Smith v. Vaughn, 95-249-CIV-FTM-17D.
| Decision Date | 20 November 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-249-CIV-FTM-17D.,95-249-CIV-FTM-17D. |
| Citation | 946 F.Supp. 957 |
| Parties | Robert E. SMITH, Plaintiff, v. Sheriff Thomas VAUGHN, individually and officially in his capacity as Sheriff, Desk Sergeant Sally Campbell, Investigator Ed Campbell, and Lieutenant Jim Roy, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
John Dawson Mills, Law Office of John D. Mills, Ft. Myers, FL, for plaintiff.
John W. Lewis, Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, P.A., Ft. Myers, FL, for defendants.
ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This cause is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 14) and Memorandum of Law (Dkt. 15) of Defendants, Sheriff Thomas Vaughn, individually and officially in his capacity as Sheriff, and Lieutenant Jim Roy, individually. Plaintiff has filed his Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 19) and Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition (Dkt. 20).
Plaintiff's Complaint states three causes of action. The first cause of action is a civil rights action. The second cause of action is an action for malicious prosecution. The third cause of action is a civil rights action asking for declaratory and injunctive relief.
Defendant Lieutenant Jim Roy's Answer includes affirmative defenses. Lieutenant Roy alleges that probable cause existed to arrest and prosecute Plaintiff for the crimes charged. Lieutenant Roy further alleges that he is immune from liability because he acted in the course and scope of his employment with the Sheriff of Hendry County and all of his actions were taken in good faith and in good faith belief that he was not in any way violating any of Plaintiff's constitutional rights.
Defendant Sheriff Thomas Vaughn's Answer also contains affirmative defenses. In addition to making the same allegations as Lieutenant Jim Roy does in his Answer, Sheriff Vaughn alleges that he is entitled to all of the provisions of Florida Statute 768.28 with regards to the state tort action of malicious prosecution. Sheriff Vaughn claims that Plaintiff has not complied with the statute.
All of the parties to this action agreed to the Stipulation Amending and Clarifying Complaint (Dkt. 9), which states that Plaintiff is not attempting to seek punitive damages under any cause of action against Hendry County Sheriff's Department nor Sheriff Thomas Vaughn in his official capacity as Sheriff.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
The moving party bears the initial responsibility of stating the basis for its motions and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. That burden can be discharged by "showing ... that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 and 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-2553 and 2553-2554.
Issues of fact are "`genuine' only if a reasonable jury considering the evidence presented could find for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Material facts are those which will affect the outcome of the trial under governing law. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.
In determining whether a material fact exists, the court must consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Sweat v. The Miller Brewing Co., 708 F.2d 655 (11th Cir.1983). All doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Hayden v. First National Bank of Mt. Pleasant, 595 F.2d 994, 996-997 (5th Cir. 1979), quoting Gross v. Southern Railroad Co., 414 F.2d 292 (5th Cir.1969).
Although factual disputes preclude summary judgment, the "mere possibility that factual dispute may exist, without more, is not sufficient to overcome a convincing presentation by the party seeking summary judgment." Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438, 445 (2nd Cir.1980). When a party's response consists of nothing "more than a repetition of his conclusional allegations," summary judgment is not only proper but required. Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1034 (11th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1010, 102 S.Ct. 2303, 73 L.Ed.2d 1306 (1982).
On February 18, 1994, Plaintiff and his brother, Matt Smith, arrived on the property of Susan Alderman, Matt Smith's former fiance. While Plaintiff and Plaintiff's brother were outside their vehicle, and Ms. Alderman was in her vehicle, Plaintiff's brother and Ms. Alderman participated in a heated argument.
Plaintiff states in his Complaint (Docket No. 1) that Ms. Alderman shouted a threat and attempted to pull a gun out of the holster that was in her vehicle. Plaintiff then lunged toward the vehicle, wrestled Ms. Alderman for the loaded gun, and finally grabbed the gun out of her hand. Plaintiff and Plaintiff's brother then took the gun to Hendry County Sheriff's Department to file a charge of attempted murder against Ms. Alderman.
Plaintiff and Plaintiff's brother reported the incident to Sergeant Forbes at the Hendry County Sheriff's Department. Sergeant Forbes contacted Investigator Teal, who then turned the investigation over to Desk Sergeant Sally Campbell and Investigator Ed Campbell.
According to Desk Sergeant Campbell's affidavit, Ms. Alderman appeared at the Hendry County Sheriff's Department on the date of the incident with swollen lips, bright red gums, and a bruised, swollen hand. Desk Sergeant Campbell took photographs of Ms. Alderman's injuries.
In her statement to Desk Sergeant Campbell on February 18, 1994, Ms. Alderman stated that Plaintiff struck her on the left side of her face and then reached further into her vehicle to retrieve the gun which was in its holster. Ms. Alderman was further injured as she attempted to stop Plaintiff from taking the gun. According to her statement, Ms. Alderman did not take the gun out of its holster, as Plaintiff claims, but only attempted to stop Plaintiff from taking the gun from her vehicle.
Plaintiff and Plaintiff's brother allegedly refused to give Desk Sergeant Campbell their statements of what happened. In Desk Sergeant Campbell's presence, Ms. Alderman allegedly told Plaintiff's brother "I'm tired of your family hitting me" to which Plaintiff's brother allegedly responded
Desk Sergeant Campbell, whom Plaintiff claims knew Ms. Alderman personally because her mother used to work at Hendry County Sheriff's Department, consulted with Investigator Ed Campbell regarding Ms. Alderman's statement. Investigator Campbell arrested Plaintiff on February 18, 1994 and allegedly told him that his army career was over. Investigator Campbell also allegedly told Plaintiff that he was going to spend 10 years in jail for the charges being made against him.
The charges against Plaintiff were first degree burglary of a conveyance, grand theft of a firearm, and battery. On August 16, 1994, the state attorney filed a nolle prosequi of all charges at the request of the alleged victim, Ms. Alderman.
Plaintiff's father, a Lee County Sheriff's Officer, traveled to Hendry County Jail, where Plaintiff was being held, and talked to Sheriff Vaughn and other employees of the Sheriff. Plaintiff was then released and was told that the case was over and that nothing further would be done concerning the case.
On February 19, 1994, Plaintiff spoke with Lieutenant Jim Roy and attempted to file a formal complaint regarding the way he was treated on the previous day. Plaintiff claims that Lieutenant Roy refused to allow Plaintiff to file a formal complaint, stated that Plaintiff should still be in his jail and further more, told Plaintiff that his army career was over.
The Sheriff's office later presented Susan Alderman's affidavit to the state attorney's office, who filed an Information against Plaintiff (Dkt. 14, Exhibit B). On April 11, 1994, Judge James Sloan determined that probable cause existed to hold Plaintiff for trial (Dkt. 14, Exhibit C).
Six weeks after Plaintiff's return to his army base in Savannah, Georgia, he was approached by his base commander who told him that there was a warrant for his arrest out of Hendry County, Florida. Plaintiff was shocked, humiliated, scared and angry. Plaintiff took a temporary leave from his army base and turned himself in to the Hendry County Jail.
After hiring a criminal defense attorney in the amount of $2,500.00 and posting a $1,500.00 bond, Plaintiff returned to his army camp in Savannah, Georgia. Plaintiff was told that a felony conviction would destroy his accrued benefits and that such a conviction would have him kicked out of the army. Plaintiff claims that he suffered mental worry and anguish until August 16, 1994, when the State Attorney's Office, as a result of Ms. Alderman's...
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McCray v. City of Dothan
...to arrest McCray. "A substantive element of the claim of malicious prosecution is the absence of probable cause." Smith v. Vaughn, 946 F.Supp. 957, 962 (M.D.Fla.1996). Stated differently, "if there are undisputed facts in the record establishing that the defendant had probable cause to purs......