Smith v. Upson County, Ga.

Decision Date08 August 1994
Docket NumberCiv. A. 93-242-2-MAC (WDO).
PartiesMartin J. SMITH, Plaintiff, v. UPSON COUNTY, GA., et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Harlan S. Miller, III, Atlanta, GA, for plaintiff.

Truitt A. Mallory, Thomaston, GA, James R. Morgan, Jr., Winston-Salem, NC, for defendants.

ORDER

OWENS, Chief Judge.

Before the court is defendants' motion for summary judgment. After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant case law, and the record as a whole, the court issues the following order.

FACTS

In 1984, plaintiff Martin J. Smith was hired by the Upson County, Georgia Sheriff's Department to work as an undercover investigator. Subsequently, plaintiff was assigned to a multijurisdictional drug task force, a law enforcement organization staffed by officers from various local law enforcement agencies. Captain Dan Greathouse of the Upson County Sheriff's Department was commander of the multijurisdictional drug task force. Captain Greathouse served as plaintiff's immediate supervisor in the task force.

In December 1988, the Upson County Sheriff's Department, along with other county offices, petitioned the Upson County Board of Commissioners to create a civil service system for county employees. On December 30, 1988, the board of commissioners passed a resolution creating a civil service system for Upson County.

On June 28, 1991, defendant Mountain Greene assumed the office of Sheriff of Upson County.1 Prior to Greene taking office, the deputy sheriffs in the sheriff's department had received overtime pay for hours worked over 171 hours per pay period. However, when Greene took office, he implemented a new policy providing for compensatory time off in lieu of overtime pay. Greene notified the employees of the sheriff's department of the policy change at two meetings held shortly after he took office. No employee of the sheriff's department expressed opposition to the policy change.

In June 1992, plaintiff received information that his supervisor, Captain Dan Greathouse, was involved in illegal wiretapping. Shortly after receiving the information, plaintiff arranged a meeting with agents of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation ("G.B.I."), the F.B.I., and an Assistant United States Attorney to discuss the information. At the meeting, it was decided that an investigation of the allegations was in order. As the investigation concerned allegations against Greathouse, a decision was made not to notify Greathouse of the investigation. Further, plaintiff did not inform Sheriff Greene or Chief Deputy Daniel Kilgore of the investigation or the allegations against Greathouse. Plaintiff did, however, speak with several other officers in the drug task force about the investigation. Subsequently, Captain Greathouse received information that plaintiff was involved in an investigation and that plaintiff was attempting to keep the investigation a secret from Greathouse.

On June 25, 1992, Greathouse called plaintiff on the telephone and asked plaintiff for information regarding plaintiff's investigation. Plaintiff, however, informed Greathouse that he could not talk about the investigation. The next day, Greathouse called plaintiff into his office and again asked plaintiff for information concerning the investigation. Again, plaintiff refused to discuss the investigation. Greathouse then told plaintiff that he was going to request that plaintiff be transferred out of the drug task force. Accordingly, Greathouse wrote a letter to Sheriff Greene, which stated:

I am requesting that Narcotics Task Force Agent Marty Smith be re-assigned to the Upson County Sheriff's Office. In the recent weeks, Smith has been conducting unauthorized investigations and has deliberately withheld this information from the commander. I feel that Smith does not trust me and I further feel that due to this mistrust, it would be impossible for me to supervise Smith.

Subsequently, a meeting was held involving Sheriff Greene, Chief Deputy Kilgore, Captain Greathouse, and plaintiff. During the meeting, plaintiff accused Greathouse of revealing confidential information to "friends and acquaintances" and of participation in an illegal wiretap. Plaintiff also admitted that he was participating in an investigation of Greathouse's involvement with the alleged wiretap and that the G.B.I. had instructed him to keep the matter quiet. At the conclusion of the meeting, Sheriff Green informed plaintiff that he was being transferred out of the task force and into the investigations division of the sheriff's department. Plaintiff's transfer, however, did not affect his salary, benefits, or classification.

On Friday, March 12, 1993, plaintiff arrived at work with a patch over his right eye. Plaintiff explained to his supervisor that he had been hit in the eye with a hockey stick. However, despite the injury, plaintiff worked a full day. On March 13 or 14, plaintiff's wife telephoned plaintiff's supervisor and informed the supervisor that plaintiff would not be at work on March 15 because of a doctor's appointment to have plaintiff's eye examined. After being examined by the doctor, plaintiff was informed that he had cancer, and that it would be necessary to surgically remove his right eye.

On March 15, 1993, plaintiff's wife informed plaintiff's supervisor that plaintiff would be out of work for six to eight weeks because of eye problems. Plaintiff's wife, however, did not explain to the supervisor the exact nature of plaintiff's medical problem. Plaintiff's supervisor reported this conversation to Chief Deputy Kilgore. On March 30, Kilgore contacted plaintiff and asked plaintiff to provide a doctor's certificate to confirm plaintiff's medical condition.2 Kilgore also asked plaintiff about a falsified search warrant that had surfaced in a criminal prosecution. Plaintiff denied having any knowledge of the warrant.

After ten days had passed, and Kilgore had received no certificate from plaintiff, Kilgore contacted plaintiff's wife and again requested a doctor's certificate to confirm plaintiff's medical condition. During this same period of time, it was determined that plaintiff was responsible for the false search warrant that Kilgore had questioned plaintiff about on March 30. Instead of securing the signature of a magistrate on the search warrant, plaintiff had signed the warrant himself in an illegible fashion.

On April 16, 1993, Chief Deputy Kilgore served notice on plaintiff that effective April 26, 1993, plaintiff was terminated from his employment with the Upson County Sheriff's Department. Plaintiff was informed that the basis for the discharge was (1) plaintiff's failure to provide a doctor's certificate and (2) forging a magistrate's signature on a search warrant. Kilgore also informed plaintiff of plaintiff's right to respond to the proposed termination within three working days of receipt of the notice. Upon receipt of Kilgore's letter, plaintiff responded to the allegations contained therein. However, after consideration of plaintiff's response, Kilgore informed plaintiff by letter dated April 23, 1993 that the decision to terminate plaintiff would stand. In addition, Kilgore in formed plaintiff of his right to appeal the decision.

On April 29, 1993, plaintiff requested a hearing concerning the discharge. On Friday, May 14, 1993, plaintiff was informed that a hearing would be held on the following Monday, May 17, 1993. On the morning of the hearing, the County Attorney received a note from plaintiff, which stated: "Your proposed hearing date of May 17, 1993, is in conflict with my calendar. On this date I have an important meeting with officers of the court in Macon." Despite plaintiff's absence, a hearing was held on May 17, 1993, and the hearing officer upheld plaintiff's discharge. At plaintiff's request, a second hearing was held on April 12, 1994, before a different hearing officer. However, the second hearing officer also upheld plaintiff's discharge.

On July 26, 1993, plaintiff filed suit against Upson County, Sheriff Mountain Greene, Chief Deputy Daniel Kilgore, and Captain Dan Greathouse under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.3 On May 25, 1994, defendants filed this motion for summary judgment. Defendants contend that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of plaintiff's claims. Further, the individual defendants assert that they are entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. On June 2, 1994, plaintiff amended his complaint to include a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. In defendants' reply to plaintiff's response to defendants' motion for summary judgment, defendants also contend that they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act.

DISCUSSION
The plain language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The nonmoving party must put forth more than a "mere `scintilla'" of evidence; "there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party." Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990). "There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." United States v. Metropolitan Petroleum Co., 743 F.Supp....

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