.... Only when a defendant challenging jurisdiction has presented a compelling case that would render jurisdiction unreasonable ... should courts weigh the federal interests favoring the exercise of jurisdiction.” Id. (citation and internal marks omitted). Once the plaintiff shows that a defendant objecting to personal jurisdiction has “sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole,” that defendant bears the “burden of establishing constitutionally significant inconvenience,” which will be found only in “rare” and “highly unusual cases.” Id. at 946–47. “The burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that the assertion of jurisdiction in the forum will make litigation so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he unfairly is at a severe disadvantage in comparison to his opponent.” Id. at 948 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Odyssea has not come close to satisfying this daunting burden. ⁴ At best, Odyssea complains in conclusory, non-specific terms in its reply brief (unsupported by affidavit, declaration or any other form of evidentiary showing) that it lacks contacts with Alabama and that Louisiana (where Odyssea would prefer to defend this litigation) would be a more convenient forum. (Doc. 24, at 6.) As Republic of Panama teaches, however, “a defendant's contacts with the forum state play no magical role in the Fifth Amendment analysis” because “state lines cannot provide an accurate measure of the burdens that would be imposed on a defendant by requiring him to defend an action in a particular forum.” 119 F.3d at 946. Odyssea has presented literally nothing to show that defending its interests in this forum (as opposed to one a couple hundred miles away in Louisiana) would make litigation so gravely difficult and inconvenient that Odyssea would be placed at a severe disadvantage relative to Smith. Accordingly, this is not one of the “rare” or “highly unusual” cases where the inconvenience to Odyssea of defending itself in this forum would give rise to a cognizable Fifth Amendment due process concern.

Simply put, Odyssea has “presented no evidence that [its] ability to defend this lawsuit will be compromised significantly if [it is] required to litigate in” the Southern District of Alabama. Republic of Panama, 119 F.3d at 948;see also Grail Semiconductor, 2012 WL 5903817, at *5 (defendant's conclusory statements that it would be “extremely difficult” for him to litigate a case in Florida...