Smith v. Whitmore
Decision Date | 06 October 1959 |
Docket Number | No. 12867.,12867. |
Parties | George SMITH, Plaintiff, v. Max C. WHITMORE, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, Appellee (Pervis Lee PUE, Jr., Third-Party Defendant, Appellant). |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Tom P. Monteverde, Philadelphia, Pa. (Lynwood F. Blount, Philadelphia, Pa., Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, Josephine H. Klein, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for third-party defendant, appellant.
Elston C. Cole, Philadelphia, Pa. (Charles Wright, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for plaintiff.
Before GOODRICH, KALODNER and HASTIE, Circuit Judges.
This appeal involves the issue of application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C., to the provisions of the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act in effect in Pennsylvania ("Uniform Act").1
Plaintiff George Smith instituted suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania2 against Max C. Whitmore for recovery of damages for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident which occurred in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.3
Pursuant to Rule 14 of the Federal Rules, Whitmore impleaded Pervis Lee Pue, Jr. as a third-party defendant4 seeking contribution in the event that he and Pue were found negligent. Plaintiff never amended his complaint to include Pue as a party defendant. The jury returned a general verdict for Smith against Whitmore in the sum of $19,500 which was never appealed. In returning its general verdict the jury, in response to an interrogatory, found that Pue was "guilty of negligence which was a substantial factor in causing the accident".
The District Court entered the following judgment:
On January 22, 1959, third-party defendant moved, pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules, for an Order amending the foregoing Judgment to read as follows:
"Judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant in the sum of Nineteen Thousand Five Hundred ($19,500.00) Dollars and in favor of third-party plaintiff and against third-party defendant for contribution."
The following Order was thereafter entered by the District Court:
"And Now this 29th day of January, 1959, an Order is entered amending the Judgment entered on January 13, 1959, to read Judgment in favor of plaintiff, George Smith, and against defendant, Max C. Whitmore, in the sum of $19,500.00, and in favor of third-party plaintiff and against third-party defendant in the sum of $9,750.00, for contribution."
It is from this money judgment of $9,750 against him that the third-party defendant has appealed. He contends that it is erroneous in that the Uniform Act precludes the entry of a money judgment for contribution until such time as the third-party plaintiff has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability and cites in support Section 2 of the Act which provides as follows:
"(1) The right of contribution exists among joint tortfeasors; (2) A joint tortfeasor is not entitled to a money judgment for contribution until he has by payment discharged the common liability or has paid more than his pro rata share thereof. * * *" 12 P.S. § 2083.
In reply, the third-party plaintiff argues in substance that although the Uniform Act creates a substantive right to contribution among tortfeasors its further provision that a joint tortfeasor is not entitled to a money judgment for contribution until he has paid more than his pro rata share of the judgment against him is merely "procedural" and that while a federal court is required to apply the substantive law of the states5 it is not required to apply its procedural rules and will apply instead the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On the latter score, says the third-party plaintiff, the judgment in the instant case is valid by reason of Rule 14(a) and 49(b) of the Federal Rules, since the third-party defendant was impleaded under the provisions of the former and Rule 49(b) controls where a general verdict is accompanied by interrogatories, as here.
We have not had occasion, heretofore, to rule upon the precise issue presented by this appeal. We have, however, held that "Contribution is a right arising under the substantive law of the States" and applied the holding to the Pennsylvania Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 1075, 12 P.S. § 2081, the predecessor statute to the Uniform Act under consideration. Howey v. Yellow Cab Co., 3 Cir., 1950, 181 F.2d 967, 972, affirmed 1951, sub nom. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 71 S.Ct. 399, 95 L.Ed. 523. Earlier in Sheppard v. Atlantic States Gas Co., 3 Cir., 1948, 167 F.2d 841, 844-845, we held with respect to the same Act that it was "controlling" in a joint tortfeasors contribution action. Again, in Gartner v. Lombard Bros., 3 Cir., 1952, 197 F.2d 53, 55, we stated with respect to the 1939 statute that "It is Pennsylvania law which governs here." In the cases cited the third-party defendant was impleaded by the defendant (third-party plaintiff) under Rule 14(a).
The sum of the third-party plaintiff's contention is that the Uniform Act has a "split personality"; it is "substantive" as far as it grants him the right of contribution against his joint tortfeasor, but "procedural" in so far as it conditions his right to a money judgment for contribution "until he has by payment discharged the common liability or has paid more than his pro rata share thereof. * * *"
We cannot subscribe to that contention.
By the clear terms of the Uniform Act the right of contribution and the conditions imposed as to the accrual of the right to a money judgment for contribution are substantive rights. Subsection 1 of Section 2 of the Uniform Act establishes the "right of contribution" among tortfeasors; subsection 2 of Section 2 makes payment of more than the pro rata share of the common liability a condition precedent to the accrual of the right to a money judgment for contribution.
The case books abound with decisions in accord with our view.
Thus, in Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Rosenthal, 1954, 14 N.J. 372, 102 A.2d 587, at page 591, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, with respect to a similar provision of the New Jersey contribution statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-1 et seq., said:
and at pages 593-594 of 102 A.2d:
"Joint liability is not enough; payment is of the essence of the right of action, not only under the statute but also at common law in cases where contribution may be had, De Paris v. Wilmington Trust Co., 7 Boyce 178, 30 Del. 178, 104 A. 691, 1 A.L.R. 1352 (Sup.Ct.1918) * * *." (Emphasis supplied.)
To the same effect see Sattelberger v. Telep, 1954, 14 N.J. 353, 102 A.2d 577; Mijon v. Acquaire, 1958, 51 N.J.Super. 426, 144 A.2d 161, certification denied, 1958, 28 N.J. 146, 145 A.2d 357.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in a Note to the subsection of the Uniform Act precluding a money judgment until the third-party plaintiff has paid more than his pro-rata share of the judgment, said:
The third-party plaintiff's contention that Rules 14 and 49 of the Federal Rules permit the entry of the judgment at issue is utterly without merit.
As was pointed out in D'Onofrio Construction Company v. Recon Company, 1 Cir., 1958, 255 F.2d 904, 906, Rule 14 cannot be used in a contribution proceeding "* * * to enhance the substantive rights of the original defendant over what is given by state law." To the same effect see Linkenhoger v. Owens, 5 Cir., 1950, 181 F.2d 97, at page 99, where it was said:
In Brown v. Cranston, 2 Cir., 1942, 132 F.2d 631, 633-634, 148 A.L.R. 1178 certiorari denied sub nom. Cranston v. Thompson, 1943, 319 U.S. 741, 63 S.Ct. 1028, 87 L.Ed. 1698 it was held in a contribution action that Rule 14 cannot be construed "* * * as to give the defendant a recovery which could not be obtained through any remedy available in the New York State Courts."
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