Smith v. US, Civ. A. No. 90-1021 SSH

Decision Date30 April 1991
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 90-1021 SSH,90-2052 SSH.
PartiesShenan SMITH and Sharon Parrish, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant. Kimberly PEAY, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America and Joseph A. Grimes, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Gerald I. Holtz, Washington, D.C., for Shenan Smith and Sharon Parrish.

Michelle Adrien Parfitt, Ashcraft & Gerel, Washington, D.C., for Kimberly Peay.

James N. Owens, Asst. U.S. Atty., U.S. Atty.'s Office, Washington, D.C., for U.S.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

STANLEY S. HARRIS, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the motions of plaintiffs Shenan Smith and Sharon Parrish to amend the complaint in Civil Action No. 90-1021 and the United States' motion for summary judgment in Civil Actions No. 90-1021 and 90-2052. On consideration of the entire record, the Court denies plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint and grants the United States' motion for summary judgment.

These actions arose out of a motor vehicle accident on September 29, 1989. Defendant Joseph Grimes is a detective sergeant with the Metropolitan Airport Authority. On the date of the accident, Grimes was on temporary detail to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). For that detail, Grimes was given a United States Government vehicle and authorized to drive it to and from work. Grimes completed his tour of duty at 5:00 p.m. on the day before the accident. At approximately 11:00 p.m. that evening, Grimes stopped at the Fraternal Order of Police Lodge at 512 5th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., where he consumed several drinks. An hour later, Grimes's vehicle collided with another vehicle from behind. The accident occurred near the intersection of Maine Avenue and East Mason Drive. Plaintiff Kimberly Peay was driving the other vehicle, in which plaintiffs Shenan Smith and Sharon Parrish were passengers. United States Park Police Officers Robert Hadlicke and John Malhoyt responded to the scene of the collision. In their official report, the officers noted that Grimes had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath, his speech was slurred, he was unsteady on his feet, and he fumbled with his wallet. The officers administered two breathalyzer tests to Grimes. The tests indicated a blood alcohol level of .223.

On May 2, 1990, plaintiffs Smith and Parrish filed a complaint against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346 et seq. Plaintiff Peay filed a separate action against the United States and Grimes on August 23, 1990. On the motion of the United States, the two cases were consolidated before the undersigned. Plaintiffs Smith and Parrish have moved to amend their complaint to add Grimes as a defendant in Civil Action No. 90-1021. The FTCA bars a negligence action against a government employee for alleged negligence while operating a motor vehicle within the scope of the employment. Id. § 2679(b).1 Plaintiffs therefore cannot assert a claim against Grimes under the FTCA. Plaintiffs' claim against Grimes individually would be a pendent state-law negligence claim. To assert such a pendent-party claim, plaintiffs must establish diversity jurisdiction as an independent basis for the claim. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 109 S.Ct. 2003, 2006, 104 L.Ed.2d 593 (1989). Because plaintiff Smith and the putative defendant, Grimes, are both residents of Maryland, the Court would not have diversity jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claim against Grimes. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 2 L.Ed. 435 (1806). For that reason, the Court denies plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint.

The United States has moved for dismissal or for summary judgment in both actions, on the grounds that Grimes was acting outside the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. In support of its motion, the United States provided the affidavit of Craig E. Richardson, Associate Chief Counsel, DEA. Richardson stated that: (1) Grimes was authorized to use the official government vehicle only for direct travel to and from work, (2) working hours for Grimes were between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., (3) Grimes's stop at the Fraternal Order of Police Lodge had no connection to his employment with the DEA, and (4) DEA...

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3 cases
  • Russell v. Dupree
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • February 22, 2012
    ...Sheppard v. United States, 640 F.Supp.2d 29 (D.D.C.2009); Smith v. Grimes, 798 F.Supp. 798, 801–02 (D.D.C.1992); Smith v. United States, 762 F.Supp. 1511 (D.D.C.1991) (decided on the same facts as Smith v. Grimes). This Court agrees. In determining scope of employment, the District of Colum......
  • Sheppard v. U.S.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • July 30, 2009
    ...to have served the activities, interests, or objectives of the United States or of the District of Columbia. See Smith v. United States, 762 F.Supp. 1511, 1513 (D.D.C.1991) (holding as a matter of law that an off-duty government agent was not acting within the scope of his employment when h......
  • Russell v. Dupree
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • February 22, 2012
    ...v. United States, 640 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D.D.C. 2009); Smith v. Grimes, 798 F. Supp. 798, 801-02 (D.D.C. 1992); Smith v. United States, 762 F. Supp. 1511 (D.D.C. 1991) (decided on the same facts as Smith v. Grimes). This Court agrees. In determining scope of employment, the District of Columbi......

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