Smith v. State, S15A0614.
Decision Date | 01 June 2015 |
Docket Number | No. S15A0614.,S15A0614. |
Citation | 773 S.E.2d 269,297 Ga. 268 |
Parties | SMITH v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Lynn M. Kleinrock, Atlanta, for appellant.
Paula Khristian Smith, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Atty. Gen., Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Meghan Hobbs Hill, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daniel J. Porter, Dist. Atty., Christopher Michael Quinn, Lisa Ann Jones, Asst. Dist. Attys., for appellee.
Appellant Ronald Smith appeals his convictions for felony murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Genai Coleman. Appellant's sole contention is that the trial court improperly commented on the credibility of a witness. We find no merit to this contention and affirm appellant's convictions and sentences, except for the conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm during the commission of the aggravated assault of Coleman, which must be vacated.1
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence presented at trial showed that, on the evening of July 18, 2008, Coleman parked her car in a parking lot near Gwinnett Place Mall while waiting for her daughter to finish her shift at work. Appellant, who had just purchased some beer and cigarettes at a gas station located across the street from where the victim was parked, approached her car. Appellant attempted to take Coleman's car, and a brief struggle ensued, during which Appellant shot the victim once in the chest, killing her. He then drove off in her car. The victim's car was later recovered in Forest Park, Georgia, and DNA material recovered from a cigarette butt found in the car matched appellant's DNA. Appellant's fingerprints were also found on the car.
verdict, the evidence presented at trial and summarized above was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
[W]here multiple crimes are committed together during the course of one continuous crime spree, a defendant may be convicted once for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime as to every individual victim of the crime spree, as provided under OCGA § 16–11–106(b)(1), and additionally once for firearm possession for every crime enumerated in subsections (b)(2) through (5).
State v. Marlowe, 277 Ga. 383, 386(2)(c), 589 S.E.2d 69 (2003). In this case, because the underlying crimes of murder and aggravated assault were committed against one victim, the possession charge predicated on aggravated assault merged with the possession charge predicated on murder. See Gibbs v. State, 295 Ga. 92(2), 757 S.E.2d 842 (2014) ; Marlowe, 277 Ga. at 386–387, 589 S.E.2d 69. The trial court properly entered a judgment of conviction and sentence on the possession charge predicated on hijacking a motor vehicle, as that crime is enumerated in subsection (b)(3) of OCGA § 16–11–106. See Marlowe, 277 Ga. at 387, 589 S.E.2d 69 ( ).
2. Appellant's sole contention concerns the testimony of a witness who saw the encounter between appellant and the victim. During cross-examination, the witness became visibly upset. The trial court took a break in the trial for the benefit of the witness and questioned the witness out of the jury's presence about the reason for her distress.
When the court asked the witness if she wanted to take a break, she responded that she wanted to “get it over” and “go home.” When the jury returned to the courtroom, the trial court, with the witness's permission, informed the jury that:
[The witness] doesn't feel well this morning. She's having some personal medical issues. And she's not upset with any of the lawyers, but she doesn't feel well. But we're going to try to finish asking her questions. But I just wanted y'all to know that the stress is not really related to this case. So we're going to try to get her out of here as soon as we can.
Appellant contends that the trial court's statement that the witness's stress was not related to the trial was an improper comment on her credibility and violated OCGA § 17–8–57. We disagree.
OCGA § 17–8–57 says that “[i]t is error for any judge in any criminal case, during its progress or in his charge to the jury, to express or intimate his opinion as to what has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the accused....” One of the purposes of OCGA § 17–8–57 “is to prevent the jury from being influenced by any disclosure of the trial court's opinion regarding the credibility of a witness.” Murphy v. State, 290 Ga. 459, 460(2), 722 S.E.2d 51 (2012). However, a trial court has considerable discretion to control the trial of the case to ensure a fair trial and the orderly administration of justice. See Bonner v. State, 295 Ga. 10(3), 757 S.E.2d 118 (2014) ; Smith v. State, 292 Ga. 588(2), 740 S.E.2d 129 (2013). A trial court also has discretion to “propound questions to a witness to develop the truth of the case or to clarify testimony.” Finley v. State, 286 Ga. 47, 51–52(9)(a), 685 S.E.2d 258 (2009).
In exercising these powers, a trial court may not violate OCGA § 17–8–57, and whether the trial court in this case did so depends on whether or not it improperly bolstered the witness's credibility. See Smith, 292 Ga. at 589–590, 740 S.E.2d 129 ( ); Murphy, 290 Ga. at 461, 722 S.E.2d 51 ( ); John v. State, 282 Ga. 792(3), 653 S.E.2d 435 (2007) ( ); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 277 Ga. 729, 730(1), 594 S.E.2d 653 (2004) ( ); Callaham v. State, 305 Ga.App. 626, 627(1), 700 S.E.2d 624 (2010) “ ...
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