Smith v. State
Decision Date | 21 October 2021 |
Docket Number | No. SC18-1763, No. SC19-680,SC18-1763 |
Parties | Terry SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. Terry Smith, Petitioner, v. Mark S. Inch, etc., Respondent. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Robert S. Friedman, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Karin L. Moore and Elizabeth C. Spiaggi, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Northern Region, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellant/Petitioner
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Jason William Rodriguez, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellee/Respondent
Terry Smith appeals the denial of numerous guilt-phase claims raised in his initial motion for postconviction relief filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief as to the guilt phase and deny Smith's habeas petition.
Terry Smith was convicted of the first-degree murders of Desmond Robinson, Berthum Gibson, and Keenethia Keenan. He was sentenced to death for the murders of Gibson and Keenan and to life for the murder of Robinson. Smith v. State , 139 So. 3d 839, 841 (Fla. 2014). On direct appeal, this Court set forth the facts of the murders as follows:
Smith , 139 So. 3d at 841-42 (alteration in original). We affirmed the convictions and sentences in 2014. Id. at 841.
Smith filed a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and several amendments thereto, ultimately raising sixteen claims. After holding a case management conference, the trial court granted an evidentiary hearing on nine claims. Subsequent to the evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order denying in part Smith's motion for postconviction relief and granting in limited part Smith's motion for postconviction relief as to a new penalty phase under Hurst v. State , 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), receded from in part by State v. Poole , 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020).1 This appeal follows.2
Smith first raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase. Under Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 686-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), a defendant alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel has the burden to demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that trial counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. "Both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law and fact." Johnson v. State , 135 So. 3d 1002, 1013 (Fla. 2014). "In reviewing a trial court's ruling after an evidentiary hearing on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this Court defers to the factual findings of the trial court to the extent that they are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviews de novo the application of the law to those facts." Id. (quoting Mungin v. State , 932 So. 2d 986, 998 (Fla. 2006) ).
As to the first prong, the defendant must establish "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A court reviewing the second prong must determine whether "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim ... to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." Id. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Contained within Smith's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are numerous subclaims. We now address each subclaim in turn.
Smith first claims that counsel was ineffective for introducing into evidence an additional portion of Smith's taped interrogation in which detectives repeatedly accused Smith of having no remorse for the murders.3
On April 1, 2009, Detectives Nelson and Chizik of the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office conducted a video-recorded interrogation of Smith regarding the murders of Robinson, Gibson, and Keenan, which occurred at Robinson's house on Ahmad Drive. At trial, the State introduced portions of the recording, in which Smith repeatedly denied being involved in the murders or ever having been inside the Ahmad Drive house. On cross-examination, defense counsel played an additional portion of the video recording, in which Detective Nelson continued to ask Smith questions even after Smith had repeatedly requested to stop the interrogation. During the portion of the video recording played by defense counsel, the detectives made multiple references to Smith's lack of remorse.
At the evidentiary hearing, lead trial counsel, Richard Kuritz, testified that he introduced the additional portion of the video in order to portray the detectives as dishonest and unethical and show that they were "running all over" Smith's constitutional rights. Counsel said that he wanted to show the jury that the lead detective was not as charming and nice as he seemed during direct examination and that he thought that the conduct of the detectives on the video was more damning to the State's case than anything else. Counsel used the interrogation practices displayed on the video to argue in closing that the detectives also disregarded the rights of and used heavy-handed interrogation techniques on the witnesses against Smith in this case—Breon Williams, Ullysses Johnson, and Jonathan Peterson—in order to get them to implicate Smith. The trial court concluded that trial counsel's decision to introduce the additional portion of the video was a sound, strategic decision, intended to provide a concrete example of the lead detective's aggressive interrogation tactics.
The...
To continue reading
Request your trial