Smith v. State
Citation | 302 Ga. 717,808 S.E.2d 661 |
Decision Date | 11 December 2017 |
Docket Number | S17A1757 |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Parties | SMITH v. The STATE. |
Michael Wayne Tarleton, for Appellant.
Peter J. Skandalakis, District Attorney, Jeffery W. Hunt, Christopher R. Keegan, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jason M. Rea, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.
Following the denial of his motion for new trial, as amended, Herman Smith appeals his convictions for felony murder while in the commission of aggravated assault, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and carrying a weapon without a license, all in connection with the fatal shooting of Cardarius Steagall and an assault upon Chaserah Horton. Smith challenges the trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial and two evidentiary rulings. Finding the challenges to be unavailing, we affirm.1
1. Construed to support the verdicts, the evidence showed the following. On November 18, 2012, at approximately 2:30 a.m., police responded to a nightclub where they found Steagall dead on the floor. Next to the body, the officers discovered a .22 caliber revolver, with one empty shell casing and two live bullets in it. The spent shell casing was the final round in the cylinder, and the trigger would have to be pulled five times for the next live round to fire. Officers also recovered four .45 caliber shell casings and two .45 caliber bullets from the crime scene, and a third .45 caliber bullet from Steagall’s body during the autopsy. The cause of death was determined to be three gunshot wounds
to the neck, head, and chest, which were consistent with a large caliber gun being fired from some distance away.
Later on the day of the shooting, investigators interviewed Smith, who admitted that he was at the nightclub when Steagall was shot. Smith also stated that he had used cocaine, a street drug he called "Molly," and alcohol the previous night and that the whole night was a "blur." Smith said that he had heard a single gunshot and ran from the building. During a second interview on December 6, 2012, Smith claimed that Steagall had brandished a weapon, causing Smith to fire in self-defense.
At trial, witnesses called by the State testified that Steagall was not holding a gun when he was shot. Horton testified that he was next to Steagall, that he heard three shots, that he thought for a moment that he had been shot, and that he saw Steagall fall and did not see him with a gun. Horton also testified that he made eye contact with the shooter, whom he positively identified as Smith, and saw him put the gun away. Witnesses called by Smith, however, testified that, at various times during the night, they had seen Steagall with a gun.
Smith does not contest the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Nevertheless, as is this Court’s practice in murder cases, we have reviewed the record and conclude that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find Smith guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. Smith contends that the trial court erred by refusing to grant motions for mistrial he made during jury deliberations on the ground that notes from the jury showed that it was hopelessly deadlocked. Instead of declaring a mistrial, the trial court instructed the jury several times to continue deliberations, and the court eventually gave a modified Allen charge. See Allen v. United States , 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896). These actions, Smith complains, coerced a holdout juror into changing his or her vote. However, the trial court’s determination of whether the jury was hopelessly deadlocked "will be reversed on appeal only for an abuse of ... discretion," Humphreys v. State , 287 Ga. 63, 78-79 (8) (b), 694 S.E.2d 316 (2010), and "[w]hether a verdict was reached as the result of coercion depends upon the totality of the circumstances." Sears v. State , 270 Ga. 834, 837 (1), 514 S.E.2d 426 (1999). Accordingly, we will now review the totality of the circumstances surrounding Smith’s motions for mistrial and the trial court’s actions during deliberations.
Early in the jury’s deliberations, which began at 1:30 p.m. on Monday, August 5, 2013, the jurors sent various notes to the trial court containing requests for certain exhibits and asking questions about the evidence and the law. These were followed late Monday afternoon and Tuesday by a number of notes from the jury regarding its deliberations. The first of these notes said, "What happens if the jury vote is at 11 guilty and one not guilty on count one and count two?"2 At 6:00 p.m. that Monday, the jury was instructed to keep deliberating. About an hour later, the jury sent another note reading, Smith moved for a mistrial, and the State requested an Allen charge. The judge denied both, and the court went into recess for the night. The next day, the jury returned at 9:00 a.m. and later wrote the following:
We continue to deliberate count one and count two. There are still ten guilty and two not guilty. One not guilty is reviewing the evidence, and one refuses to change her vote. The ten guilty votes agree to compromise for count one not guilty for a unanimous guilty verdict on count two. Would you like for us to continue to deliberate?3
Smith again moved for a mistrial, and the State again requested an Allen charge. At 9:55 a.m., the judge denied both and instructed the jury to continue deliberating. A subsequent note from the jury stated, Smith again moved for a mistrial, and the State requested that the alternate juror be substituted for the juror refusing to deliberate or, in the alternative, that an Allen charge be given. The judge denied these requests and, at 11:00 a.m., instructed the jurors to continue to deliberate. A later note from the jury read, Smith, once more, requested a mistrial, which was denied.
After lunch, the foreperson, at her request, was brought into the courtroom, and she stated, In response to questions from the court, the foreperson stated that all 12 jurors had participated in the deliberations at the start and continued for a period of time. When the foreperson was excused, Smith moved for a mistrial, and the court denied it and instructed the jurors to resume their deliberations. The next note from the jury read, Smith moved for a mistrial, noting that the jury had deliberated for close to ten hours, and the State requested an Allen charge. The judge denied both requests and instructed the jury to keep deliberating. Another note from the jury read, The court permitted the jury to take a break and resume its deliberations upon returning. Thereafter, the jury sent a note saying, Once again, Smith moved for a mistrial. The judge denied it and instructed the jury to keep deliberating.
At 3:20 p.m., another note from the jury stated, The State again requested an Allen charge. The court decided not to give the pattern charge but, over Smith’s objection, did administer an Allen -like charge drawn from ABA Standard for Criminal Justice 15-5.4 (3d ed. 1996) (formerly 15-4.4).4 The jury subsequently sent a note requesting use of an empty room with similar dimensions to the crime scene for a re-enactment. After consulting with counsel for both parties, the trial court permitted the jurors to use the jury assembly room and granted their additional request for a tape measure. At 7:30 p.m., the jury returned its verdicts, confirmed by a jury poll, finding Smith not guilty of malice murder and one count of aggravated assault upon Horton, but guilty of the other charges. See footnote 1, supra.
As this review demonstrates, the jury did not simply announce that it was "deadlocked." Rather, the jury reported its numerical division and the lack of continued participation by one juror, solicited suggestions and guidance from the court, and described its position with the terms "stalemate" and "dilemma." Even assuming that the jury had more strongly described itself as "hopelessly deadlocked" or some equivalent description, ...
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