Smith v. U.S. Dep't of Agric.

• Decision Date: 28 August 2012
• Docket Number: No. 4:12–cv–362 RP–CFB.,4:12–cv–362 RP–CFB.
• Citation: 888 F.Supp.2d 945
• Parties: Ruby L. SMITH, Mark Mendenhall, Mark D. Boles, Kevin Hullinger, Lovett Farms, and Stephen C. Kyner, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, Thomas J. Vilsack, in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture, Farm Services Agency, Juan Garcia, in his official capacity as Administrator of the Farm Services Agency, Iowa State Farm Service Agency, and John Whitaker, in his official capacity as Executive Director of the Iowa State Farm Service Agency, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

888 F.Supp.2d 945

Ruby L. SMITH, Mark Mendenhall, Mark D. Boles, Kevin Hullinger, Lovett Farms, and Stephen C. Kyner, Plaintiffs,

v.UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, Thomas J. Vilsack, in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture, Farm Services Agency, Juan Garcia, in his official capacity as Administrator of the Farm Services Agency, Iowa State Farm Service Agency, and John Whitaker, in his official capacity as Executive Director of the Iowa State Farm Service Agency, Defendants.

No. 4:12–cv–362 RP–CFB.

United States District Court,

S.D. Iowa,

Central Division.

Aug. 28, 2012.

Andrew Paul Lesko, Verle William Norris, Law Office of Verle W. Norris, Corydon, IA, for Plaintiffs.

Gary L. Hayward, United States Attorney, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants.

ORDER

ROBERT W. PRATT, District Judge.

Currently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”) filed on August 20, 2012. Clerk's No. 6. Plaintiffs filed a response on August 24, 2012 (“Resistance”). Clerk's No. 18. Defendants replied on August 27, 2012 (“Reply”). Clerk's No. 19. The matter is fully submitted.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs challenge Defendants' decision to close the Decatur County Farm Service Agency (“FSA”) office. See Compl. ¶¶ 19, 21. Plaintiffs are all farmers participating in various farm programs in Decatur County, Iowa. See id. ¶¶ 1–6. Defendant United States Department of Agriculture (the “USDA”) approved the closure of the Decatur County FSA office—which is located in Leon, Iowa—on May 29, 2012. See id. ¶ 31; see also Clerk's No. 1–1 at 6. In deciding to close this office, the USDA followed the mandate of 7 U.S.C. § 6932a to first consider closing FSA offices with two or fewer permanent full-time employees that are also located within twenty miles of another FSA office. Compl. ¶ 25. Using Euclidean miles, the USDA calculated that the Decatur County FSA office was located “19.99 miles from the nearest FSA office located in Osceola, Iowa.” ¹Id. ¶ 26. Plaintiffs, however, allege that the USDA “used the wrong building in Clarke County to measure the distance between the Decatur County and the Clarke County FSA offices.” Id. ¶ 35. Due to this mistake, Plaintiffs claim that the calculated distance is shorter by “more than 240 feet, ... [and, therefore,] the Decatur County FSA office is more than 20 Euclidean miles from the Clarke County FSA office.” Id. ¶ 37. Since the USDA incorrectly calculated this distance, Plaintiffs insist that the USDA should remove the Decatur County office from the closure list.²See id.

Currently, the Decatur County FSA office has only one permanent full-time employee who has been offered an early retirement package. See id. ¶ 42. If she accepts the retirement package, her last day of work would be August 28, 2012. See id. Thus, her potential acceptance of the early retirement package could lead to the closure of this office on August 28, 2012, rather than on the original closing date of “no later than September 28, 2012.” See id.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Defendants move to dismiss this lawsuit on two grounds: (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction, seeFed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1); and (2) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, seeFed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See Defs.' MTD at 1.

A. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

In order for the Court to dismiss a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the opposing party must successfully challenge the claim “on its face or the factual truthfulness of its averments.” Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir.1993). Facial challenges are limited to analyzing the face of the complaint. Biscanin v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 407 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir.2005). Under a facial challenge, each factual allegation concerning jurisdiction is presumed to be true. Titus, 4 F.3d at 593. Thus, the moving party's motion can be “successful if the plaintiff fails to allege an element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. Factual challenges invoke facts other than those pled in the complaint. Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n. 6 (8th Cir.1990). If a party mounts a factual challenge, “the Court may look outside the pleadings to determine whether jurisdiction exists, and the nonmoving party loses the benefit of favorable inferences from its factual statements.” Dolls, Inc. v. City of Coralville, 425 F.Supp.2d 958, 970 (S.D.Iowa 2006). Here, Defendants appear to assert a facial challenge.

B. Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In reviewing a complaint, a court must “accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” and must draw “all reasonable inferences ... in favor of the plaintiff.” Schaaf v. Residential Funding Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir.2008) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).

A viable complaint must include “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. “The plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to show at the pleading stage that success on the merits is more than a ‘sheer possibility.’ It is not, however, a ‘probability requirement.’ ” Braden v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir.2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937).

The Supreme Court, in Iqbal, described a “two-pronged approach” for evaluating complaints challenged under Rule 12(b)(6). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. First, a court should divide the allegations between factual and legal allegations; factual allegations should be accepted as true, but legal allegations should be disregarded. Id. Second, the factual allegations must be parsed for facial plausibility. Id.

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.... Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ ”

Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

The “parsing” process requires careful examination of the plaintiff's allegations, however, “the complaint should be read as a whole, not parsed piece by piece to determine whether each allegation, in isolation, is plausible.” Braden, 588 F.3d at 594. Indeed, “[r]equiring a plaintiff to rule out every possible lawful explanation for the conduct he challenges would invert the principle that the complaint is construed most favorably to the nonmoving party, and would impose the sort of probability requirement at the pleading stage which Iqbal and Twombly explicitly reject.” Id. at 597 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

A court will “draw on its judicial experience and common sense” when determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Thus, the Court may consider other, more likely explanations for the acts described in the complaint when determining whether the pleaded factual allegations give rise to a plausible entitlement to relief. Id. at 680, 129 S.Ct. 1937. But the Court must always be mindful that “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the facts alleged is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’ ” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974)). “[W]hile a plaintiff must offer sufficient factual allegations to show that he or she is not merely engaged in a fishing expedition or strike suit, [a court] must also take account of [his or her] limited access to crucial information.” Braden, 588 F.3d at 597.

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

Defendants move to dismiss this case because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit and because Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Defs.' MTD ¶¶ 3–6. Plaintiffs insist that dismissing this case would be an error because Plaintiffs have standing, because 7 U.S.C. § 6932a creates a private right of action, and because 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704, and 706 waive the government's sovereign immunity. See Pls.' Resistance ¶ 1.

For reasons that follow, the Court finds Defendants' arguments persuasive and, accordingly, GRANTS their Motion to Dismiss.

A. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over This Case

Defendants argue that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because there is no case or controversy and because the federal government has not waived its sovereign immunity. See Defs.' MTD ¶¶ 3–4. The Court agrees.

1. No case or controversy.

The case-or-controversy requirement is a prerequisite for invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; see also Conway Sch. Dist. v. Wilhoit, 854 F.Supp. 1430, 1432 (E.D.Ark.1994). Standing is one of “the several doctrines ... that have elaborated the ‘case or controversy’ requirement.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Standing has the following elements: (1) “injury in fact[, or] an invasion of a...