Smith v. Southern Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 14 October 1910
• Citation: 69 S.E. 18,87 S.C. 136
• Parties: SMITH v. SOUTHERN RY. CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

69 S.E. 18

87 S.C. 136

SMITH v. SOUTHERN RY. CO.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

October 14, 1910

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Spartanburg County; J. W Devore, Judge.

Action by Clara Smith, administratrix, against the Southern Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Blackwood & Hannon and Wilson & Osborne, for respondent. Sanders & De Pass, for appellant.

WOODS J.

The plaintiff, as administratrix, recovered a judgment of $500 damages against the defendant, Southern Railway Company, for the death of her intestate, Jake Smith. The circumstances of the casualty and the charges of negligence are thus set out in the complaint: "That on or about the 1st day of May 1907, Jake Smith, plaintiff's intestate, a boy of tender years, was in the employ of defendant as water carrier and as assistant section hand, and was performing his duties upon the works of defendant company at Charlotte, N. C., and it was his duty as such to supply said hands with water and to assist in loading cars, and to do other duties in connection with said section hands when called upon; that, while he was in the discharge of his duties at said time, he was struck and killed by a heavy steel rail which fell upon him while the same was being loaded or raised by defendant's employés onto a gondola car; that said injuries and death were due (1) to the negligence of defendant company in failing to have a sufficient supply of hands to handle said heavy rail, (2) in not furnishing the deceased with a safe place in which to work, and with safe, suitable ways, means and appliances with which to work, (3) to the negligence of the other employés engaged in performing said work in the manner in which said work was handled, and in permitting the same to fall upon the deceased." The exceptions of the defendant are numerous and elaborate, but the questions of law on which the case turns are few .

First. Was the law of South Carolina or the law of North Carolina applicable? The evidence showed that the boy Jake Smith entered into the contract of employment in South Carolina and that when killed he was doing work of the kind contemplated by his contract in North Carolina. There was no evidence that the contract expressed or implied that his work should be confined to this state. Questions concerning the applicability of conflicting state laws are usually very perplexing, because of the intricacy of the principles involved and the contrariety of judicial expression on the subject. The question here presented may, however, be regarded settled beyond further discussion; the rule being that, in actions of tort based on negligence resulting in death or personal injury, the right of recovery must be determined by the law of the state where the injury was inflicted. The Supreme Court of the United States has expressly so held. Northern Ry. Co. v. Babcock, 154 U.S. 190, 14 S.Ct. 978, 38 L.Ed. 958; Slater v. Mexican N. Railway Co., 194 U.S. 120, 24 S.Ct. 581, 48 L.Ed. 900. The great importance of all the states having common rules on questions of conflict of laws is a very strong reason for all courts to follow any rule on the subject laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States. In this state the case of Dennis v. Atlantic C. L. Ry., 70 S.C. 254, 49 S.E. 869; 106 Am. St. Rep. 746, was decided on the principle that the cause was to be determined by the law of the place where the injury was received. Numerous authorities in other states to the same effect are collated in 26 Cyc. 1079, Boston & Maine R. R. Co. v. Hurd, 108 F. 116, 47 C. C. A. 615, 56 L. R. A. 193, note. The opinion rendered in Caldwell v. Seaboard A. L. Ry., 73 S.C. 443, 53 S.E. 746, contains expressions apparently inconsistent with the rule we have stated, but that case is not an authority against this principle. There the contract of service was made in South Carolina, and there was a subsequent promotion in the service in the state of North Carolina, where the injury was inflicted. The trial judge left it to the jury to decide whether the law of North Carolina or that of South Carolina should be applied; the law of South Carolina being more favorable to the defendant. The exception to the charge on this point was not sustained. Clearly the defendant could not be heard to complain that the jury were allowed, if they saw fit, to apply the law of South Carolina, more favorable to it, when the less favorable law of North Carolina was really applicable. So also in this case the same conditions arise. One of the defenses set up was that the death...