Smith v. United States
Decision Date | 23 April 1959 |
Docket Number | No. 14874.,14874. |
Citation | 269 F.2d 217,106 US App. DC 26 |
Parties | Walter SMITH, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Mr. J. Robert Walsh, Washington, D. C. (appointed by the District Court) for appellant.
Mr. Nathan J. Paulson, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. Oliver Gasch, U. S. Atty., and Carl W. Belcher, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before EDGERTON, DANAHER, and BASTIAN, Circuit Judges.
Petition for Rehearing En Banc Denied July 9, 1959.
Certiorari Denied October 19, 1959. See 80 S.Ct. 130.
Appellant was indicted and convicted for violating the marihuana statutes. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4742(a), 4744(a), 68A Stat. 560, 562. An expert witness testified that certain cigarettes which appellant sold "contained marihuana" and that "Cannabis sativa is marihuana." The statute provides that "The term `marihuana' means all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds, or resin; but shall not include the mature stalks of such plant, fiber produced from such stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds of such plant, any other compound manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such mature stalks (except the resin extracted therefrom), fiber, oil, or cake, or the sterilized seed of such plant which is incapable of germination." 26 U.S.C. § 4761(2), 68A Stat. 566.
There was no testimony that the Cannabis sativa in appellant's cigarettes was, or that it was not, derived from the sources which the statute says marihuana "shall not include". This does not affect the validity of the conviction. It is settled that an indictment "founded on a general provision defining the elements of an offense * * * need not negative the matter of an exception made by a proviso or other distinct clause, whether in the same section or elsewhere, and that it is incumbent on one who relies on such an exception to set it up and establish it." McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 357, 43 S.Ct. 132, 67 L.Ed. 301.
Affirmed.
Before PRETTYMAN, Chief Judge, and EDGERTON, WILBUR K. MILLER, BAZELON, FAHY, WASHINGTON, DANAHER, BASTIAN, and BURGER, Circuit Judges, in Chambers.
Upon consideration of appellant's petition for a rehearing en banc, it is
Ordered by the court that the petition for rehearing en banc is denied.
Before EDGERTON, DANAHER, and BASTIAN, Circuit Judges.
Memorandum To Accompany Order Denying Rehearing En Banc
The District Judge permissibly read to the jury the statutory definition of marihuana. Maynard v. United States, 1954, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 347, 350, 215 F.2d 336, 339; United States v. Stallsworth, 7 Cir., 1951, 193 F.2d 870, 873, certiorari denied, 1952, 343 U.S. 942, 72 S.Ct. 1035, 96 L.Ed. 1347; cf. Francis v. United States, 10 Cir., 1956, 239 F.2d 560. Yet counsel here presses upon us Shurman v. United States, 5 Cir., 219 F.2d 282, 292, certiorari denied, 1955, 349 U.S. 921, 75 S.Ct. 661, 99 L.Ed. 1253, where the court considered the definition of marihuana in the statute to be "complicated and confusing." The courts in the last three cited cases seem not to have considered the "exemption" feature of the Act. We turn to the legislative history. United States v. Public Utilities Comm., 1953, 345 U.S. 295, 315, 73 S.Ct. 706, 97 L.Ed. 1020.
H.R. 6906 was reported out of the House Committee on Ways and Means. H.R.Rep.No. 792, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) to accompany the bill reflects extensive hearings concerning the evils of the marihuana drug traffic. Under the influence of the drug the will is destroyed and all power of direction and controlling thought is lost, the Committee found. Inhibitions are released and many violent crimes have been and are being committed by users of the drug. The Report explains that the regulatory scheme of the bill was predicated upon the order form and registry requirements of the Harrison Act, 26 U.S.C. § 4701 et seq., as sustained in United States v. Doremus, 1919, 249 U.S. 86, 39 S.Ct. 214, 63 L.Ed. 493; Nigro v. United States, 1928, 276 U.S. 332, 48 S.Ct. 388, 72 L.Ed. 600, and the registration provisions of the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5801 et seq. sustained in Sonzinsky v. United States, 1937, 300 U.S. 506, 57 S.Ct. 554, 81 L.Ed. 772.
When H.R. 6906 reached the Senate further hearings were conducted. Hearings on H. R. 6906 Before a Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Finance, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). Treasury counsel explained that all transfers of marihuana are to be made in pursuance of official order forms issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, and to prevent transfers to persons who would use marihuana for illicit purposes, a transfer tax is imposed upon each transfer of marihuana.
It was developed that many legitimate industrial uses may be made of some portions of the plant. From the mature stalk, fiber yields twine and other fiber products. The seeds yield oil for use in the manufacture of paint, varnish, linoleum and soap. Hempseed cake may be utilized for cattle feed and the seed itself is useful as a special seed for pigeons. The problem was explained in terms of so defining marihuana that illicit production, sale and transfer might be curbed by use of the taxing power while exemptions would be accorded as to industrial uses. Thus counsel further explained that manufacturers of oil and byproducts will pay an occupational tax but their purchases of seed and sales of such items "will be entirely exempt * * *." Similarly, "Manufacturers of birdseed will also pay an occupational tax, but their purchases of seed will be exempt from the transfer tax and order form provisions of the bill * * *." Again, "producers of hemp will only pay a small occupational tax and make their purchases and sales of seed subject to regulations * * *." It was noted that some suggestion had been made that such producers be eliminated entirely from the bill but "Such an exemption * * * is believed to be impossible."
Clearly, both the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance were fully aware of the evils sought to be reached and of the problem in doing so. S.Rep.No.900, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., to accompany H.R. 6906 informed the Senate, not only as to the reasons for the adoption of the definition of marihuana as contained in the bill but as to the plan for permitting exemption in favor of legitimate industrial users. Against such background, Section 13 was caused to read as follows:
In this form the bill was...
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