Smith v. State

• Decision Date: 19 December 1891
• Citation: 18 S.W. 237,55 Ark. 259
• Parties: SMITH v. STATE
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

18 S.W. 237

55 Ark. 259

SMITH v. STATE

Supreme Court of Arkansas

December 19, 1891

APPEAL from Franklin Circuit Court, Ozark District, HUGH F THOMASON, Judge.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

George A. Mansfield for appellant.

Argued the case orally.

1. The third instruction asked for defendants should have been given. It states the law and was supported by evidence. It was his defense. Buswell on Insanity, secs. 431, 433; Lawson's Cr. Def., p. 107; Bish., Cr. Law., vol. 1, sec 392, and note 7.

2. It was error to permit the opening statement of the prosecuting attorney, and introduce Martin to prove it, and then refuse to allow defendant to disprove it by Gurley.

3. The evidence totally fails to support the verdict, but points irresistibly to the truth of the facts stated in the third instruction asked.

4. No motive was shown for the killing. And taking the whole evidence, it is clear his defense was made out.

W. E Atkinson, Attorney General, and Charles T. Coleman for appellee.

1. The instructions are mostly from the digest, secs. 1517 to 1522, 1549, 1551 and 1552; and the others approved in 40 Ark. 511; 50 id., 511; and 16 S.W. 658.

2. The third instruction asked for defendant is adroitly drawn, but is unsound and liable to mislead. 16 S.W. 658; 10 Cl. & F., 200.

3. The question asked Smith on re-cross examination was proper under the circumstances. 28 Tex. App., 151; 12 Ohio 483.

4. There was no proper foundation laid for the question put to King. He had not stated the facts within his knowledge.

5. Evidence of the reputation of being insane is not admissible. 58 Ga. 296; 2 Bish., Cr. Proc., sec. 687 (a).

OPINION

HEMINGWAY, J.

The defendant was indicted for murder in the first degree, and sought to excuse the homicide upon the ground of his insanity at the time of its commission. There was evidence tending to prove that at the time of the homicide, and for several years before, he was subject to delusions under the influence of which he believed that a conspiracy had been formed to kill him; that on the morning of the homicide he was in a state of great alarm, and summoned the sheriff to protect him against an apprehended attack; that he believed the deceased to be a party to the conspiracy, and that he had arrived in advance of his associates to accomplish their purpose. The undisputed fact was that at the time of the homicide the deceased was seated quietly at the house of the defendant, making no demonstration of violence, and that there had never been any difficulty between them; but the evidence tended to prove that the defendant believed that the deceased was about to kill him, and that he acted under the belief that it was necessary to kill the deceased to save his own life. We only state that there was evidence of the facts above set out, which made a charge upon that state of case proper. The weight of such evidence is a matter for a jury, and the statement above indicates no opinion in reference thereto.

The State introduced, against defendant's objection, statements made by him to the effect that he had once before killed a man, set up insanity as a defense and been acquitted; and excluded evidence offered by the defense to show that he had killed a man and been discharged, and that he did not interpose the defense of insanity. We think the proof admitted was relevant to the issue, and proper to be considered by the jury in determining whether the homicide was committed under the influence of an existing or of a feigned delusion. If the testimony offered by the defendant related to the killing spoken of in the statement proved, we think it should have been admitted; but in the absence of anything to connect them, we think the testimony offered was irrelevant and properly excluded.

The defense propounded to a witness the following question: "From all you saw and observed while he (defendant) was confined, do you believe that he had sufficient mind to discriminate between right and wrong in reference to his act of shooting Stevens? Or, if he could so discriminate right from wrong, do you believe that he had sufficient mental power to control his actions?" The witness had detailed what he had seen and observed in the conduct of the defendant, as the basis of the opinion he was asked to express. He should, therefore, have been permitted to answer so much of the question as related to the mental competency of the defendant to distinguish between right and wrong in reference to the homicide. There was no evidence tending to show that the defendant could discriminate right from wrong, but from mental disorder could not control his actions; and the fact that he was controlled by overmastering anger or revenge would not have excused him. We think, therefore, that the latter part of the question should not have been answered. Bolling v. State, 54 Ark. 588, 16 S.W. 658. It would serve no useful purpose for us to comment upon the many and cruel outrages upon justice that have been perpetrated in the name of emotional insanity. The fact is within the observation of all, and its effects have prejudiced none more than the unfortunate members of society who are in fact bereft of reason. It has no place as a defense in the laws of this State.

The court is constrained to express its disapproval of the twentieth instruction given on behalf of the State, without expressing an opinion as to the extent or effect of the error in giving it. Instructions are intended to enlighten the jury and guide them to correct legal conclusions upon the facts they shall find. There is no popular belief that a jury has the pardoning power, and the jury could not have believed that the law gave it such power, or that its usurpation would not be a gross violation of duty. To declare such principles was wholly unnecessary, and an...