Smith v. Superior Court
| Citation | 41 Cal.App.4th 1014,49 Cal.Rptr.2d 20 |
| Decision Date | 09 January 1996 |
| Docket Number | F023736,Nos. F023864,s. F023864 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
| Parties | , 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 261, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 348 Dora A. SMITH, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Fresno County, Respondent; GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Real Party in Interest. Michael D. STEPHENS et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Stanislaus County, Respondent; GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Real Party in Interest. |
In this case, we are called upon to decide whether the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution requires California courts to enforce a permanent injunction entered by a court in another state in unrelated proceedings which adversely affects petitioners' discovery rights. We answer in the negative. We hold that because the out-of-state injunction was obtained in a proceeding to which petitioners were not parties, and it violates fundamental California public policy, the full faith and credit clause does not compel its recognition in our courts.
On November 29, 1991, petitioner Dora A. Smith, her husband and two children were involved in a multiple vehicle collision. The 1980 Chevrolet Monza vehicle in which they were traveling burst into flames. Although Smith was severely injured, she survived the accident. However, her husband and two children were unable to exit the Monza and suffered fatal burns. Smith sued General Motors Corporation (GM), setting forth a cause of action for product liability alleging the Monza's fuel tank system had been defectively designed and manufactured.
On May 8, 1992, petitioners Robert and Michael Stephens were injured when the GM pickup truck in which they were traveling struck a utility pole and burst into flames. The Stephenses also filed suit against GM, likewise setting forth a cause of action for product liability alleging the truck was not crashworthy and its fuel tank system had been defectively designed and manufactured.
Ronald Elwell's employment with GM began in 1959. From 1971 to 1987 he was assigned to GM's Engineering Analysis Group (EA). One of the responsibilities of EA is to monitor and study "the performance of [GM] vehicles in the hands of GM customers, including specifically GM vehicles involved in collisions giving rise to products liability lawsuits." EA also serves "as an in-house litigation support staff of experts, assisting [GM's] lawyer's in the technical defense of product liability litigation." Elwell was one of the EA engineers "responsible for fuel system analysis and the defense of post-collision fire cases ... with particular responsibility for the analysis and defense of pickup truck fuel systems." He testified for GM on numerous occasions in products liability lawsuits "in defense of the safety and crashworthiness" of the fuel systems of GM vehicles.
Employment disputes arose between Elwell and GM; in 1987, Elwell was placed on "unassigned" status. Subsequent to April 1, 1987, he "was retained as an expert in various litigation matters by GM and others in the automotive industry." Between 1989 and 1991 Elwell and GM unsuccessfully attempted to resolve their disagreement.
On May 3, 1991, Elwell was deposed during pretrial proceedings in General Motors Corp. v. Moseley (1994) 213 Ga.App. 875, 447 S.E.2d 302, a products liability suit similar to those at issue here. His testimony differed markedly from that which he had given while employed by GM. Specifically, Elwell "criticized the performance of the GM pickup truck fuel system [as] inferior to that of its competitors."
On June 19, 1991, Elwell filed suit against GM in Wayne County Superior Court, Michigan, alleging he had been wrongfully terminated. Thereafter, on August 8, 1991, GM filed a counterclaim against Elwell in the Michigan court alleging he had breached his fiduciary duties and misappropriated confidential information.
On August 15, 1991, Elwell was deposed for a second time in the Moseley case. He brought five boxes of GM documents to the deposition. After the Georgia court telephonically ruled that GM had a right to review the documents before plaintiffs could have access to them, they were withdrawn by Elwell's attorney.
The Michigan court subsequently issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting Elwell "from consulting or discussing with or disclosing to any person any of [GM's] trade secrets confidential information or matters of attorney-client work product relating in any manner to the subject matter of any products liability litigation...."
Elwell and GM subsequently settled the wrongful termination suit. They entered into a stipulation in which Elwell agreed to entry of a broadly worded permanent injunction which not only enjoined Elwell from disclosing any GM trade secret or confidential information and required him to return all GM documents in his possession, but which also prohibited him from:
"testifying without the prior written consent of GM, either at deposition or trial, as an expert witness, or as a witness of any kind, and from consulting with attorneys or their agents in any litigation already filed or to be filed in the future, involving GM as an owner, seller, manufacturer and/or designer of the product(s) in issue."
Thereupon, the Michigan court entered an order dismissing Elwell's complaint and granting "an agreed permanent injunction" containing the language quoted above (the Michigan injunction). No hearing was held and no evidence was offered other than the stipulation.
In February 1995, Smith filed a motion in the Fresno County Superior Court seeking an order modifying the Michigan injunction to permit her to depose Elwell and call him to testify as an expert witness at trial. Likewise, in April 1995, the Stephenses filed a motion in the Stanislaus County Superior Court for issuance of a commission to take the out-of-state deposition of Elwell.
Both motions were denied on the ground that the Michigan injunction must be given full faith and credit in California courts.
The instant petitions for writ of mandate followed. As both petitions involve identical issues, we have ordered them consolidated.
While parties are generally limited to appellate review of most interim orders, pretrial writ relief is available in certain limited circumstances, summarized in Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266, 258 Cal.Rptr. 66:
(209 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1273-1274, 258 Cal.Rptr. 66.)
As will be shown below, petitioners have successfully demonstrated the necessity of pretrial relief.
It is undisputed that the issue presented here is an important matter of first impression. Moreover, GM does not contest petitioners' assertion that the Michigan injunction has been the subject of conflicting rulings in California trial courts as well as numerous other courts throughout the nation. Hence, guidance on this point is necessary and will be a benefit in many cases. In Oceanside Union School Dist. v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 180, 185-186, footnote 4, 23 Cal.Rptr. 375, 373 P.2d 439, our Supreme Court found the presence of these two factors to be sufficient to justify "use of the writ." And the importance of the issue presented has been repeatedly deemed sufficient to justify writ review. (Williamson v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 829, 833, 148 Cal.Rptr. 39, 582 P.2d 126; Stermer v. Superior Court (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 777, 779-780, fn. 1, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 577.)
Despite GM's protestations to the contrary, petitioners have also demonstrated they will suffer irreparable injury if writ review is denied and that they have no adequate remedy at law. The Stephenses provided two declarations of counsel 1 showing that Elwell is a crucial witness and the order precluding his testimony severely damages their case. Elwell is independent of GM and has comprehensive knowledge on postcollision fuel-fed fires and the "evolution, design and intended design decisions" of the subject vehicles. He also participated in efforts to reduce postcollision fires and consulted with individuals concerning postcollision fire safety. He has testified as an expert witness for GM and has consulted with others in the industry about the fuel systems at issue here. No other present or former GM employee has Elwell's depth and range of knowledge...
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