Smith v. State Of Del.
Decision Date | 26 May 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 190,2009.,190 |
Citation | 996 A.2d 786 |
Parties | Shawn SMITH, Defendant Below, Appellant,v.STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. |
Court | Supreme Court of Delaware |
Court Below-Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County, Cr. No. 0802036112.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court. REVERSED and REMANDED.
Bernard J. O'Donnell, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, DE, for appellant.
Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, DE, for appellee.
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices.
The defendant-appellant, Shawn Smith (“Smith”), appeals from his judgments of conviction in the Superior Court for Aggravated Menacing, Assault in the Second Degree, weapon and related offenses. Smith contends that the record does not establish that he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his constitutional right to counsel before being permitted to proceed pro se at trial. We agree. Therefore, the judgments of the Superior Court must be reversed.
During the first day of a three day trial beginning January 27, 2009, Smith's counsel made an opening statement to the jury. The State called its first witness, Shana Whittle (“Whittle”), who testified that Smith had assaulted her and several of their children. After a recess, an issue arose concerning Smith's representation by counsel. Smith's counsel informed the trial judge that:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I think that the very brief honeymoon he and I have enjoyed has fallen upon hard times. All based on a simple question; what did he expect me to cross examine her about. May we ask this witness about a 609 issue so we don't have to stop when we cross examine.
The following colloquy occurred:
The prosecutor and the defense counsel then described the plea agreement negotiations to the trial judge up to that point, concluding that Smith faced no mandatory imprisonment term if he was convicted, but Smith responded that he still wanted to represent himself:
The State completed its direct examination of Whittle and Smith cross-examined her. Smith made several evidentiary objections which were overruled. During Smith's cross examination the state made several objections which were sustained and the trial court also sua sponte interrupted several times. The next morning before the cross-examination of Whittle resumed the trial court conveyed to Smith its own observations:
Smith continued to represent himself. Smith was convicted by a jury of several of the charged offenses. On March 27, 2009, Smith was charged cumulatively to fifteen years, four months imprisonment at Level 5 suspended after eight years, four months imprisonment at Level 5 for decreasing levels of supervision. Smith filed a timely notice of appeal and requested that counsel be appointed for him on appeal. Smith's appeal was remanded to the Superior Court where counsel was appointed.
Smith contends that he did not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive his constitutional right to counsel before being permitted to proceed pro se at trial. “It is well-established that criminal defendants have a constitutional, Sixth Amendment right to waive counsel and continue pro se if they do so knowingly intelligently, and voluntarily.” 1 “A determination of whether a defendant has intelligently waived the right to counsel depends upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the defendant.” 2 We review an asserted denial of that constitutional right to counsel de novo.3
We have held that “[b]efore a trial court may permit a defendant to represent himself, the court must: 1) determine that the defendant has made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his constitutional right to counsel; and 2) inform the defendant of the risks inherent in going forward in a criminal trial without the assistance of legal counsel.” 4
Before the trial judge allows a defendant to exercise his right to waive counsel, he must conduct a hearing to inquire into the defendant's decision, warn the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, and establish a record that the defendant knows what he is doing.5 A hearing is required to allow the defendant to establish on the record that the right to counsel is being waived intelligently and voluntarily.6 Several factors are used to determine whether a defendant has successfully demonstrated a proper waiver of counsel.7 In Briscoe v. State,8 we adopted the guidelines set forth in United States v. Welty.9 The trial judge should consider the defendant's background, experience, and conduct, and advise the defendant of the following:
1) he will have to conduct his defense in accordance with the rules of evidence and criminal procedure, rules with which he may not be familiar;
2) he may be hampered in presenting his best defense by his lack of knowledge of the law;
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