Smith v. Stratus Computer, Inc.

Citation40 F.3d 11
Decision Date14 September 1994
Docket NumberNo. 94-1306,94-1306
Parties66 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 729 Stephanie S. SMITH, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. STRATUS COMPUTER, INC., Defendant, Appellee. . Heard
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)

Laurence M. Johnson, with whom Ann E. Johnston and Fordham & Starrett, P.C., were on brief, for appellant.

Samuel A. Marcosson, Atty., James R. Neely, Jr., Deputy Gen. Counsel, Gwendolyn Young Reams, Associate General Counsel, and Vincent J. Blackwood, Asst. Gen. Counsel, were on brief, for the E.E.O.C., amicus curiae.

David H. Erichsen, with whom Peter A. Spaeth, Ann K. Bernhardt, and Hale and Dorr, were on brief, for appellee.

Before SELYA, Circuit Judge, CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge, and STAHL, Circuit Judge.

STAHL, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Stephanie S. Smith sued her former employer, Stratus Computer, Inc. ("Stratus"), for illegal sex discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment for Stratus and Smith appeals. We affirm.

I. Standard of Review and Background
A. Standard of Review

Because we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 259 (1st Cir.1994). Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When a party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party bears the burden of proof at trial, there can no longer be a genuine issue as to any material fact: the failure of proof as to an essential element necessarily renders all other facts immaterial, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). See also Woods, 30 F.3d at 259. Even in an employment discrimination case, " 'where elusive concepts such as motive or intent are at issue, summary judgment may be appropriate if the nonmoving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.' " Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1116 (1st Cir.1993) (quoting Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990)).

B. Factual and Procedural Background

Smith was hired in May 1989 as director of product marketing by Stratus, a Marlboro, Massachusetts, corporation that designs, manufactures and sells "fault-tolerant" computer systems and products--i.e., products that enable customers to remain on-line in the event of a system failure. Previously, Smith had worked for more than five years as a marketing director for another Boston-area computer company and had earned master's and doctoral degrees in psychology from the University of Illinois. Smith received from Stratus a $115,000 starting salary, a $15,000 sign-on bonus, and options on 7,000 shares of Stratus stock.

Smith's first months at Stratus proceeded smoothly. In December 1989, William Thompson, Smith's supervisor and Stratus's senior vice-president of marketing, gave her a favorable performance review. Thompson described Smith's start at Stratus as "excellent," and wrote that she was "perceived as a substantial and valuable contributor to Stratus." Thompson rated Smith's overall performance as "exceed[ing] expectations in several significant areas," the second-highest of five possible performance ratings. Contemporaneous with her review, Smith received a 5% raise and stock options for an additional 1,500 shares.

Around January 1990, as part of a company reorganization, Smith came under the direct supervision of Stratus co-founder Robert Freiburghouse, who held the title of senior vice-president for marketing and engineering. Before the reorganization, Thompson had recommended that Smith be promoted to vice-president for product marketing--a title that Smith thought was critical to her effective interaction with executives in other departments. Freiburghouse did not act immediately on Thompson's recommendation; he testified in his deposition that he was uncertain about her qualifications for the title. In April 1990, however, after personally supervising Smith for four months, Freiburghouse recommended that Smith be named a vice-president.

In June 1990, Smith received a 4.8% raise in recognition of her new title as well as another 5% merit raise, bringing her annual salary to $133,000. Although the record contains no formal evaluation of Smith's work by Freiburghouse, Smith stated that Freiburghouse told her that she was one of his top two employees, and that John Young, Stratus's vice-president for human resources, told her that Freiburghouse was very enthusiastic about her performance. In deposition testimony, Freiburghouse described Smith's performance only as "satisfactory." Freiburghouse did say, however, that if she had not been performing well enough to merit the title of vice-president, he would not have recommended her promotion.

In the fall of 1990, Smith learned that the company would again be reorganized at the end of that year, this time bringing her under the supervision of Gary Haroian, Stratus's general manager of corporate operations.

The prospect of working for Haroian worried Smith. Haroian had a different view of marketing's proper function within the company; he thought marketing should focus more on supporting the sales staff and conducting rigorous pricing analyses and less on product development, which he saw as the purview of the engineering department. Months earlier, Haroian had expressed some reservations to Freiburghouse about Smith's promotion to vice-president, although the evidence does not indicate whether Smith ever learned about this. Smith did know, however, about Haroian's differing vision of the marketing function; she testified in her deposition that she knew he "wasn't a fan." In a meeting with Freiburghouse before the change took effect, Smith expressed her concern about working for Haroian, even asking Freiburghouse if she should quit. In her deposition, Smith testified that she was not serious about quitting, but was merely soliciting reassurance from Freiburghouse that she was generally on the right track and would be able to work things out with Haroian.

Things did not work out, though--at least from Haroian's perspective. Although Smith testified that she received no indication that anything was seriously amiss until a June 12, 1991, meeting with Haroian, Haroian testified that the meeting was the culmination of several weeks of mounting frustration over Smith's failure to redirect the marketing effort in the way he desired. In addition, Haroian testified that he had been hearing numerous complaints about Smith's leadership and poor morale within the marketing group. At the June 12 meeting, Haroian outlined the problems he perceived, and Smith asked him whether she should just take a severance package (Smith testified that, as was her habit, she was reacting emotionally, and was not serious about quitting). Haroian, however, told Smith not to worry, that things were not all that bad, and that he would think about how to proceed during Smith's vacation, which was to begin the next day. Smith went home that night and drafted a handwritten memo to Haroian outlining how she proposed to solve the problems he perceived in marketing.

While Smith was on vacation, Haroian heard further complaints about Smith's lack of leadership and focus from mid-level managers who reported directly to Smith. At the end of June, Haroian spoke with Stratus's president, William Foster, and Stratus's human resources vice-president, John Young, about removing Smith from her position as marketing vice-president. Both of them agreed that Haroian should take such action. On July 1, 1991, the day Smith returned from vacation, Haroian met with Smith in his office and informed her that he was removing her from her job as marketing vice-president.

Exactly what happened next is disputed, but we accept Smith's version of events. Haroian offered her a severance package extending over six months, which Smith rejected as unacceptably short. Then, and only then, Smith claims, did Haroian offer her another position in the company--a position on Haroian's staff with unspecified duties, coextensive with the proposed severance period. Smith interpreted Haroian's actions as termination of her employment rather than a suggestion that she be permanently reassigned; no one at Stratus ever advised her differently. The day after her meeting with Haroian, Smith cleared out her office at Stratus. A week later, she called a meeting with her staff and announced that she was leaving, without making clear to them whether she had been fired or had resigned.

During the week following her termination, Smith met with John Young and another human resources manager, Richard Marciante, to discuss her situation. Smith claims that Marciante told her that she should not be overly concerned about losing her job since her husband was employed and could at least provide the family with one income.

Smith claims that her treatment was markedly different from that of male vice-presidents and managers whose performances were deemed unsatisfactory. Those employees, Smith claims, either received more generous severance packages than the six months offered to Smith or were offered other suitable employment within the company. In mid-July, when Smith asked Haroian why she was being treated differently from these other executives, Haroian simply shrugged. When Smith asked John Young the same question, Young told her that he had asked Haroian that...

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