Smith v. Stratton

• Decision Date: 29 December 1938
• Citation: 302 Mass. 17,18 N.E.2d 328
• Parties: SMITH v. STRATTON et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

302 Mass. 17

18 N.E.2d 328

SMITH

v.STRATTON et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

Dec. 29, 1938.

Proceeding in the matter of the estate of Johanna Driscoll, on petition by Jane F. Smith, executrix, for allowance of her first and final account, wherein Catherine A. Stratton and others made objection. From an adverse decree, the executrix appeals.

Affirmed.Appeal from Probate Court, Bristol County; Mayhew R. Hitch, judge.

A. E. Seagrave and A. E. Beaulieu, both of Fall River, for appellant.

D. Silverstein, of Fall River, for appellees.

DOLAN, Justice.

This is an appeal by Jane F. Smith from a decree entered in the Probate Court upon her petition for allowance of what is described as her ‘first and final account’ as executrix of the will of Johanna Driscoll.

Objection was made to the allowance of the account by two sisters of the petitioner, who were given legacies of $500 each under the terms of the will of the testatrix.

After hearing, the judge entered a decree charging the petitioner, in schedule A, with the amount of three deposits in savings banks, which at one time stood in the name of the testatrix but were transferred into her name and that of the petitioner in joint account on October 13, 1933, and subsequently withdrawn by the petitioner. The judge made a finding in the decree that the transfer of those deposits into joint account had been procured to be made by the undue influence of the petitioner and her husband, Joseph Smith. He further decreed that four items, in schedule B of the account as rendered, showing payments of legacies, should be allowed only as payments on account. The decree established a balance of $9,798.81 in the hands of the petitioner as executrix, instead of nothing shown by the account as rendered.

The petitioner appealed, and her counsel has contended that at the hearing in the Probate Court evidence was improperly admitted that attacked, on the ground of undue influence, the transfers of savings bank deposits made prior to the death of the deceased.

It is settled by what is said in Cook v. Howe, 280 Mass. 325, 182 N.E. 581, that this contention cannot be sustained. It is established that if, as found in the instant case, the transfers of the deposits in question, which were subsequently withdrawn by the petitioner to her own use, were procured to be made through undue influence exercised upon the testatrix by the petitioner, she would hold the proceeds as trustee thereof for the benefit of the testatrix and her estate upon a constructive trust, and that, except for the fact that the petitioner is the executrix of the will of the testatrix, the proceeds could be recovered by a personal representative of the testatrix in an action at law. See Devlin v. Houghton, 202 Mass. 75, 88 N.E. 580. The petitioner could not sue herself in an action at law. Where the same person has in one capacity a duty to pursue a claim against himself in another capacity resort must be had to a suit in equity. Bemis v. Converse, 246 Mass. 131, 135, 140 N.E. 686. The proceeding in the Probate Court upon the account of the petitioner is deemed to be a proceeding in equity. G. L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 206, § 4; c. 215, § 2.

The evidence bearing on the question of the transfer of the deposits involved was properly admitted.

The petitioner has also argued that, if this evidence was properly before the court, there was not a sufficient basis for the finding that the transfers involved were procured by undue influence exercised upon the testatrix.

A stenographer was appointed to take the evidence under the provisions of G. L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 215, § 18, and, at the request of the petitioner, the judge made a report of the material facts found by him. G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 215, § 11. Accordingly, all questions of fact, discretion and law presented by the record are open on the appeal. In dealing with questions of fact we weigh the reported evidence, giving due weight to the findings of fact made by the judge upon oral conflicting testimony, but we do not reverse such findings unless we are convinced that they are plainly wrong. Trade Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Peters, 291 Mass. 79, 84, 195 N.E. 900, and cases cited. Buckley v. Buckley, Mass. 17 N.E.2d 887. An examination of the evidence and of the subsidiary facts found by the judge does not convince us that his ultimate finding, that the transfers of the deposits in question were procured to be made by the testatrix through the undue influence of the petitioner and her husband, is plainly wrong.

A recital of the evidence would add nothing to our jurisprudence. We think it will suffice to say that the evidence would warrant a finding of the following facts, most of which are in substance set forth by the judge in his report of material facts.

The deceased was an elderly woman. She was unmarried and had been employed as a servant for many years. She had accumulated some money. She was intimate for a long time with the petitioner, who lived in Westport, and with the latter's sisters, Mrs. Bridgewater and Mrs. Stratton, who both lived in Newport. None of them is related to the deceased, who stayed at different times with them. Prior to July 7, 1933, she had given up her work and was staying with Mrs. Bridgewater in Newport. On that date she went to the home of the petitioner and while there broke her hip on August 3, 1933. The husband of the petitioner was then employed by a Fall River attorney at law as chauffeur, and he asked this attorney to draw a will for the deceased. The attorney did so and it was executed by the deceased on August 5, 1933. In that will $500 was given to Mrs. Stratton, the same amount to Mrs. Bridgewater, $1,000 to the Sisters of the Holy Union of the Sacred Heart Church and $100 to a priest for masses. The residue was bequeathed to the petitioner. The attorney who drew the will was named as executor. The deceased was taken to a hospital on August 16, 1933, but became ‘dissatisfied,’ insisted upon leaving, and the petitioner ‘took her to her home. There she was confined to her bed and was in considerable pain part of the time and was given some quieting medicine by the doctor * * * Mrs. Bridgewater called upon her often and Mrs. Stratton some.’ There was evidence...