Smith v. The Mobility Group, Inc., No. A07-1037 (Minn. App. 5/21/2008), A07-1037.
| Decision Date | 21 May 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. A07-1037.,A07-1037. |
| Parties | Steven Smith, et al., Appellants, v. The Mobility Group, Inc., d/b/a Complete Mobility Systems, Respondent, Ford Motor Company, a Delaware corporation licensed to transact business in the State of Minnesota, Defendant, The Braun Corporation, an Indiana corporation, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the District Court, Sherburne County, File No. 71-C4-06-001012.
Todd E. Gadtke, Hauer, Fargione, Love, Landy & McEllistrem, Minneapolis, MN (for appellants).
Thomas Harlan, Katherine Becker, Madigan, Dahl & Harlan, Minneapolis, MN (for respondent The Mobility Group, Inc.).
Mark R. Bradford, Bassford Remele, Minneapolis, MN, (for respondent The Braun Corporation).
Considered and decided by Shumaker, Presiding Judge; Willis, Judge; and Poritsky, Judge.*
Appellants challenge the grant of partial summary judgment to respondents, arguing that the district court erred by concluding that (1) there is no independent cause of action under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (2000), for a claim of breach of a limited warranty and (2) privity of contract is required of a claim for the remedy of revocation of acceptance. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
On January 11, 2003, appellants Steven and Susan Smith purchased a 2002 Ford Econoline van. They hired respondent The Mobility Group, d/b/a Complete Mobility Systems (Complete Mobility) to install adaptive equipment to make the van handicapped-accessible, including the installation of a wheelchair lift manufactured by respondent The Braun Corporation (Braun). Complete Mobility issued a limited warranty for its workmanship, and Braun issued its own limited warranty for the wheelchair lift.
After taking delivery of the van in early March 2003, the Smiths immediately began experiencing problems: the van would not start properly, the check-engine light came on intermittently, the doors would not completely open and close, and an electronic pad on the wheelchair lift malfunctioned. Additionally, the wheelchair lift would not rise off the ground and retract into the van, the controls on the arm of the lift did not work, and the rear heating controls in the van had been removed, making it impossible to direct hot air to the rear of the van.
Two days after taking delivery, the Smiths brought the van back to Complete Mobility to have the problems fixed. Complete Mobility readjusted the doors but told the Smiths that they did not have enough time that day to work on the malfunctioning lift. The Smiths brought the van back to Complete Mobility on March 16, 2003; they told Complete Mobility that the rear heating controls had been removed; and Complete Mobility agreed that the wheelchair lift was not functioning properly because there was no horizontal lever or tilt function on the controls. Thereafter, the Smiths continued to bring the van back to Complete Mobility for repairs both to the van itself and to the wheelchair lift,1 and, in early January 2005, they again contacted Complete Mobility, complaining that there was a leak in the van's steering system, a defective backlight on the wheelchair lift's touchpad, a defective switch on the lift, a defective remote control for the lift and door, and the rear heating controls had not been replaced. Complete Mobility apparently attempted repairs at no charge to the Smiths. The Smiths allege, however, that the problems with the van continue to exist.
The Smiths filed a complaint in district court in July 2006 against Complete Mobility, Braun, and Ford Motor Company,2 asserting breaches of express warranties in violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (2000) (Magnuson-Moss); revocation of acceptance under Minn. Stat. § 336.2-608 (2006); and breaches of express warranties in violation of Minn. Stat. § 325G.19 (2006). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Braun on all three claims and in favor of Complete Mobility on the Smiths' claims under Magnuson-Moss and section 325G.19. The district court denied summary judgment, however, on the Smiths' claim seeking revocation of acceptance against Complete Mobility, concluding that there remained a fact issue regarding that claim. The Smiths appeal.3
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court determines whether there are genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its application of the law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990). When the district court grants summary judgment based on its application of a statute to undisputed facts, the result is a legal conclusion, which we review de novo. Lefto v. Hoggsbreath Enters., Inc., 581 N.W.2d 855, 856 (Minn. 1998). And this court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993). We may affirm a district court's grant of summary judgment if it can be sustained on any ground. Winkler v. Magnuson, 539 N.W.2d 821, 827 (Minn. App. 1995).
The district court concluded that Magnuson-Moss "does not permit a consumer who is issued a limited warranty a direct right of action under state law." Because Complete Mobility and Braun issued limited warranties to the Smiths, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Complete Mobility and Braun on the Smiths' Magnuson-Moss claims. The Smiths argue that Magnuson-Moss provides an independent cause of action for a breach of a limited warranty, and, therefore, the district court erred by granting summary judgment.
Under Magnuson-Moss, "a consumer who is damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under this chapter, or under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract, may bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable relief" in an appropriate state court or federal court. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (2000). Magnuson-Moss distinguishes between full warranties and limited warranties. See id. § 2303(a). Magnuson-Moss imposes minimum standards for full warranties and "provides remedies for their breach, including either a full refund of the purchase price or a replacement of the product if the warrantor cannot remedy defects or malfunctions after reasonable attempts to do so." Schimmer v. Jaguar Cars, Inc., 384 F.3d 402, 405 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing 15 U.S.C § 2304 (2000)). But limited warranties are not subject to section 2304, and, thus, the substantive remedies provided for in that section, which include a full refund of the purchase price, are not available for a breach of a limited warranty. See 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a); Schimmer, 384 F.3d at 405; MacKenzie v. Chrysler Corp., 607 F.2d 1162, 1166 n.7 (5th Cir. 1979).
Complete Mobility and Braun contend that this court's decision in Bretheim v. Monaco Coach Corp., No. A06-127, 2006 WL 3593044, at *2 (Minn. App. Dec. 12, 2006), review dismissed (Minn. Feb. 28, 2007),4 is controlling and holds that a consumer cannot maintain a breach-of-warranty claim under Magnuson-Moss when the consumer has not expressly asserted a breach-of-warranty claim under state law. They conclude that because the Smiths do not appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment on their only claims citing a specific state law—that is, their claims under Minn. Stat. § 325G.19—the "procedural posture of the case in this court is fatal to the Smiths' purported [Magnuson-Moss] claim[s]."
In Bretheim, this court rejected an argument that a claim under Magnuson-Moss does not require consumers of products with limited warranties to bring suit under state law, explaining that "appellants cite no case in which a consumer of a product with a limited warranty recovered without bringing an action under state law." 2006 WL 3593044, at *2. The plaintiffs in Bretheim "unequivocally" declared that their claims were not claims "for breach of warranty," but rather claims for a warrantor's "failure to comply with any obligation under [Magnuson-Moss]." Id. at *1 (alteration in original). See also 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (). Accordingly, this court viewed the plaintiffs' claims in Bretheim as being claims that a warrantor failed to meet the minimum standards prescribed in section 2304. Id. at *1-*2. And because the warranty at issue in Bretheim was a limited warranty, the minimum standards in section 2304 did not apply, and the plaintiffs failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Id. at *2. But here, unlike in Bretheim, the Smiths' claims are for breach of warranty and are not based on alleged violations of the minimum warranty standards prescribed in section 2304.
Properly understood, Bretheim holds that a claim of breach of a limited warranty under Magnuson-Moss will necessarily fail if a plaintiff is unable to show that there has in fact been a breach of the warranty, which is a question that is answered by looking to state breach-of-warranty law. Thus, if a plaintiff fails to establish, under state law, that a warranty has been breached, the corresponding Magnuson-Moss claim will likewise fail. Such a conclusion is consistent with the application of Magnuson-Moss in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Milicevic v. Fletcher Jones Imps., Ltd., 402 F.3d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 2005) (...
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