Smith v. Smith
| Decision Date | 16 May 1961 |
| Parties | Stella SMITH, individually and Stella Smith as Administratrix of the Goods, Chattels and Credits of Jack Smith, deceased, Plaintiff, v. Elizabeth SMITH a/k/a Elizabeth Bittner Smith and Alexander J. Ziemba, Defendants. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
Jesse B. Hecht, New York City, for plaintiffs.
Romano & Moore, Brookly, for defendants Smith.
Defendants move (1) to make more definite and certain paragraphs 9, 13 and 14 and the third cause of action of the amended complaint, (2) to strike out as sham and frivolous the second and fourth causes of action, and (3) in the alternative to dismiss the entire complaint 'for failure to set forth a valid cause of action'.
In his opposing affidavit plaintiff's attorney states that the prime purpose for the entire action is to establish that a conveyance of certain real property from plaintiff's intestate, her deceased husband, to defendant Elizabeth Smith, and a further conveyance of said property from said defendant to herself and defendant Ziemba, as joint tenants, were fraudulent.
The complaint contains four causes of action. Two are asserted by plaintiff Stella Smith, individually, and two are asserted by her in her representative capacity. Two causes of action (one in each capacity) are based upon the theory that said conveyances were made with actual intent to defraud (see Debtor and Creditor Law, § 276) and two causes of action (one in each capacity) are based upon the theory of implied fraud (id., §§ 271, 273).
Plaintiff may, of course, proceed upon as many theories as are available to her in her individual and representative capacities . See 13 Carmody-Wait, Cyclopedia of N.Y.Practice, p. 730; Real Property Law, § 268. Indeed, by order of this court dated March 13, 1961, plaintiff, upon motion of defendants, was ordered separately to state and number her cause of action for fraud in her individual capacity as a judgment creditor, and her cause of action in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of Jack Smith. This she has done. The difficulty with the instant complaint, however, is that the first cause of action--all the allegations of which are incorporated by reference in each of the succeeding causes of action--contains allegations which do not properly belong in that cause of action, which is brought by plaintiff in her individual capacity to set aside the transfers of the property in question on the theory of actual intent to defraud. For example, in paragraphs 11, 12, 13 and 14 plaintiff speaks of the estate of Jack Smith or of his lawful distributees, or both, and in paragraph 15 she unnecessarily alleges his insolvency (see Gunsberg v. Takabi Corp., 20...
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