Smith v. State

• Decision Date: 17 March 2011
• Docket Number: No. SC09–386.,SC09–386.
• Citation: 59 So.3d 1107
• Parties: Anthony E. SMITH, Petitioner,v.STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

59 So.3d 1107

Anthony E. SMITH, Petitioner,

v.STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC09–386.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 17, 2011.

Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Beth C. Weitzner, Assistant Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, FL, for Petitioner.Pamela J. Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, Richard L. Polin, Bureau Chief, Douglas J. Glaid and Ansley B. Peacock, Assistant Attorneys General, Miami, FL, for Respondent.PARIENTE, J.

The issue in this case is whether a trial court can deny a party the right to exercise a peremptory strike against a juror where the record does not establish that the juror was a member of a protected class. The decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Smith v. State, 1 So.3d 352 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), is in express and direct conflict with our precedent in State v. Alen, 616 So.2d 452 (Fla.1993), which held that a juror's surname, without more, is insufficient to trigger an inquiry as to whether the strike was exercised in a discriminatory manner.¹ The Third District's opinion, which does not require that there be a threshold demonstration that the juror was a member of a protected class, has the potential to undermine the very purpose for the protections required to prevent invidious discrimination in jury selection. We quash the decision of the Third District because it is contrary to our precedent in Alen that a juror's surname, without more, is insufficient to trigger an inquiry as to whether the strike was exercised for a discriminatory reason.

FACTS

During voir dire, each of the jurors answered a list of standard questions regarding their backgrounds. A potential juror, Earl Buchholz, Jr., identified himself as the chairman of a prestigious international tennis tournament held annually in Key Biscayne, Florida.

MR. BUCHHOLZ: My name is Earl Buchholz, Jr. I was born 9/16/1940. I reside in Unincorporated Dade. I have lived here about 17 years. My occupation is I'm chairman of the NASDAQ 100 Open, which is a tennis tournament at Key Biscayne.

THE COURT: Isn't your name Butch?

MR. BUCHHOLZ: Yes, hello. How are you doing?

My wife is a domestic engineer. I have three grown children. I have served on a jury before when I was living in St. Louis. It was a criminal charge and they settled the case, plea bargained.

I do not have any law enforcement people in my family. We have been robbed when we lived in Boca. Our house was robbed.

I have never been accused of a crime. And I have not been a witness.

THE COURT: Thank you.

During the parties' exercise of challenges, defense counsel stated that he was peremptorily striking Mr. Buchholz, at which point the following exchange occurred:

MR. CASASNOVAS [defense counsel]: We are going to ask for a peremptory on Mr. Buchholz, No. 12.

MS. MATO [prosecutor]: Judge, I would—

THE COURT: Wait a minute. What about Buchholz? You are peremptorily challenging him?

MR. CASASNOVAS: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Are you requiring an explanation?

MS. MATO: Yes, Judge.

MR. CASASNOVAS: Is he a member of a distinct minority group which would render him—

THE COURT: Buchholz?

MR. CASASNOVAS: Yes.

THE COURT: Sounds to me like a German name.

MR. CASASNOVAS: This is a recognized minority group within the law, I believe.[ ²] Mr. Buchholz— THE COURT: I suppose there is—anybody qualifies under our present great, deeply thought out appellate decisions.

MR. CASASNOVAS: He is a victim of a house robbery which makes him a victim of a crime. And he can harbor bias or any difficulty in this case—

THE COURT: The Court will rule that is not a genuine objection and it is overruled.

MR. CASASNOVAS: We have several others.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. CASASNOVAS: He served on a jury.

THE COURT: He served on a jury in Ohio.

MS. WRIGHT [co-defense counsel]: St. Louis.

MR. CASASNOVAS: In a criminal case.

MS. MATO: Those were the same reasons I requested that juror No. 3 be excused.

THE COURT: We are done with Juror No. 3.

MS. MATO: The reasons they said were not the same reasons they are saying for Juror No. 12 [Buchholz].

THE COURT: I don't think that the objections to Buchholz are genuine. I'm going to overrule it.

MR. CASASNOVAS: That is over our respectful objection.

THE COURT: That's correct.

(Emphasis added.)

On appeal, Smith raised only one issue: whether the trial court erred in denying defense counsel's peremptory challenge of Buchholz. In reaching its decision, the Third District rejected the defendant's claim that the State's objection to the peremptory challenge was insufficient. The Third District first recognized that when a party objects to the use of a peremptory challenge, the opponent “must make a timely objection, identify the racial or ethnic class or gender of the juror being challenged, and request that the trial court ask the striking party to articulate its reason(s) for the strike.” Smith, 1 So.3d at 353. Any doubt as to whether this initial burden was met must be resolved in the objecting party's favor. The Third District then held that if an objection is insufficient, a trial court is not required to make an inquiry as to the reason for the strike. Id. at 354. However, the “trial court may exercise its discretion to do so if it clearly understands the nature of the objection.” Id.

Relying on this Court's opinion in Franqui v. State, 699 So.2d 1332, 1335 (Fla.1997), the Third District interpreted Franqui as drawing a distinction between “those cases in which reversal is being sought when the trial court failed to make a required inquiry and those in which an inquiry was made even though the objection levied did not require it to do so.” Smith, 1 So.3d at 354. In support, the Third District reasoned that

in Franqui, while the State's objection was arguably insufficient to require the trial court to conduct a Neil [ ³] inquiry, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed Franqui's convictions after concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requesting the defense to provide a race-neutral reason for its peremptory challenge of the juror since it was clear that the trial court understood that the objection was made on racial grounds.

Id. (emphasis omitted). The Third District rejected the premise that an inquiry cannot be made by the trial court unless the objecting party meets the first prong of Melbourne,⁴ which requires the objecting party to “make a timely objection, identify the racial or ethnic class or gender of the juror being challenged, and request that the trial court ask the striking party to articulate its reason(s) for the strike.” Smith, 1 So.3d at 353. The Third District then concluded that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requesting the defense to provide a race-neutral reason for its peremptory challenge of prospective juror Buchholz.” Id. at 355. The Third District affirmed the trial court because the trial court found that the reasons proffered were not genuine and the record clearly supported the trial court's finding.

ANALYSIS

The conflict issue is whether a juror's surname, without more, is sufficient to trigger an inquiry into whether the peremptory strike was exercised in a discriminatory manner. As we explain below, the Third District's decision directly conflicts with this Court's decision in Alen, which held that a juror's surname alone is insufficient to demonstrate ethnicity. The Third District's opinion also mistakenly relied on and misapplied this Court's decision in Franqui. While Franqui recognized that no magic words were necessary to trigger an inquiry into whether a strike was exercised in a discriminatory manner, Franqui did not eliminate the necessity of establishing that the juror was a member of a cognizable class.

To answer this question, we discuss the law relative to peremptory challenges and then apply it in this case to determine if the trial court and the Third District properly determined that an inquiry into the basis for the peremptory challenge was appropriate. For the reasons addressed in more depth below, we conclude that the inquiry was contrary to this Court's well-established precedent.

Our Precedent Regarding Peremptory Challenges

As recognized by this Court, “the very purpose of peremptory challenges is ‘the effectuation of the constitutional guaranty of trial by an impartial jury.’ Although peremptory challenges are not themselves constitutionally guaranteed at either the state or federal level, such challenges are nonetheless ‘one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused.’ ” Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 98 (Fla.2004) (citations omitted); see also Alen, 616 So.2d at 453. These peremptory challenges, however, cannot be used in a discriminatory manner to exclude potential jurors based on race, ethnicity, or gender. Busby, 894 So.2d at 99.

Article I, section 16, of the Florida Constitution guarantees a defendant the right to an impartial jury. This Court has held that the exercise of a peremptory challenge solely on the basis of race violates the right to trial by an impartial jury under article I, section 16, of the Florida Constitution. See Neil, 457 So.2d at 486. The Court has explained the tension between the right to exercise peremptory challenges and the right to an impartial jury free of impermissible discrimination as follows:

Traditionally, a peremptory challenge permits dismissal of a juror based on no more than “sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another.” 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 353 (1807). This ancient tradition, however, is to some degree inconsistent with the requirements of the Florida and federal constitutions. We thus cannot permit the peremptory's use when it results in the exclusion of persons from jury service due to constitutionally impermissible prejudice. To the extent of the inconsistency, the constitutional principles must prevail, notwithstanding the traditionally unlimited scope of the peremptory.

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