Smith v. St. Paul & D. R. Co.
| Decision Date | 25 February 1895 |
| Citation | 62 N.W. 392,60 Minn. 330 |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
| Parties | SMITH v. ST. PAUL & D. R. CO. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
(Syllabus by the Court.)
1. Where an employé, in consideration of an agreement on the part of the employer to give him work as long as he is able to perform it, releases a claim for damages said to have been caused by the employer's negligence, the agreement is not void because lacking mutuality. By releasing his claim the employé has paid in advance for an optional contract, and he has the right to have it remain optional.
2. Any conduct on the part of a railway engineer, in respect to the use of intoxicating liquors, which, to retain him, would render it negligence on the part of a railway company towards its passengers, constitutes good and sufficient ground for the engineer's discharge.
3. Held, that the verdict in the case was not sustained by the evidence.
Appeal from district court, Ramsey county; Otis, Judge.
Action by Charles L. Smith against the St. Paul & Duluth Railroad Company. Verdict for plaintiff, and from an order denying a new trial defendant appeals. Reversed.
Bunn & Hadley and James D. Armstrong, for appellant.
Francis H. Clarke and M. F. Propping, for respondent.
In September, 1889, while in defendant's employ as a locomotive engineer, the plaintiff, claiming that he had been injured by means of a defective reverse lever on his engine, brought an action for damages, alleging defendant's negligence. In consideration of a full release of all claims arising out of the injuries, the latter agreed to give to the former his old position on the road, and to retain him as long as he should be able to do the work. The plaintiff thereupon resumed work, and by virtue of certain rules relating to duration and period of service, through which came seniority in point of time of employment, he was entitled to, and up to September 21, 1892, did, run a passenger locomotive between St. Paul and Duluth. He was then discharged, the reason given being that he was addicted to the frequent and excessive use of intoxicating liquors. Two questions only need to be discussed,-the first touching upon defendant's contention that, allowing the plaintiff the benefit of the most favorable interpretation of the testimony, no valid and subsisting contract was established; and the second relating to the claim that, from the evidence, it clearly and conclusively appeared that defendant company had good cause for discharging the plaintiff from its employ.
1. There can be no sufficient objection to the contract as proven, on the ground that it lacks mutuality, because the plaintiff was not bound, by its terms, to continue in defendant's service but could cease work at his pleasure. The consideration for defendant's agreement to employ was paid by the release of plaintiff's claim for damages quite as much and as effectually as if plaintiff had actually paid cash. By releasing his claim for damages, the plaintiff paid in advance for the privilege or option of working for the defendant; and, having done this, he had the right to have it remain optional with him how long he would continue to work for the company, while it remained obligatory upon the latter to furnish the opportunity so long as he chose to work, and was able to properly perform the same. The plaintiff had parted with value for the optional contract, and there was owing to him a reciprocal duty and obligation on the part of the company. Pennsylvania Co. v. Dolan, 6 Ind. App. 109, 32 N. E. 802.
2. The trial judge, when denying defendant's motion for a new trial, frankly stated that he would have been better satisfied if the jury had found that the defendant had good cause for discharging the plaintiff from its service. We are not surprised at this expression of dissatisfaction, for we regard the evidence as conclusive upon this branch of the defense; and, although it is with great reluctance that we interfere with the determination of a question of fact by a jury, there are cases where justice imperatively demands that it be done. This is such a case. The testimony was overwhelming that for more than two years before his dismissal the plaintiff had been in the habit of visiting saloons, usually when off duty, and drinking until he became partially or wholly intoxicated. The fact was shown by saloon and bar keepers, and by men who kept boarding houses at which the plaintiff had boarded. This class of testimony was rebutted simply by the evidence of plaintiff's acquaintances to the effect that they had never seen him under the influence of liquor, and by his own denials that he was drunk, or visibly affected by liquor, at any time or place. The real value of plaintiff's denials may best be determined by a statement that in his opinion, as shown by a cross-examination, there is, in respect to a man's ability...
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