Smith v. State
Decision Date | 13 March 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 78509,78509 |
Citation | 264 Kan. 348,955 P.2d 1293 |
Parties | Dewey R. SMITH, et al., Appellants, v. STATE of Kansas, et al., Appellees. |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
In a suit challenging Shawnee County District Court Rule 3.311 pretrial release procedures and seeking class action certification, injunctive relief, and attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994) against defendant judges and damages against the State under the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA), K.S.A. 75-6101 et seq., the record is reviewed and it is held: (1) The claims alleged against the 14 district judges as individuals for injunctive relief, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, were properly dismissed under K.S.A. 60-212(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, (2) the State is immune from the KTCA damage claims under K.S.A. 75-6104(b), the judicial function exception, and (3) a district court's reason for a decision is immaterial if the ruling was correct for any reason.
Michael F. Brunton, Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief, for appellants.
Eliehue Brunson, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause, and Kevin D. Case, Assistant Attorney General, and Carla J. Stovall, Attorney General, were with him on the brief, for appellees.
This is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) and Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA), K.S.A. 75-6101 et seq., case. Plaintiffs are eight persons who, following arrest, experienced pretrial release procedures in the Third Judicial District (Shawnee County). Plaintiffs challenge the procedures. Defendants are the State, the Third Judicial District, and the 14 Third Judicial District judges as individuals.
The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. See K.S.A. 60-212(b)(1) and (6). Plaintiffs object specifically to the "Own Recognizance-Cash Deposit Bond" (ORCD bond) authorized by Third Judicial District Court Rule (DCR) 3.311. DCR 3.311 was adopted under Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 96.
Plaintiffs' petition asserts constitutional violations and seeks class certification, injunctive relief, and attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994). The certification references a class of persons "arrested in the Third Judicial District since 1985 who have been required to post bail to be eligible for pre-trial release." Plaintiffs estimated that the class numbered 73,000 as of July 24, 1996, the date the petition was filed. The class grows by an average of 20 persons per day. Damages are sought against the State in the KTCA claim, for false imprisonment and conversion. Our jurisdiction is under K.S.A. 20-3018(c) ( ).
We consider two questions: Did the district court err in dismissing (a) the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and (b) the KTCA damage claims?
The answer to both is "no."
We affirm the district court.
Our Order No. 96 (issued January 17, 1995) gives all judicial districts discretion to adopt a pretrial release procedure similar to DCR 3.311. Paragraph 2 of Order No. 96 clearly says that any local rule dealing with pretrial release is "[i]n addition to the current statutory pretrial release system."
The legislature has addressed pretrial release procedures. Under K.S.A. 22-2802(1), persons charged with crimes "shall ... be ordered released pending ... trial upon the execution of an appearance bond in an amount specified by the magistrate and sufficient to assure the appearance of such person before the magistrate when ordered and to assure the public safety." Under paragraphs (3) and (4), 22-2802 contemplates three types of appearance bonds: own recognizance, surety, or a cash deposit instead of the bond. The bond is to have sufficient sureties, unless the magistrate decides that requiring sureties is not necessary to assure appearance. In lieu of a surety bond, cash may be deposited for the bond.
Under DCR 3.311, besides the statutory bonds described in 22-2802, the ORCD bond, a hybrid type of bond, is created. Paragraph 16 of DCR 3.311 provides that ORCD bond participation is on a voluntary basis and the statutory methods of providing bail are not to be limited or restricted. With the ORCD bond, the judge sets a bond amount (for example, $1,000). The accused is required to deposit 10 percent of that amount with the clerk of the district court ($100). The accused receives 90% of that deposit back upon completion of all obligations to the court--unless the accused has other financial obligations such as back child support or outstanding fines. If there are outstanding financial obligations, the $90 will be applied to those. Ten percent of the deposit ($10 in the example) will be kept as an administrative fee. Another key provision is Paragraph 15. This paragraph provides that when the court has specified the bond as cash or ORCD but the accused wants a professional surety bond, "the deputy clerk shall contact the
judge authorizing the bond for modification of the bond."
The first amended petition sets forth the factual allegations surrounding the arrest, bail bonds, and release of each plaintiff. The case numbers of the individual criminal cases of plaintiffs are alleged, but the judge handling the particular case is not identified. In seven of the plaintiffs' bond situations, the district court allegedly set cash or ORCD bonds for varying amounts, although the plaintiffs had requested surety bonds. Requests for surety bonds were denied, either by the judge or because the deputy clerk allegedly refused to contact the judge to make the modification. In one situation, the plaintiff had requested a cash bond, but a surety or ORCD bond was specified. One of the plaintiffs (Hendricks) was released only after the district attorney declined to prosecute. Plaintiffs also complain that DCR 3.311 allows the district court to apply an accused's cash deposit to other obligations unrelated to the accused's criminal case. They also contend that an unauthorized administrative fee is charged with ORCD bonds. Plaintiffs assert that the practices allowed under DCR 3.311 and as applied by the defendant judges are not authorized by K.S.A. 22-2802.
The petition alleges that the defendants, acting under color of state law, violated plaintiffs' federal civil rights of due process, equal protection, and freedom from excessive bail, and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 through the pretrial release procedure. Plaintiffs also claim defendants have violated § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. The petition sets out a list of specific defects in the pretrial release procedure. Plaintiffs claim their releases were delayed and they were unlawfully forced to forfeit money deposited with the court during the bonding-out process. These allegations are advanced in support of KTCA claims for false imprisonment and conversion. Plaintiffs seek prospective injunctive relief prohibiting enforcement of the pretrial release procedures, costs and attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, monetary damages for the class, and restitution.
The petition is not separated into different counts. All claims are alleged together against all defendants. The petition does not identify the current status of plaintiffs' criminal cases. It also does not plead that any plaintiffs sought relief regarding their bonds in their criminal cases, either through appeal or by writ of habeas corpus.
Defendants jointly moved to dismiss the petition under K.S.A. 60-212(b)(1) (subject matter jurisdiction) and (6) (failure to state a claim). The parties fully briefed the issues, which were heard before the Honorable Stephen D. Hill, who was assigned from another judicial district.
Plaintiffs presented several evidentiary witnesses, including court services personnel, a criminal defense attorney, a legal assistant from the public defender's office, jail personnel, and three of the plaintiffs. The testimony addressed the operation of the pretrial release program as applied to the three plaintiffs who testified.
Judge Hill decided the Third Judicial District was not a legal entity and dismissed all claims against the district, under K.S.A. 60-212(b)(1). All 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the State were dismissed for failure to state a claim, K.S.A. 60-212(b)(6) ( ). On appeal, plaintiffs have not briefed the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against either the judicial district or the State. Plaintiffs' counsel acknowledged at oral argument that these claims were abandoned.
In determining that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 equitable relief against the judges, Judge Hill relied on the following two reasons:
(1) The noninterference doctrine, as stated in Schaeffer v. Schaeffer, 175 Kan. 629, 633, 266 P.2d 282 (1954), applied:
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