Smith v. Wash. State Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 26 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 45479–3–II.,45479–3–II. |
| Citation | 359 P.3d 867,189 Wash.App. 839 |
| Parties | Joyce M. SMITH, individually and as Personal Representative for the Estate of James W. Smith; Izetta Dillingham, as Limited Guardian Ad Litem for the minor children, Ja'Mari Smith, Janaja Smith, and Jamae Smith; and Sharee Dammell, as Limited Guardian Ad Litem for the minor child Shalyse Smith, Appellants, v. WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; and John and Jane Doe (1–10), Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Thaddeus Phillip Martin IV, Attorney at Law, Lakewood, WA, Paul Alexander Lindenmuth, Ben F. Barcus & Associates PLLC, Tacoma, WA, for Appellants.
Garth Ahearn, Office of the Attorney General, Tacoma, WA, for Respondents.
¶ 1 Joyce Smith, individually and in her capacity as personal representative of the estate of her husband James Smith,1 appeals from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in the Department of Corrections' (DOC) favor. The Estate argues that DOC negligently supervised an offender on community custody, causing the offender to murder James Smith. We conclude that because DOC promptly issued an arrest warrant for the offender after he absconded and it had no information about his whereabouts, DOC had no further duty to control the offender. Additionally, the Estate failed to establish a prima facie case of proximate cause for any alleged negligent supervision before the offender absconded. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment to DOC.
¶ 2 Antwane Goolsby pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree. He received a sentence of 56.25 months in prison and 18 to 36 months of community custody. Goolsby was released from prison on January 21, 2009. Judith Lang, a DOC community corrections officer, supervised Goolsby's community custody.
¶ 3 Lang understood that Goolsby was a “high risk offender” and she was “skeptical about [his] motivation for change.” Clerk's Papers (CP) at 62. Goolsby had gang affiliations, mental health issues, and an extensive criminal history.2 Although Goolsby required mental health medications, he had not been on his medication for a month before his release. Because of his criminal history and his “behaviors while incarcerated,” Lang believed that Goolsby was unsuitable to be released in the community. CP at 723.
¶ 4 DOC categorized Goolsby as a “High Violent, untreated, Level II Sex Offender.” CP at 300. DOC requires its officers to have three “face to face” contacts and one “collateral” contact per month with offenders at this level. CP at 180. Two of the three “face to face” contacts must be outside the DOC office. CP at 180. At no time during Goolsby's community custody did Lang contact Goolsby in person outside the DOC office. Goolsby received no mental health medications.
¶ 5 The terms of Goolsby's community custody forbade him from using drugs or associating with drug users. He had to obey all laws and all DOC's instructions. Lang instructed Goolsby to report to DOC daily, to stay in DOC-approved housing, and to stay in King County.
¶ 6 Goolsby had inconsistent compliance. Goolsby reported to DOC on most days when he was not detained.3
Goolsby also entered a chemical dependency treatment program, but failed to attend most of his sessions. Goolsby lied to DOC about where he resided; he never stayed in a DOC-approved location. Instead, he stayed at a motel where he associated with a fellow offender and drug user. Goolsby may also have been “prostituting girls out and/or dealing from motel room.” CP at 54.
¶ 7 DOC arrested and detained Goolsby twice for violating his community custody terms. On his first day of community custody, January 22, 2009, Goolsby walked away from the homeless shelter where Lang had left him. DOC requested a warrant for Goolsby's arrest.4 Four days later, when Goolsby reported to DOC, he was arrested. On that same day, before his arrest, Goolsby submitted to a drug test that came back positive for marijuana. Goolsby was detained until a DOC hearing on February 18. The hearing officer found Goolsby guilty of violating his community custody conditions, and imposed 21 days confinement as a sanction, with credit for time served. Lang alerted the DOC Community Response Unit (CRU) in Tacoma that Goolsby was out of jail and could not be in Pierce County.5
¶ 8 Goolsby's second arrest occurred on March 6, when a DOC agent visited Goolsby at his motel room. There, a man later identified as a fellow gang member of Goolsby's ran to the toilet and attempted to flush a baggie containing cocaine. Goolsby attempted to block the agent from recovering the baggie. The DOC agent immediately detained Goolsby. Pending Goolsby's violation hearing, Lang reported to the hearing officer in a report of “Alleged Violations” that Goolsby's “activities outside the office are indicative of his continued criminal thinking,” and that his “behavior and his recent affiliations” are “truly a concern for community safety.” CP at 300. Lang recommended that Goolsby be sanctioned to 60 days confinement. Instead, the hearing officer imposed 16 days as a sanction, with credit for time served. Because he had served all of his time for the violation, Goolsby was released on March 23 after the hearing. DOC warned Goolsby not to reside in a motel and Goolsby stated that he intended to “reside homeless in Seattle.” CP at 53–54.
¶ 9 Goolsby's last contact with DOC occurred on April 10. On that day, a DOC officer confronted Goolsby because he had been lying about staying in a DOC-approved shelter. The officer warned Goolsby that “failure to reside at [the shelter] would result in violation and possibly arrest.” CP at 50. Goolsby agreed to stay at the shelter, but absconded from supervision the following day. On April 16, DOC requested an arrest warrant for Goolsby, which issued the next day. Goolsby was missing until August 5, when he shot and killed James Smith in Tacoma.
¶ 10 The Estate sued DOC, claiming that DOC had negligently supervised Goolsby. The Estate's expert, William Stough, declared that “intensive supervision, combined with treatment” has a statistically significant downward effect on recidivism. CP at 154. Stough opined that DOC had failed to enforce Goolsby's community custody conditions and that DOC's omissions “directly led to him absconding, supervision,” and led to James Smith's death. CP at 157. Stough further opined that if DOC had done more to enforce Goolsby's conditions, “Goolsby would have been under control or incarcerated and would not have absconded and ‘blown off supervision completely.’ ” CP at 157. Finally, Stough opined that strict enforcement of supervision and holding offenders accountable prevents absconding and recidivism and would have done so in this case.
¶ 11 DOC moved for summary judgment dismissal of the Estate's claim for negligent supervision. After hearing argument and considering the proffered evidence both in support of and in opposition to the motion, the trial court granted DOC's motion for summary judgment. The Estate appeals.
¶ 12 The Estate argues that DOC negligently supervised Goolsby, causing him to murder James Smith. “The elements of a negligence cause of action are the existence of a duty to the plaintiff, breach of the duty, and injury to plaintiff proximately caused by the breach.”Hertog ex rel. S.A.H. v. City of Seattle, 138 Wash.2d 265, 275, 979 P.2d 400 (1999). Initially, DOC owed a duty to supervise Goolsby; however that duty ended when Goolsby absconded supervision and DOC issued a warrant for his arrest. DOC is not liable for its alleged inaction after Goolsby absconded because its duty to supervise him ended. As for DOC's alleged negligent supervision before Goolsby absconded, we conclude that the Estate failed to establish a prima facie case of proximate cause. Therefore, the trial court did not err by granting DOC's summary judgment motion to dismiss the Estate's negligent supervision claim.
¶ 13 We review a trial court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Hertog, 138 Wash.2d at 275, 979 P.2d 400. Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c) ; Hertog, 138 Wash.2d at 275, 979 P.2d 400. We consider all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Vallandigham v. Clover Park Sch. Dist. No. 400, 154 Wash.2d 16, 26, 109 P.3d 805 (2005). But we do not weigh evidence or resolve factual disputes. Babcock v. State, 116 Wash.2d 596, 598–99, 809 P.2d 143 (1991).
¶ 14 The parties bear different burdens in a summary judgment motion. The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact.
Atherton Condo. Apartment—Owners Ass'n Bd. of Dirs. v. Blume Dev. Co., 115 Wash.2d 506, 516, 799 P.2d 250 (1990). If the moving party is the defendant and meets its burden,6 then the inquiry shifts to the party with the burden of proof at trial to present admissible evidence to establish a material factual dispute. Atherton, 115 Wash.2d at 516, 799 P.2d 250 ; Young v. Key Pharm., Inc., 112 Wash.2d 216, 225, 770 P.2d 182 (1989). “If, at this point, the plaintiff ‘fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,’ then the trial, court should grant the motion.” Young, 112 Wash.2d at 225, 770 P.2d 182 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ). In such a situation, a failure of proof “ ‘concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial’ ”. Young, 112 Wash.2d at 225, 770 P.2d 182 (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ).
¶ 15 “ ‘Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish a...
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