Smith v. Vernon County

• Decision Date: 24 May 1905
• Parties: SMITH v. VERNON COUNTY.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

87 S.W. 949

188 Mo. 501.

SMITH v. VERNON COUNTY.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

May 24, 1905.

REWARDS — ISSUANCE BY COUNTY COURTS — COMPLIANCE WITH CONDITIONS — PAYMENT TO OFFICERS — RELIANCE ON OFFER.

1. Rev. St. 1899, § 2474, authorizes the county court to offer a standing reward for the "apprehension and arrest" of any person committing a felony in the county, but prohibits the payment of the reward until the final conviction of the felon. A county court offered a reward for the "apprehension and conviction" of a felon. Held that, construing the offer with the statute under which it was made, it constituted an offer to pay a reward after conviction for the apprehension of the felon, and was complied with by a claimant who made such apprehension on his own initiative, and at his own expense and hazard, and put him in the hands of the proper officer, and gave evidence at the trial from which a conviction resulted.

2. The fact that the claimant of a reward offered by the county court for the apprehension of a felon, pursuant to Rev. St. 1899, § 2474, was paid his witness fees for attending and testifying at the trial, does not preclude him from recovering the reward.

3. A policeman of a municipality in one state is not, by reason of his official position, precluded from claiming and recovering a reward offered by the authorities of another state for the apprehension of a fugitive from justice, whom he arrested on his own initiative, and at his own expense and hazard, without being under any duty to do so.

4. One who apprehends a felon before the offer of a reward, and delivers him over to the proper authorities without knowledge of or reliance on the reward, is not entitled to such reward.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Vernon County; H. C. Timmonds, Judge.

Action by Ed Smith against Vernon county. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

A. J. King, for appellant.

Scott & Bowker, for respondent.

LAMM, J.

This cause comes here by virtue of article 6 of the state Constitution, as amended in 1884. See section 5 of said amendment. Lying in small compass, few, simple, and substantially agreed to, the record facts are as follows: Smith on the 14th day of July, 1901, was a member of the police force of Council Bluffs, Iowa, and there is evidence indicating that he was also at the time engaged in the detective business along lines not covered by his official duties as such policeman. On the 3d day of July, 1901, A. D. Paxton was murdered in Vernon county, Mo., by one Alva Johnson, who fled the country and became a fugitive from justice. At some time undisclosed by the record, but between said date and the 15th of July, the state of Missouri offered a reward for his capture. On the 15th day of July, 1901, appellant county through its county court offered a similar reward in the following terms: "The county court of Vernon county, Missouri, hereby offers a reward of $100.00 for the apprehension and conviction of the murderer of A. D. Paxton, which occurred on July 3, 1901." This offer was published by being spread of record. On the day before this offer, to wit, on Sunday, the 14th day of July, Smith became aware of the receipt of a letter for Alva Johnson at the post office at Council Bluffs. The record is silent as to how he became aware of the fact that a murder had been committed in Vernon county, or that there was any ground for connecting Johnson with the commission of that crime. Johnson, it seems, had sent to the Council Bluffs post office by a messenger for his mail, and Smith learned of his whereabouts at a distant point in the country by the inquiries and disclosures of the messenger. Armed with this information, on his own initiative he went 14 miles into the country, found Johnson on a farm, took him into custody on suspicion (without a warrant so far as the record discloses), and caused him to be confined in the city jail at Council Bluffs and held pending inquiry. For some cause not disclosed, on the afternoon of the next day, the 15th, he telephoned the sheriff of Vernon county, and through him was informed that Johnson was wanted, and on what account. On hearing Johnson was in custody, and acting alone on the strength of information derived from Smith and the arrest made by him, the said sheriff, on the night of July 15th, was induced thereby to go to Council Bluffs, and on the next day, or the one after that, identified Johnson, and thereupon Smith turned over his prisoner for the purpose of having him taken to Missouri and prosecuted for the Paxton murder. Thereat said sheriff brought Johnson to Vernon county, where, on the 19th of July, a warrant was procured to be issued and served upon Johnson. On the same day an information was filed in the Vernon circuit court charging Johnson with murder in the first degree. In the following October he was tried and convicted of a degree of manslaughter on said information, Smith attending as a witness, testifying against him, and claiming, and afterwards receiving, witness fees for his attendance; and this conviction remains unappealed from.

The record is silent as to the date Smith became aware that the county, as well as the state, had offered a reward. It is certain the Vernon county sheriff, though he knew of the state reward prior to his Iowa trip, did not know of the county reward until after his return to Vernon county with Johnson, and therefore could not have disclosed the latter fact to Smith when in Iowa, and there is nothing in the record showing that Smith knew of the reward in question until some time after he turned over his prisoner. Smith claimed, and was paid, the state reward. The county court refused payment. On such refusal Smith sued, and, on proof of facts above outlined, the court below gave judgment for him; the county appealing. At the trial plaintiff asked the court to declare the law to be that on the facts proved he was entitled to recover, and defendant asked the court to declare the law to be the converse. The court gave plaintiff's and refused defendant's instruction. In this court appellant insists the cause should be reversed because (1) the evidence failed to show that respondent had complied with the conditions of the reward offered by the county; (2) because plaintiff was a police officer at the time, and was not entitled to a reward for the performance of his duty; and (3) because the apprehension of Johnson was prior to the offer, without a knowledge and not made on the faith of the reward by the county. Of these in their order.

1. To be entitled to recovery, one claiming a reward for the return of lost or stolen goods, or the mere apprehension, or the apprehension and conviction, of a criminal, or for information leading to either, must establish his substantial compliance with all the conditions of the offer of reward. Lovejoy v. Ry., 53 Mo. App. 386, and cases cited; Shuey v. U. S., 92 U. S. 73, 23 L. Ed. 697; Ralls County v. Stephens et al. (interpleaders), 104 Mo. App. 115, 78 S. W. 291. But, conceding the foregoing fundamental proposition, there would seem to be no merit in appellant's contention, for the reasons following: The statute authorizing a county court to offer and pay a reward reads as follows (section 2474, Rev. St. Mo. 1899): "Whenever the county court of any county in this state, or any two judges thereof in vacation, shall be satisfied that any felony has been committed in said county, such court or judges may offer a standing reward of not exceeding five hundred dollars for the apprehension and arrest of the person or persons committing the same, which reward shall be paid out of the county treasury; but in no instance shall any reward be paid to any person who shall be entitled thereto until final conviction of the defendant." Starting out with the assumptions (1) that the county court had no power to offer a reward for the arrest and conviction of a felon, except such as may be found in the statute (24 Am. & Eng. Ency. 944, 945), and that (2) such county court had no power to go beyond and enlarge the terms of the statute in an offer of a reward for the arrest of one committing a felony, it will be seen that the statute is a warrant of authority to the county court to offer a certain kind of a reward, to wit, a reward "for the apprehension and arrest of the person or persons committing the same"; the word "apprehension" and the word "arrest" having been construed by this court in Cummings v. Clinton County, 181 Mo. 162, 79 S. W. 1127, to be interchangeable terms, "arrest" meaning the same as "apprehension." It will be seen, further, the statute does not contemplate that the party apprehending or arresting a felon had the duty resting on his shoulders of not only turning the criminal over to the law, but also of convicting him. The duty of conviction, after the felon is produced, is left by the statute where reason and law place it, in so far as a county reward is concerned; that is to say, upon the proper officers, in the proper court, and with the proper instrumentalities all under the wise safeguards of the law. Thornton v. R. R., 42 Mo. App., loc. cit. 64. The ends of justice, however, are reached by the proviso in the statute to the effect that such reward shall not be paid out of the county treasury until after the final conviction. This proviso not only protects the state from imposition, but it compels the surrender of the prisoner after his apprehension, stimulates the interest of the reward claimant in the prosecution, tends to secure his testimony as a witness if he possess any knowledge advantageous to the state, and, going beyond a bare arrest, it tends to produce the ultimate result aimed at, to wit, a conviction.

When Vernon county offered a reward, as it did, "for the apprehension and conviction" of the murderer of A. D. Paxton, it is not fair to conclude that the word "conviction," used in the offer, was used in any other sense or for...