Ferguson v. F.R. Winkler GMBH & Co. KG

• Decision Date: 22 May 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-7100,95-7100
• Citation: 79 F.3d 1221
• Parties: , Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,579 Bennie FERGUSON and Mary Ferguson, Appellees v. F.R. WINKLER GMBH & CO. KG, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 1221

79 F.3d 1221

316 U.S.App.D.C. 421, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,579

Bennie FERGUSON and Mary Ferguson, Appellees v. F.R. WINKLER GMBH & CO. KG, Appellant.

No. 95-7100.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Jan. 18, 1996.

Decided April 5, 1996.

Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing In Banc Denied May 22, 1996.

[316 U.S.App.D.C. 422] Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 91cv02397).

Ronald G. DeWald, argued the cause for appellant, with whom Leonard L. Lipshultz, Silver Spring, MD, was on the briefs.

James M. Hanny, argued the cause for appellees, with whom Michelle A. Parfitt, Washington, DC, was on the brief.

Before: WILLIAMS, GINSBURG and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge:

In this products-liability action, plaintiff Bennie Ferguson claimed that defendant F.R. Winkler GMBH & Co. KG ("Winkler") was strictly liable for an injury allegedly caused by a design defect in bakery equipment that Winkler manufactured. Winkler moved for judgment as a matter of law both at the close of the evidence and after the jury's verdict against Winkler. The district court denied these motions as well as a motion for a new trial. Winkler now asks us to reverse any of these denials. Because the evidence presented does not adequately demonstrate that the equipment was unreasonably dangerous when it left Winkler's control, we do reverse the district court's denial of Winkler's motion for judgment as a matter of law and direct the district court to enter judgment for Winkler.

BACKGROUND

Appellant Winkler designs and manufactures various equipment for baking production lines. One component of this equipment, and the focus of this litigation, is the string-line proofer, which transports shaped pieces of dough from one step of the production process to another. According to Winkler's design of the proofer, the pieces of dough rest on trays attached to a moving chain, which, along with the gears and gear sprockets that drive the chain, are enclosed within a large metal duct. Removable panels along the duct permit limited access to the internal machinery for maintenance purposes.

Winkler has manufactured proofers with at least two different types of panels. The older proofer design had panels that were bolted onto the duct, and could only be removed and reinstalled through use of tools. Upon learning that maintenance workers did not always bolt these panels back onto the proofer when they were finished working, however, Winkler replaced these bolted panels with panels that could be removed and reinstalled by hand. On both the older and newer designs, Winkler included the same safety mechanism: an emergency shut-off button that, when pressed, would stop the line. In the proofer's operations manual, Winkler cautioned users to shut down the line prior to reaching inside the proofer to clean it. Winkler also made a practice of placing a similar warning on the machine itself.

Ottenberg Bakery, a mass producer of baked goods, received the newer model of the Winkler proofer, complete with operations manual and warning sign, in 1975. In using the proofer, Ottenberg grew frustrated with the occasional "double"--two dough pieces that were not fully separated on a single tray--and "hanger"--a piece that did not rest entirely on one of the moving trays--that would appear within the proofer. Not only did the presence of doubles and hangers decrease the number of sellable goods, but too many of the latter would periodically clog the line, as dough would accrete to the machinery with which it came in contact. Although workers could stop the line in order to remove the dough before it could jam the proofer, any such delay reduced the productivity of the bakery.

In an attempt to limit the effects of these "dough anomalies," Ottenberg replaced an exterior panel at one end of the proofer with a hinged, plexiglass door. This door permitted workers to reach into the interior of the proofer and salvage hangers or separate doubles, either by hand or by use of a long rod designed for these purposes. Ottenberg did not add any safety mechanism that would automatically stop the line when the door was opened, and workers became accustomed to reaching into the moving proofer because Ottenberg discouraged shutdowns of the line.

Appellee Bennie Ferguson, an employee of Ottenberg since 1971, had worked with the proofer since Ottenberg received it in 1975. On September 25, 1988, he opened the plexiglass door installed by Ottenberg and reached into the proofer to clear some pieces of dough, as he had done many times before. This time, however, his arm became caught in the moving machinery within the proofer. The accident permanently disabled Ferguson's upper arm.

Ferguson sued a number of parties, including Winkler, Winkler International Corporation, Winkler USA, and Bakers Equipment Wholesalers, Inc. He completed trial only with Winkler, whom he claimed was strictly liable for the defective design of the proofer and for failing to warn Ferguson adequately of the dangers of reaching into the moving proofer. After the district court denied various efforts by Winkler to take the verdict away from the jury, the jury awarded Ferguson $679,173 for the design defect and awarded Ferguson's wife $230,000 for her loss of consortium. Winkler then renewed its motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, but the district court denied each after oral argument.

Winkler now appeals the denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law, claiming that Ferguson assumed the risk when he reached into the moving proofer, that the proofer, as shipped by Winkler, did not suffer a design defect, that any unreasonable danger resulted from Ottenberg's alterations to the proofer, and that Ferguson did not need additional warning from Winkler as he was fully aware of the danger involved in the moving equipment. Winkler also revives its motion for a new trial, contending that the judge should have given a more specific instruction regarding Ottenberg's modifications of the proofer.

DISCUSSION

We review the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo. See McFarlane v. Caterpillar, Inc., 974 F.2d 176, 178 (D.C.Cir.1992). We will reverse the district court only if "reasonable men could not disagree" that the verdict was incorrect. McNeal v. Hi-Lo Powered Scaffolding, Inc., 836 F.2d 637, 641 (D.C.Cir.1988) (quoting Carter v. Duncan-Huggins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225, 1227 (D.C.Cir.1984)). Even though we resolve evidentiary disputes in favor of Ferguson whenever reasonable, see id., the evidence on which the verdict relied must have been "more than merely colorable," but "significantly probative if the ... verdict is to stand." McFarlane, 974 F.2d at 179 (quoting Siegel v. Mazda Motor Corp., 878 F.2d 435, 437 (D.C.Cir.1989)).

To determine whether the evidence presented was sufficiently probative to sustain a verdict arising within our diversity jurisdiction, we look to the law of the locality in which the district court that rendered the judgment sits. See Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 553 (D.C.Cir.1993) (noting that we have extended the Erie doctrine to the District of Columbia). According to the law of the District of Columbia, a manufacturer cannot be liable for a design defect unless the plaintiff proves that the product that caused the injury was sold in "an unreasonably dangerous condition." Warner Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Boston, 654 A.2d 1272, 1276 (D.C.App.1995). The evidence, even taken in the light most favorable to Ferguson, demonstrates that Winkler not only limited potential dangers of the proofer through the design of the machine, but also extensively and explicitly warned persons not to misuse the proofer in a manner that might expose them to any remaining risk. Because Ferguson did not adequately demonstrate that the proofer was unreasonably dangerous when sold, we hold that the district court should have granted Winkler's motion for judgment as a matter of law.

A. Did the proofer have an unreasonably dangerous design defect?

This past year, the D.C. Court of Appeals reviewed its first design-defect claim based on a theory of strict liability in tort. Id. Warner Fruehauf adopted a four-step test for determining whether a seller should be strictly liable:

1) the seller [must have been] engaged in the business of selling the product that caused the harm;

2) the product [must have been] sold in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or user;

3) the product [must have been] one which the seller expected to and did reach the ... consumer or user without any substantial change from the condition in which it was sold; and

4) the defect [must have been] a direct and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.

Id. Warner Fruehauf further analyzed what constituted an unreasonably dangerous defect through a form of the commonly used "risk-utility balancing test," which looks to " 'the risks, costs and benefits of the product in question and alternative designs' " and compares " 'the magnitude of the danger from the product [to] the costs of avoiding the danger.' " Id. at 1276 (quoting Hull v. Eaton Corp., 825 F.2d 448, 453 (D.C.Cir.1987)). Implicit in this analysis is that a court should weigh only those risks of a product against which a manufacturer has some duty to guard a worker, including those risks that emerge from the normal use of the product or objectively foreseeable misuse of the product. See, e.g., Payne v. Soft Sheen Products, Inc., 486 A.2d 712, 726 (D.C.App.1985); Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir.1988) (weighing, under Maryland law, only risks incurred from normal use and "the incidental and attendant consequences that accompany normal use" (quoting Payne, 486 A.2d at 726)); cf. Young v. Up-Right Scaffolds, Inc., 637 F.2d 810, 814 (D.C.Cir.1980) (finding...