Smith v. Smith

• Decision Date: 03 February 2022
• Docket Number: 110214,110274,110245
• Citation: 2022 Ohio 299
• Parties: KEVIN SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellee/ Cross-Appellant, v. CSILLA E. SMITH, Defendant-Appellant/ Cross-Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

2022-Ohio-299

KEVIN SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellee/ Cross-Appellant, v. CSILLA E. SMITH, Defendant-Appellant/ Cross-Appellee.

Nos. 110214, 110245, 110274

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga

February 3, 2022

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Domestic Relations Division Case No. DR-17-366276

Stafford Law Co., L.P A., Joseph G. Stafford, and Nicole A Cruz, for appellee and cross-appellant

Rosenthal | Thurman | Lane, L.L.C., and James L. Lane, for appellant and cross-appellee.

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, JUDGE

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant/cross-appellee, Csilla Smith ("Csilla"), appeals from the judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, adopting the magistrate's decision primarily regarding distribution of marital assets, as modified. Plaintiff-appellee/cross-appellant, Kevin Smith ("Kevin") also appeals the judgment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Procedural History and Substantive Facts

{¶ 2} The parties were married on June 9, 1984, shortly after they both graduated from The Ohio State University. Four children were born as issue to the marriage, all of whom are emancipated adults, and all of whom obtained their college education with the financial assistance of their parents.

{¶ 3} In 1986, after the parties' first child was born, Csilla obtained a law degree and passed the bar exam in 1987. Csilla initially worked as a law clerk but gave up attempts to be employed full-time as an attorney because of the high cost of childcare. During the underlying proceeding Csilla was employed full-time as a Quality Assurance Manager with Yes MLS at an annual salary of $56, 000, plus benefits.

{¶ 4} Kevin, who holds a college degree in agriculture, initially worked in the insurance industry, teaching agents how to sell health insurance. Kevin held a variety of sales and marketing jobs, but later acquired a minority interest in several business entities. Kevin did not acquire his minority interest with cash contributions, but instead through his labor and knowledge of running the daily operations of these entities. During the underlying proceedings, Kevin's income was approximately $155, 000.

{¶ 5} The parties acquired two homes in Northeast Ohio, one located in Broadview Heights and the other in Medina. They also acquired a home in Columbus, Ohio, so that their children could live rent free, while attending The Ohio State University. In addition, the parties acquired a condominium in Florida, where they vacationed once or twice each year. Apart from the real property purchases, the parties did not spend a lot of money during the marriage, choosing instead to focus on paying for their children's college education.

{¶ 6} On November 23, 2015, the parties mutually separated, and Kevin left the marital residence. Following their separation, the parties attempted to amicably divorce through mediation and then through a collaborative process but were unsuccessful.

{¶ 7} On March 22, 2017, Kevin filed his complaint for divorce. On May 3, 2017, Csilla filed her answer and counterclaim, wherein she sought a temporary support order. On August 2, 2017, the magistrate issued a support order that required Kevin to pay Csilla $2, 500 per month in temporary spousal support.

{¶ 8} The matter was heard before the court magistrate on March 6-7, 2018, June 12-13, 2018, February 25-26, 2019, May 28-29, 2019, and July 8, 2019, respectively. The magistrate heard testimony from Csilla and Kevin, as well as their respective business valuation experts Lewis Baum ("Baum") and Bernard Agin ("Agin").

{¶ 9} On February 26, 2020, the magistrate issued the decision. The decision addressed the issue of (1) the duration of the marriage, (2) marital value of the minority interests in corporate entities, (3) marital value of the Columbus, Ohio student housing rental property proceeds of sale, (4) recommendations involving other real and personal property, (5) receivable for loan to the parties' son and receivable from WSKS, (6) Self-Employee Pension ("SEP") in Kevin's name, (7) remaining marital property and payments, (8) property division chart, and (9) Csilla's request for spousal support.

{¶ 10} On March 9, 2020, Csilla filed objections to the magistrate's decision. On June 15, 2020, Csilla filed supplemental objections, numbered I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX and X.^[1] {¶ 11} On December 14, 2020, the trial court issued a journal entry, which overruled objections II, III, VII, VIII and IX. The trial court sustained objections V and VI, plus sustained, in part, objections I, VI, and X. In addition, the trial court ordered that Kevin pay Csilla $2, 066.98 per month, plus statutory interest to equalize the division of property. The trial court further ordered Kevin to pay Csilla $1, 500 in spousal support per month for 108 months or until the death of either party. The trial court retained jurisdiction to modify the amount and duration of the spousal support, noting that remarriage or cohabitation of Csilla may be grounds for modification of the spousal support.

{¶ 12} Kevin also raised objections to the magistrate's decision, numbered I and II, which the trial court overruled.^[2]

{¶ 13} On January 20, 2021, the trial court issued a judgment entry of divorce. The entry incorporated the unmodified provisions of the magistrate's decision and the trial court's previous judgment entry that ruled on the parties' respective objections to the magistrate's decision.

{¶ 14} On January 7, 2021, Csilla filed a notice of appeal of the trial court's December 14, 2020 judgment entry. On January 22, 2021, Csilla filed a notice of appeal of the trial court's January 20, 2021 judgment entry of divorce. On February 5, 2021, Kevin filed a cross-appeal of the trial court's judgment entry of divorce. Subsequently, we sua sponte consolidated the respective appeals for briefing, hearing, and disposition.

{¶ 15} In the now consolidated appeal, Csilla assigns the following errors for review:

Assignment of Error No. 1

The trial court erred and abused its discretion when it determined that the de facto termination date of the parties' marriage was November 23, 2015.

Assignment of Error No. 2

The trial court erred and abused its discretion when it awarded appellant only $1, 500 per month in spousal support for a definite period of 108 months.

Assignment of Error No. 3

The trial court erred and abused its discretion by failing to award appellant her reasonable attorney fees and litigation expenses.

Assignment of Error No. 4

The trial court erred and abused its discretion by failing to properly value marital property owned by the parties and by giving appellee ten full years to equalize the division of marital property with monthly payments made to appellant.

Assignment of Error No. 5

The trial court erred and abused its discretion by failing to retroactively modify temporary spousal support pursuant to Civ.R. 75.

Assignment of Error No. 6

The trial court erred and abused its discretion by refusing to include the loans receivable to the parties in the marital estate.

Assignment of Error No. 7

The trial court erred and abused its discretion by failing to properly value the marital assets in the magistrate's handwritten property division chart.

Assignment of Error No. 8

The trial court erred and abused its discretion by failing to award appellant her separate property and awarding separate property to appellee which was marital in nature.

{¶ 16} In his cross-appeal, Kevin assigns the following error for our review:

Cross-Assignment of Error

The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion by failing to allocate marital debts due and owing to the parties' adult children.

Law and Analysis

{¶ 17} For ease of discussion, we will address the assignments of error out of sequence or simultaneously, where appropriate.

{¶ 18} Preliminarily, Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) provides in relevant part that "the [trial] court shall undertake an independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law." This "independent review" requires the court to '"conduct a de novo review of the facts and an independent analysis of the issues to reach its own conclusions about the issues in the case."' Lichtenstein v. Lichtenstein, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108854, 2020-Ohio-5080, ¶13, citing In re I.R.Q., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105924, 2018-Ohio-292, ¶ 23, quoting Radford v. Radford, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 96267 and 96445, 2011-Ohio-6263, ¶ 13.

{¶ 19} "The trial court must decide 'whether the [magistrate] has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law, and where the [magistrate] has failed to do so, the trial court must substitute its judgment for that of the [magistrate]."' Id., citing Gobel v. Rivers, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94148, 2010-Ohio-4493, ¶ 16, quoting Inman v. Inman, 101 Ohio App.3d 115, 118, 655 N.E.2d 199 (2d Dist.1995). It is generally presumed that the trial court properly conducted an independent review of the magistrate's decision unless the party asserting the error affirmatively shows otherwise. Id., citing Hartt v. Munobe, 67 Ohio St.3d 3, 615 N.E.2d 617 (1993) ("An appellate court reviewing a lower court's judgment indulges in a presumption of regularity of the proceedings below.").

A. Standard of Review

{¶ 20} We review a trial court's determination in domestic relations cases for an abuse of discretion. Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144, 541 N.E.2d 1028 (1989).

Since it is axiomatic that a trial court must have discretion to do what is equitable upon the facts and circumstances of each case, * * * it

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