Smith v. State
| Citation | 231 Ga. 23,200 S.E.2d 119 |
| Decision Date | 06 September 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 28055,28055 |
| Parties | Herbert B. SMITH et al. v. The STATE. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
Syllabus by the Court
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the appellants to withdraw their 'guilty' pleas after sentence had been pronounced.
Ike W. Cobb, Atlanta, for appellants.
Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Morris H. Rosenberg, Kenneth E. Traub, James H. Mobley, Jr., Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Courtney Wilder Stanton, Asst. Atty. Gen., B. Dean Grindle, Jr., Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.
This is a direct appeal from a sentencing judgment entered in a case in which appellants plead guilty to several counts of armed robbery. The appeal challenges the subsequent order of the trial court following sentencing in which the appellants' request to withdraw their pleas was denied. The issue before this court is whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow the appellants to withdraw their pleas. In reviewing this decision, we proceed on the basis that a ruling on a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty after pronouncement of sentence is always within the sound legal discretion of the trial court. McCrary v. State, 215 Ga. 887(2), 114 S.E.2d 133 (1960). See, also, the recent trilogy of cases in the Court of Appeals, Ware v. State, 128 Ga.App. 407, 196 S.E.2d 896 (1973); Marshall v. State, 128 Ga.App. 413, 197 S.E.2d 161 (1973); and, Farmer v. State, 128 Ga.App. 416, 196 S.E.2d 893 (1973).
At the guilty plea hearing, both appellants were represented by counsel. The assistant district attorney determined from the responses of the appellants that they had conferred with their attorney concerning the charges against them; that they had read the indictments setting forth specifically the crimes they were charged with, as read in part to them in court; that they understood the charges against them and understood the charges carried penalties of 2 to 20 years, or life; that each understood he was waiving certain constitutional rights, among which were that of trial by jury and the right to call witnesses, to remain silent and to cross examine witnesses; that they were not making their pleas due to any promises or threats made to them; and, that in fact they had committed the crimes with which they were charged.
The trial court accepted the pleas of guilty and the assistant district attorney recommended 12 years for the appellant Baldwin and 9 years for the appellant Smith, these being recommendations of leniency in both instances. The trial court, however, rejected the state's recommendations and announced he would sentence Baldwin to life-imprisonment and Smith to 20 years confinement in the State Penitentiary. The trial court also informed the defendants: 'And either of you have a perfect right to withdraw your plea of guilty, in which event it will be submitted to a jury for trial.'
The guilty plea hearing was held on March 20, 1973. Sentences were committed to judgment on the same day. Subsequently, the appellants sent a letter to the trial court requesting they be allowed to withdraw their pleas. They trial court then held another hearing on their requests. The record of this hearing reveals there was a recess at the termination of the earlier guilty plea hearing during which the appellants conferred with their attorney and determined they did not wish to withdraw their pleas. It was after this recess that sentences were pronounced by the trial court. It was also established at the hearing on the plea withdrawal, as the trial court reviewed the record of the guilty plea hearing with appellants, that at the time the pleas were entered appellants were not acting under any promise or threats to coerce them to plead guilty. Additionally, counsel for the appellants at the guilty plea hearing indicated that although he had bargained for the pleas with the assistant district attorney in return for recommendations of leniency, the appellants were assured the assistant district attorney's...
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Mims v. State, S16A0542
...plea judge that Mims was not induced to enter his plea by any impermissible or undisclosed promise of leniency. See Smith v. State , 231 Ga. 23, 25–26, 200 S.E.2d 119 (1973). For that reason, even if Mims had taken a timely appeal to assert the fourth claim of error, it would have proved un......
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Fair v. State
...of the withdrawal provision of Code Ann. § 27-1404 is to provide a necessary part of the plea bargaining procedure, Smith v. State, 231 Ga. 23, 200 S.E.2d 119 (1973). Its provisions have been held to apply to nolo contendere pleas, Wright v. State, 75 Ga.App. 764, 44 S.E.2d 569 (1947), but ......
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Browner v. State, 43998
...case. The right to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing has a necessary role in the plea bargaining process, Smith v. State, 231 Ga. 23, 25, 200 S.E.2d 119 (1973), that is not present in a capital felony case in which the trial has plainly disclosed to the defendant the possibility th......
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Goss v. State
...a plea of guilty after pronouncement of sentence is always within the sound legal discretion of the trial court." Smith v. State, 231 Ga. 23, 24, 200 S.E.2d 119. Accord, State v. Germany, 246 Ga. 455, 456(1), 271 S.E.2d 851. However, the exercise of that discretion is primarily controlled b......