Smith v. Washington Sheraton Corp.
| Decision Date | 10 February 1998 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 96-7228,96-7238,s. 96-7228 |
| Parties | , 39 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1327 Mary Jo SMITH, Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. WASHINGTON SHERATON CORPORATION, Appellant/Cross-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia(94cv01472).
Edward J. Lopata, Baltimore, MD, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant/cross-appellees.
Stephen V. Wehner, Washington, DC, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellee/cross-appellant.
Before: WALD, WILLIAMS, and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.
On June 2, 1993, the plaintiff, Mary Jo Smith, sustained head injuries when she fell off a ramp leading from a parking garage into a lobby of the Washington Sheraton Hotel. Invoking the district court's diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, Smith named as defendants responsible for the condition of the ramp ITT Sheraton Corporation; Washington Sheraton Corporation; Sheraton Operating Corporation; Woodley Road Associates, Inc.; John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company; and Sumitomo Life Realty. 1 At the close of all the evidence, the attorney jointly representing these six defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a). The district court granted the motion except with respect to Washington Sheraton Corporation, which became the sole remaining defendant. The jury found Washington Sheraton Corporation guilty of negligence and awarded Smith $175,000.
Thereafter, Washington Sheraton Corporation renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial or remittitur, arguing that Smith had failed to present any evidence showing who owned or controlled the ramp. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b) and 59. The district court denied the motion.
In its appeal, Washington Sheraton Corporation raises sufficiency of the evidence and, in the alternative, seeks a new trial on the basis of the "egregious conduct" of plaintiff's counsel. Brief for Appellant at 17. Smith cross-appeals from the judgment in favor of the five other defendants.
The governing legal principles are well known. Our review of district court decisions on motions for judgment as a matter of law is de novo. We consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Scott v. District of Columbia, 101 F.3d 748, 752-53 (D.C.Cir.1996). We do not assess the weight of the evidence, only its sufficiency. The jury's verdict will stand unless "the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are so one-sided that reasonable men and women could not disagree on the verdict." Id. at 753. But the evidence must be "more than merely colorable"; it must be "significantly probative." Siegel v. Mazda Motor Corp., 878 F.2d 435, 437 (D.C.Cir.1989).
Because this is a diversity case, the substantive tort law of the District of Columbia controls. See Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 553 (D.C.Cir.1993). The standard of care owed by an owner or occupier of land is "reasonable care under all of the circumstances." Sandoe v. Lefta Assocs., 559 A.2d 732, 738 (D.C.1988). To recover against either an owner or occupier of land, the plaintiff must show "that the defendant had notice--either actual or constructive--of the present existence of an allegedly dangerous condition." Croce v. Hall, 657 A.2d 307, 311 (D.C.1995). While generally a landlord is not responsible for injuries caused by conditions developing after the lessee takes possession, a third party may recover against the lessor or landlord of a property leased for public purposes if the party demonstrates that the injury was caused by a "condition existing when the lessee took possession" and that the lessor "knew or should have known of the condition and realized or should have realized the unreasonable risk" involved. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 359 (1965); see also Daly v. Toomey, 212 F.Supp. 475, 478-79 (D.D.C.1963), aff'd sub nom. Muldrow v. Daly, 329 F.2d 886 (D.C.Cir.1964); Hilleary v. Earle Restaurant, Inc., 109 F.Supp. 829 (D.D.C.1952). A party who operates the premises but is neither the owner nor the lessee may also have a duty of reasonable care. See F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Stoddard, 156 A.2d 229 (D.C.1959).
We will take up first Smith's claim that the district court erred in granting judgment for Sheraton Operating Corporation. Counsel for the six defendants told the court: "[W]e would move for judgment as a matter of law as to all six of the defendants that I am representing because there is a complete lack of evidence in the plaintiff's case as to which, if any, of these corporations own" the hotel. Trial Transcript at 967. Defense counsel then acknowledged that one witness had testified to working for the Sheraton Operating Corporation and so he assumed "for all the other five defendants, our motion should be granted." Id. at 1014. The court responded: "[T]he only possible defendant that the plaintiffs [sic] have brought to the attention of the jury may be the Washington Sheraton Corporation ... everyone other than Washington Sheraton Corporation is out of the case." Id. at 1079-80.
Given this exchange, the court must have meant to keep Sheraton Operating Corporation in the case and to grant judgment for the other five defendants, including Washington Sheraton Corporation. The only evidence of ownership or control brought to the jury's attention related to Sheraton Operating Corporation. A witness for the plaintiff had testified that he was the director of engineering at the Washington Sheraton Hotel and was employed by Sheraton Operating Corporation. He further testified that the engineering department was responsible for the maintenance of ramps leading from the garage to the hotel.
Because there was evidence of Sheraton Operating Corporation's control of the premises, it should not have been removed from the case for lack of such evidence. The court plainly intended for it to remain, although the order stated something quite different. We therefore reverse and remand for a new
trial against Sheraton Operating Corporation.
We shall deal next with appellant Washington Sheraton Corporation. In the confusion caused by the similarity of the defendants' names, it alone wound up before the jury. On appeal, Washington Sheraton Corporation argues that the district court erred in submitting the case to the jury because Smith "failed to introduce evidence of who owned or controlled the ramp." Brief for Appellant at 7. Washington Sheraton Corporation points out, correctly, that the only defendant mentioned in trial testimony was Sheraton Operating Corporation. Id. at 5. In other words, because the evidence implicated only Sheraton Operating Corporation, the verdict against Washington Sheraton Corporation cannot stand.
We believe Washington Sheraton Corporation's post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law should have been granted, but for a reason other than the one just mentioned. Smith's case failed not on the element of ownership or control--as we shall discuss in a moment--but on the element of knowledge. Smith presented no evidence that Washington Sheraton Corporation knew or should have known of the allegedly dangerous condition of the ramp. See Croce, 657 A.2d at 311. Judgment as a matter of law may be rendered if one party fails to present evidence on a material issue. See Ferguson v. F.R. Winkler GMBH & Co., 79 F.3d 1221 (D.C.Cir.1996); McFarlane v. Caterpillar, Inc., 974 F.2d 176 (D.C.Cir.1992).
Having concluded that the district court erred in denying Washington Sheraton Corporation's motion for judgment as a matter of law, we have three choices. We may enter judgment for that party, or we may order a new trial, or we may remand the case to the district court to determine whether a new trial is appropriate. See Scott, 101 F.3d at 760 (citing Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 329, 87 S.Ct. 1072, 1080, 18 L.Ed.2d 75 (1967)); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 50(d). For the reasons next discussed, we order a new trial.
Washington Sheraton Corporation defended at trial, and again on appeal, on the basis that there was a "total lack of proof" of its ownership or control of the hotel. Trial Transcript at 1003; see also Brief for Appellant at 9. But this ignores the pretrial order in the case, an order designed to "control the subsequent course of the action." FED. R. CIV. P. 16(e). Smith's pretrial statement described the defendants as "all either owners, operators, or parent corporations of the Washington Sheraton Hotel." The Sheraton defendants' pretrial statement stated that Sheraton Operating Corporation The Joint Venture consists of John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, Sumitomo Life Realty, and Washington Sheraton Corporation. 2 See Defendants' Answer to First Amended Complaint. Under the heading "Statement of Defenses," the Sheraton defendants listed four defenses which are so brief they may be set out in their entirety.
1. Plaintiff's claim is barred by her contributory negligence in failing to see and heed the clear warning sign on the door leading to the elevator lobby on the third floor of the Park Tower.
2. Plaintiff cannot show how the accident occurred because she has no recollection of how it actually happened and therefore she cannot prove proximate cause, which is an essential element of her claim.
3. There is no evidence of wanton or reckless conduct to support a claim of punitive damages.
4. Plaintiff's damage claims are not supported by competent...
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