Smith v. State

• Decision Date: 18 October 2021
• Docket Number: No. 80485-5-I consolidated with No. 81726-4-I,80485-5-I consolidated with No. 81726-4-I
• Citation: 496 P.3d 1195
• Parties: Joshua C. SMITH, Respondent, v. State of Washington, DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING, Appellant. Matthew B. Dyson, Appellant, v. State of Washington, Department of Licensing, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

496 P.3d 1195

Joshua C. SMITH, Respondent,

v.State of Washington, DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING, Appellant.

Matthew B. Dyson, Appellant,

v.State of Washington, Department of Licensing, Respondent.

No. 80485-5-I consolidated with No. 81726-4-I

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

FILED October 18, 2021

Jeremy Macklin Gelms, Attorney at Law, Leah E. Harris, Washington State Attorney General's Offi., 800 Fifth Ave. Ste. 2000 Seattle, WA, 98104-3188, Licensing & Administrative Law Atty. General, Attorney at Law, 800 Fifth Ave., Suite 2000, Ms-tb-14, Seattle, WA, 98104, for Appellant.

Jonathan David Rands, Attorney At Law, 21 Bellwether Way Ste. 109 Bellingham, WA, 98225-2961, Jeremy Macklin Gelms, Attorney at Law, 800 Fifth Ave. Ste. 2000, Seattle, WA, 98104-3188, for Respondent.

PUBLISHED OPINION

Verellen, J.

¶ 1 The Department of Licensing obtains jurisdiction over a person's implied consent license suspension or revocation only after it receives the required sworn report from a law enforcement officer. Because the department lacks authority to conduct any hearing until that time, the statutory deadline for the department to hold a hearing commences only when the department receives both the sworn report and a timely hearing request from the motorist.

¶ 2 Joshua Smith and Matthew Dyson argue that because the department did not hold a hearing within the timeline provided in the implied consent statute, RCW 46.20.308(7), the suspensions and revocations imposed are invalid. They contend the time to hold a hearing is calculated from the date the department received their timely hearing requests regardless of whether it received an officer's sworn report. Because the department lacked the authority to hold hearings on their cases without a sworn report, once the department received sworn reports about Smith and Dyson, it scheduled and held hearings. Because the department held timely hearings as calculated from the date it obtained jurisdiction over their cases, it had the authority to enforce the implied consent statute by suspending and revoking Smith's and Dyson's licenses.

¶ 3 Therefore, we reverse the RALJ court as to Smith and affirm as to Dyson.

FACTS

¶ 4 This case involves two different motorists, Smith and Dyson, who both refused to submit to breath tests, were arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence (DUI), and had their driving privileges suspended or revoked by the department pursuant to the implied consent statute, RCW 46.20.308. The facts are undisputed.

Joshua Smith

¶ 5 On June 15, 2018, Washington State Patrol Trooper D.A. Black pulled over a speeding car. Smith said he on his way home after having "not too much" to drink.¹ Smith smelled of alcohol, was slurring his speech, and was unaware he was driving 25 miles per hour above the speed limit. Trooper Black advised Smith of his constitutional rights, his right to refuse a breath test, and the consequences of refusing. Smith refused to submit to the breath test or to any field sobriety tests. Trooper Black provided Smith a Department of Licensing "Request for DUI Hearing" form. Trooper Black arrested Smith on suspicion of DUI and obtained a warrant to draw his blood. That day, Trooper Black submitted the blood draw to the Washington State Patrol Toxicology Laboratory for analysis.

On June 29, the department received Smith's timely submission of a request for a hearing.²

¶ 6 On November 26, 2018, Trooper Black received the blood test results, which were over the legal limit. On November 29, Trooper Black completed a sworn report about Smith's arrest, refusal to submit to a breath test, and blood test result, and he submitted it to the department. On November 30, Smith received a notice of suspension from the department, stating his personal driver's license would be suspended from January 31, 2019 until May 1, 2019, and his commercial driver's license would be permanently revoked as of January 31. The department also notified Smith it had scheduled a suspension/revocation hearing for January 15, 2019. Under the version of RCW 46.20.308(7) in effect in late 2018, the department had 60 days in which to hold a hearing.³

¶ 7 During his revocation hearing, Smith argued the department lacked the authority to suspend or revoke his licenses because more than 60 days passed between his request for a hearing and the hearing date, placing his hearing outside the timeline set by the implied consent statute. The hearing examiner concluded the hearing was timely because the department held it within 60 days of its receipt of Officer Black's sworn report. The hearing examiner sustained the department's decision.

¶ 8 In his RALJ appeal to King County Superior Court, Smith argued the revocation should be reversed because the hearing occurred more than 60 days from the department's receipt of his request for a hearing. The court agreed and reversed the revocation.

¶ 9 The department sought discretionary review, which was granted by Commissioner Jennifer Koh, pursuant to RAP 2.3(d)(3).

Matthew Dyson

¶ 10 On December 30, 2019, Trooper Briar Stanley stopped a car travelling 20 miles per hour above the speed limit on the highway. Dyson was driving. Despite denying having been drinking, he was slurring his words, smelled of alcohol, and had poor coordination. Trooper Stanley warned Dyson about the consequences of refusing a breath test. Dyson refused to submit to a breath test and was arrested for DUI. He was processed by Trooper James Van Diest, who gave Dyson a hearing request form. Dyson timely requested a hearing on January 6, 2020.

¶ 11 For reasons unknown to either the department or Dyson, neither trooper submitted a sworn report to the department until March 3, 2020. On March 6, the department sent Dyson a notice of revocation. Three days later, it sent him notice of a March 23 hearing.

¶ 12 During the revocation hearing, Dyson argued the department's action should be dismissed because it failed to schedule his hearing within the timeline set by the implied consent statute. The hearing examiner concluded the department had authority to suspend Dyson's license because it obtained jurisdiction to hold the hearing when it received the sworn arrest report, which meant the hearing was timely held and because the 30-day hearing timeline in RCW 46.20.308(7) was directory rather than mandatory.

¶ 13 On Dyson's RALJ appeal to King County Superior Court, the court upheld the department's decision, explaining that the department did not have the authority to act until it received the officer's sworn report and that the timelines in RCW 46.20.308 were directory.

¶ 14 Dyson sought discretionary review, which was granted by Commissioner Koh under RAP 2.3(d)(3). Dyson's appeal was consolidated with the department's.

ANALYSIS

¶ 15 We review a license suspension or revocation decision from the same position as the superior court.⁴ When, as here, the hearing examiners’ findings of fact are unchallenged, we review their conclusions of law and the department's actions to determine whether an error of law occurred.⁵

¶ 16 The common issues between Smith's and Dyson's cases are ones of statutory interpretation. Both contend the department invalidly suspended and revoked their licenses under the implied consent statute because their hearings were held outside the timeline set by RCW 46.20.308(7) and because that timeline is mandatory. Thus, the primary issue is how to calculate the time for a hearing under the implied consent statute. If the department held hearings within the statutory timeline, then we need not decide whether the timeline is mandatory or directory.

¶ 17 We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo,⁶ interpreting statutes to determine and effectuate the intent of the legislature.⁷ We determine the intent of the legislature by beginning with the statute's plain language, reading the enactment as a whole, and harmonizing its provisions by reading them in context with related provisions.⁸ When a statute is unambiguous, its plain language is taken as a statement of legislative intent.⁹ A statute is unambiguous when its plain language is subject to only one reasonable interpretation.¹⁰ An interpretation that yields an absurd result should be rejected because we presume the legislature does not intend such a result.¹¹

¶ 18 RCW 46.20.308(7) sets timelines for hearings authorized by the implied consent statute. In most circumstances, such as when a person refuses a breath test, a "hearing shall be held within thirty days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, following the date of timely receipt of such request for a formal hearing before the department."¹² If an officer obtains blood test results and submits them to the department, then RCW 46.20.308(7) provides a "hearing shall be held within ... thirty days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays following the date notice has been given in the event notice is given by the department following a blood test."

¶ 19 The premise of the motorists’ argument is that the clock starts ticking on the hearing timeline once the department receives a hearing request. The motorists argue RCW 46.20.308(6), RCW 46.20.308(7), and procedural due process concerns compel this result. The department contends RCW 46.20.308(5), RCW 46.20.308(7), and RCW 46.20.329 must be read together and, when harmonized, do not require a hearing until it receives both a sworn arrest report and a timely request for hearing. Because the motorists’ argument ignores the jurisdictional limits the legislature placed upon the department's ability to act on an individual license, it is unavailing.

¶ 20 The department's authority to suspend or revoke licenses "flow[s] from the police power of the state to regulate driving in the interest of public welfare and safety."¹³ Administrative agencies, like the department, "have no inherent powers" and can "exercise only those powers conferred on them" by the legislature.¹⁴ Thus, the agency must act...