Smith v. United States

• Decision Date: 27 September 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-11329,20-11329
• Citation: 14 F.4th 1228
• Parties: Samantha SMITH, individually, Ann Herrera, the Court Appointed Personal Administrator as administrator of the estate of Robert Steven Smith, Micah Smith, the Court Appointed Personal Administrator as administrator of the estate of Sydney Smith, Micah Smith, individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

14 F.4th 1228

Samantha SMITH, individually, Ann Herrera, the Court Appointed Personal Administrator as administrator of the estate of Robert Steven Smith, Micah Smith, the Court Appointed Personal Administrator as administrator of the estate of Sydney Smith, Micah Smith, individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 20-11329

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

September 27, 2021

Terry Dale Jackson, Terry D. Jackson, PC, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellants Samatha Smith, Ann Herrera.

Peter Lampros, Hall & Lampros, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellants Micah Smith, the Court Appointed Personal Administrator as administrator of the estate of Sydney Smith, Micah Smith.

Trishanda L. Treadwell, Jane Elizabeth McBath, Gabriel Adam Mendel, U.S. Attorney Service - Northern District of Georgia, U.S. Attorney's Office, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before BRANCH, GRANT, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.

GRANT, Circuit Judge:

Wanting to hold someone accountable after a tragedy is natural. Family members and estate administrators of a father and daughter who were killed when their car struck two mailboxes sued the United States over those deaths. They say that the Postal Service is liable because it failed to warn the mailboxes’ owners that the mailboxes were out of step with various safety regulations. But even assuming that they are correct—about both the regulatory infractions and the Postal Service's duty to provide warnings about those infractions—the United States cannot be held liable. The Federal Tort Claims Act waives sovereign immunity for the acts or omissions of a federal employee only when a private person would be liable under state tort law for those same acts or omissions. Here, because the plaintiffs have not pointed to any state-law duty, we affirm the district court's dismissal of their lawsuit.

I.

Just a few days after Thanksgiving in 2016, Steve Smith was driving with his 21-year-old daughter Sydney while under the influence of alcohol. Shortly after midnight, their car veered off the road and smashed into a pair of mailbox supports that belonged to two neighboring families. Tragically, both Steve and Sydney died in the collision.

The plaintiffs, members of the Smiths’ family and administrators of their estates, sued the United States, seeking damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act. They alleged that the brick, stone, and concrete mailbox supports that Steve and Sydney crashed into were in violation of U.S. Postal Service regulations as well as a host of federal guidelines, state statutes, and local ordinances. They also argued that the Postal Service's "failure to notify the Homeowners of the non-conforming mailbox installations constituted negligence per se " under Georgia law. The United States moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that it had sovereign immunity. The district court granted that motion, and the plaintiffs appealed.

II.

We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for sovereign immunity. King v. U.S. Gov't , 878 F.3d 1265, 1267 (11th Cir. 2018). The burden of establishing that a claim falls within our jurisdiction "rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994).

III.

Sovereign immunity generally protects the United States and its agencies against suit. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer , 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) ; In re Custom Contractors, LLC , 745 F.3d 1342, 1347 (11th Cir. 2014). This "familiar doctrine" has ancient roots that can be traced back to England in the Middle Ages. The Siren , 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 153–54, 19 L.Ed. 129 (1868) ; see also 1 Frederick Pollock & Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I 515–18 (2d ed. 1898). As Blackstone explained, "no suit or action can be brought against the king, even in civil matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over him." 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *242. By the time of the American founding, the doctrine of sovereign immunity was "well established in English law." Alden v. Maine , 527 U.S. 706, 715, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999). And this doctrine, like many others in English law, was also recognized early on as a feature of American law: "The universally received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against the United States." Cohens v. Virginia , 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411–12, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.).

That is, at least not without its permission. Sovereign immunity does not bar all suits against the United States—only those filed without its consent . See, e.g. , United States v. Mitchell , 463 U.S. 206, 212, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983). The federal government can waive its sovereign immunity and has done so from time to time. See, e.g. , Begner v. United States , 428 F.3d 998, 1002 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) waives sovereign immunity for tax-refund cases). Such waivers, though, cannot be implicit—for courts to have jurisdiction over a suit against the United States, the waiver of sovereign immunity must be "unequivocally expressed in statutory text." Fed. Aviation Admin. v. Cooper , 566 U.S. 284, 290, 132 S.Ct. 1441, 182 L.Ed.2d 497 (2012) (quotation omitted).

Once a waiver of sovereign immunity is recognized, it still "must be strictly construed in favor of the United States" and "not enlarged beyond what the language of the statute requires." United States v. Idaho ex rel. Dir., Idaho Dep't of Water Res. , 508 U.S. 1, 7, 113 S.Ct. 1893, 123 L.Ed.2d 563 (1993) (quotation omitted); see also 14 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3654 (4th ed. 2015) (explaining that the government may dispute a suit "on the ground that the relief requested is outside the scope of the waiver"). Along those same lines, courts are required to "strictly observe" all terms and conditions that accompany a waiver of sovereign immunity. Zelaya v. United States , 781 F.3d 1315, 1322 (11th Cir. 2015). Any ambiguities are thus interpreted in one direction—in favor of immunity. See Cooper , 566 U.S. at 290, 132 S.Ct. 1441.

One prominent waiver of sovereign immunity, and the one we consider here, is found in the Federal Tort Claims Act. See Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 401–424, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 1402(b), 2401(b), 2671 – 2680 ); Brownback v. King , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 740, 746, 209 L.Ed.2d 33 (2021). Before the Act was passed, a person injured by a federal employee's act (or omission) could sue the individual federal employee directly. Brownback , 141 S. Ct. at 745. But sovereign immunity prevented a suit against the United States itself—even when a "similarly situated private employer would be liable under principles of vicarious liability." Id.

It is easy to imagine why that seemed problematic for injured parties; just like many other employers, the federal government had far deeper pockets than its individual workers. And the process required to get compensation from those pockets was "notoriously clumsy."

Molzof v. United States , 502 U.S. 301, 305, 112 S.Ct. 711, 116 L.Ed.2d 731 (1992) (quotation omitted). Instead of filing a lawsuit against the United States, injured parties were required to petition Congress directly; Congress then sorted through the hundreds of petitions it received each year, in the end providing relief for just a small fraction of would-be plaintiffs by passing private bills. See Brownback , 141 S. Ct. at 745–46 & n.1 ; James E. Pfander & Neil Aggarwal, Bivens, The Judgment Bar, and the Perils of Dynamic Textualism , 8 U. St. Thomas L.J. 417, 424–25 n.39 (2011). In the face of criticism about the "speed and fairness" of this process, Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act, which transferred "most tort claims" from Congress to the federal courts. Brownback , 141 S. Ct. at 745–46 (quotation omitted). At least for that category of claims, Congress waived the sovereign immunity of the United States. Id. at 746.

But Congress's waiver was selective. The scope of the waiver in the Federal Tort Claims Act is defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). There, Congress gave federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over—and hence waived sovereign immunity for—claims against the United States seeking money damages for "injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission" of a federal employee acting within the scope of his employment. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) ; see also Brownback , 141 S. Ct. at 746. For claims concerning federal employee conduct that was outside the scope of employment, or seeking a remedy other than money damages, federal courts would continue to lack jurisdiction.¹ See Alvarez v. United States , 862 F.3d 1297, 1308 (11th Cir. 2017) ; Askew v. United States , 786 F.3d 1091, 1093 (8th Cir. 2015).

The Act also includes another important limitation, one that turns out to be decisive here: Congress extended jurisdiction only for claims in which "the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). So the Federal Tort Claims Act simply allows those injured by the acts or omissions of a government employee to recover damages in the same way that they would if they were injured by the acts or omissions of a private person. See Brownback , 141 S. Ct. at 749 ; 28 U.S.C. § 2674. It follows that the Federal Tort Claims Act does not cover breaches of federal statutory or regulatory duties that do not apply to private parties. See Howell v. United States , 932 F.2d 915, 917 (11th Cir. 1991). And "the law of the place where the act or omission occurred" refers to "the law of the state where the alleged tort occurred." Zelaya , 781 F.3d at 1323 (quotation...