Smith v. State
| Decision Date | 29 June 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. S09A0224.,S09A0224. |
| Citation | 285 Ga. 725,681 S.E.2d 161 |
| Parties | SMITH v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Oliver J. Browning Jr., Buchanan, for appellant.
Robert E. Brooks, Jr., District Attorney, Craig E. Miller, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, for appellee.
Following a bench trial, Ronald Dale Smith appeals his conviction for first degree homicide by vehicle, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and that the homicide by vehicle statute (OCGA § 40-6-393(a)) is unconstitutional. We affirm.
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence reveals that, on March 8, 2005, Smith, an escaped prisoner from Florida, was driving a white Dodge pick-up truck with a North Carolina tag through Carroll County. A BOLO ("be on the lookout") had been issued for the white pick-up truck, and Carroll County Sheriff's Deputy Jamie K. Godbee spotted the vehicle as Smith drove down Highway 27 in Carroll County. Officer Godbee activated his emergency lights and pursued Smith from Carroll County into Haralson County. Smith sped through a red light at the intersection of Highway 27 and Highway 78, with Officer Godbee close behind. A car driven by Rebecca Partain was stopped at the red light at the intersection. Officer Godbee, unable to see Ms. Partain's vehicle due to his close proximity to Smith's truck, collided with Ms. Partain's vehicle, killing Ms. Partain.1
The evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Smith guilty of first degree homicide by vehicle. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); OCGA § 40-6-393(a) (). See also Ponder v. State, 274 Ga.App. 93(1), 616 S.E.2d 857 (2005) ().
2. Smith contends that the homicide by vehicle statute is unconstitutional because its terms fail to provide sufficient notice to enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits. However, "[a] criminal statute is sufficiently definite if its terms furnish a test based on normal criteria which men of common intelligence who come in contact with the statute may use with reasonable safety in determining its command." (Citation omitted.) Wilson v. State, 245 Ga. 49, 53, 262 S.E.2d 810 (1980). Indeed, "[a]ll the Due Process Clause requires is that the law give sufficient warning that men may conduct themselves so as to avoid that which is forbidden." (Footnote omitted.) Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50, 96 S.Ct. 243, 46 L.Ed.2d 185 (1975). Here, the plain language of OCGA § 40-6-393(a) makes clear that a person is guilty of homicide by vehicle if he or she causes the death of another, without malice aforethought, by illegally overtaking a school bus, driving recklessly, driving under the influence, or fleeing or attempting to elude an officer. There is nothing in the statute that would have prevented Smith, or any person of ordinary intelligence, from understanding that actions taken to elude police that result in the death of another person could lead to a prosecution and conviction for first degree homicide by vehicle. See id. Smith's argument to the contrary is without merit.
Judgment affirmed.
In its criminal prosecution against Ronald Dale Smith for first degree vehicular homicide, the State chose to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt by presenting its evidence against him in the form of stipulated facts. Those facts reflected that Smith was an alleged escaped prisoner from Florida wanted for an alleged theft by taking in North Carolina. Officer Godbee of the Carroll County Sheriff's Department was on a look-out for a vehicle matching the description of Smith's truck when he encountered Smith. Officer Godbee activated his siren and lights and proceeded after Smith's vehicle but Smith fled the officer, heading north on Highway 27. Pertinent to this appeal, the State stipulated that:
6. Officer Godbee continued to pursue [Smith] North on Highway 27 for approximately three to four miles traveling at speeds of approximately 75 miles per hour, exceeding the 55 miles per hour posted speed; and
7. During most of his pursuit, Officer Godbee's vehicle was within a few car lengths of [Smith's] vehicle, which did not allow him a full field of vision forward; and
8. As [Smith] and Officer Godbee approached the intersection of Highway[s 27 and 78], the traffic light controlling the intersection was red for traffic traveling North on Highway 27; and
9. As [Smith] and Officer Godbee came to the intersection . . . both were traveling [approximately 75 mph] and there [were] three other vehicles, excluding [Smith's] and Officer Godbee's vehicles, at the intersection; and
10. Rebecca Partain's vehicle was in the Northbound lane of Highway 27 behind another vehicle, and stopped for the red light; and
11. As [Smith and the officer's] vehicles entered the intersection, Officer Godbee, unable to see Ms. Partain's vehicle due to his close proximity to [Smith's] vehicle, collided with Ms. Partain's vehicle; and
12. The collision of Officer Godbee's vehicle with Ms. Partain's vehicle resulted in Ms. Partain's death. . . .
In order to sustain a conviction for first degree vehicular homicide, the evidence must be sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt not only that the accused committed the predicate traffic offense but also that the predicate offense was the proximate cause of the victim's death. In the Interest of L.P., 228 Ga.App. 786, 787, 492 S.E.2d 757 (1997). The stipulated facts in this case established Smith's commission of the predicate traffic offense, i.e., OCGA § 40-6-395 (). As to the proximate cause element, however, the stipulated facts support two reasonable hypotheses, one consistent with Smith's guilt but the other consistent with Smith's innocence. As to the first hypothesis, the trier of fact could find that Smith was the proximate cause of the victim's death in that his actions "played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage and that the injury or damage was...
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